iiiii .. Thesis on Social-Fascism – Comuna Roja (wordpress.com) -- // nota-prologo ii .. hemos recibido, x email ii -- ,... no le vamos a contestar, ni opinar na de na,... solo repro. iii. x l.dema./71.15 years. -- vocero del grupo proletario de malaga.-2.000- //,... iii.

 

@@@ -- nota-prologo ii .. hemos recibido, x email ii -- ,... no le vamos a contestar, ni opinar na de na,... solo repro. iii. x l.dema./71.15 years. -- vocero del grupo proletario de malaga.-2.000-

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-- Thesis on Social-Fascism - Thesis on Social-Fascism (Tesis sobre el socialfascismo) --

a.- Thesis on Social-Fascism (wordpress.com)

b. - Thesis on Social-Fascism – Comuna Roja (wordpress.com)

Comuna Roja -- Línea Proletaria (reconstitucion.net --

Tesis sobre el socialfascismo -- Thesis on Social-Fascism (wordpress.com)

kunturchawa

18 de febrero de

[Esta es una traducción no oficial, el texto del Comité para la Reconstitución (Estado español) se puede leer en español aquí . Puede descargar la versión PDF de esta traducción haciendo clic aquí .]

“Desde la revolución proletaria en Rusia y sus victorias a escala internacional, que ni la burguesía ni los filisteos esperaban, el mundo entero se ha vuelto diferente, y la burguesía en todas partes también se ha vuelto diferente”.

Lenin

Nadie ignora que el giro hacia la derecha del panorama político en el Estado español se ha correspondido en el movimiento comunista con la expansión febril de un socialchovinismo sin complejos . Pero pocos se atreven a sacar las consecuencias últimas de un problema que ya ha surgido numerosas veces en la historia de nuestra clase . El lector de Línea Proletaria sabrá que, en los últimos años, la Línea Reconstitución (RL) ha encontrado útil la categoría de socialfascismo para explicar el hilo blanco que lleva del oportunismo (y del oportunismo obrero en particular, pero no sólo) a la desarrollo de un movimiento de masas fascista . Hoy, el oportunismo sin complejos fantasea con alambres de púas, con seducir a las fuerzas armadas, con la patria obrera y con golpear, en nombre del comunismo , a quienes —como nosotros— ofenden la bandera nacional ( rojigualda o tricolor, que es lo mismo en este punto). Sus abuelos alemanes ya se pusieron la chaqueta de húsar prusiano para ordenar a los proletarios que fueran a morir en nombre del país , y, cuando Espartaco se levantó, hicieron lo mismo para ordenar a los patriotas que lo mataran en nombre del socialismo . Sus padres, los Khrushchev, los Brezhnev y compañía, también difundieron el socialismo en Hungría, en Checoslovaquia, en Afganistán (de la misma manera que sus hijos legítimos, el ultraconservador Putin y la ultraconservadora Rusia, propagaron la descomunización en Ucrania). Y todos recibieron, entonces, el mismo adjetivo del comunismo revolucionario: socialfascistas .

No por casualidad, este término se sitúa fuertemente en primer plano en el contexto de dos de los tres grandes cambios que ha experimentado el movimiento obrero contemporáneo: el surgimiento histórico del Partido Comunista al inicio del Ciclo de Octubre (1917-1989) y la restauración del capitalismo en la URSS en los años 50, su transformación en “socialimperialista en el exterior y socialfascista en casa”, según Mao (el tercer gran giro fue la caída simbólica del Muro, a finales de los 80) . En estas coyunturas, sin embargo, el concepto de socialfascismo tuvo una proyección principalmente política, dejando a menudo en el aire la conexión de esta categoría en el cuerpo de la doctrina marxista-leninista. Y si bien nadie cuestiona verbalmente la centralidad que tiene la dictadura del proletariado o el Partido Comunista en esta corriente de pensamiento revolucionario, la noción de socialfascismo ha sido y es más problemática entre quienes se autodenominan marxista-leninistas. También entre los enemigos declarados del proletariado, cuya actitud ante el tema suele alternar entre la confusión y la sencillez. Mucho antes de su suicidio político, el joven Pablo Iglesias desafió a la Comintern de los locos años veinte, con su doctrina de clase contra clase y su uso del adjetivo socialfascista contra la socialdemocracia, y elogió a la sensata Comintern del Frente Popular, razonable y abierta. en materia de táctica política. Un consejo prudente mata más que la espada. Los revolucionarios deberían decidir no contrastar puerilmente dos capítulos de la historia de nuestra clase. También de descartar y adoptar conceptos basados ​​en el estrecho margen del cálculo político, que es el barómetro de los juicios de Iglesias sobre la Internacional Comunista (si bien el carácter ideológico-burgués de este tipo de razonamientos queda claro al considerar que la línea del Frente Popular no fue precisamente un éxito, ni siquiera desde el punto de vista del éxito político inmediato, como se desprende de su experiencia en estas tierras). Sea como fuere, la idea de socialfascismo ocupa un lugar extraño a los ojos de la mayoría que, amistosamente o desfavorablemente, habla de marxismo. Se asocia intuitivamente con el chovinismo y el nacionalismo fascista rojo , con el colaboracionismo de clases, con los lugartenientes obreros de la burguesía imperialista y también con la ciega intransigencia comunista hacia los socialdemócratas (al parecer, no exterminaron a suficientes proletarios de vanguardia para justificar que la Comintern los consideraba enemigos de clase). Al estar constituida por una mezcla de criterios empíricos, políticos, sentimentales y de otra índole, la intuición no puede sustituir la delimitación teórica y científica precisa, que es la que confiere carácter universal a una idea determinada.

El plano de análisis que mejor nos posiciona para abordar esta tarea es el de la historia . Cerrado el Ciclo de revoluciones proletarias del siglo XX, los comunistas nos encontramos en la posición adecuada para dilucidar los presupuestos, la lógica y el significado de ese concepto, así como el lugar que debe ocupar en la teoría de vanguardia que resume los requerimientos de la revolución hoy. Empecemos por algunos resultados que ya están bien asentados en el trabajo que viene realizando la RL al respecto. El Partido Comunista se caracteriza por resaltar el factor consciente como determinante en la construcción del comunismo, brindando medios y herramientas en función del objetivo último de una sociedad sin clases —de ahí que, para su (re)constitución, se requiera la forja de cuadros de vanguardia educados en una concepción integral del mundo y en la lucha contra el esquematismo y el determinismo en general, y el economicismo en particular, es esencial. La RL ha señalado esta cuestión, que el leninismo fundamenta, como la clave para el inicio del nuevo Ciclo de la Revolución Proletaria Mundial (RPM), y esto la ha llevado a centrarse, teóricamente, en la cuestión de las limitaciones históricas que han tenido. llevó a la crisis de dicho tema (Resumen del Ciclo de Octubre). Este aspecto interno es el principal. Pero de aquí podemos sacar una derivación hacia el aspecto externo, que no es otro que el reflejo en la burguesía del surgimiento del Partido Comunista, la transformación de la lucha de clases de la burguesía contra el proletariado comunista , que también da una nueva contentos con el viejo oportunismo obrero —del que ya Lenin decía que su forma más elevada es, precisamente, el socialchovinismo. En esta intersección es donde mejor podemos comprender el contenido profundo del concepto de socialfascismo y sus implicaciones.

El punto de vista de la estrategia puede resultar útil como una primera aproximación a este fenómeno histórico. La estrategia obliga a considerar todos los aspectos del problema (base elemental del análisis de clase marxista) y, además, enfatiza su relación con la intención final del actor en cuestión, del sujeto, con el orden, disposición y jerarquía de dichos elementos para lograr la meta proyectada ( tácticas-como-plan ). Y, aunque el marxismo ha definido el oportunismo como la renuncia a objetivos a largo plazo en favor de un éxito momentáneo (Engels), esta calificación hace tiempo que dejó de ser exacta en términos históricos (no necesariamente políticos). Es cierto que el reduccionismo dogmático y antimarxista que restringe a la clase obrera a su dimensión de capital variable (economismo, sindicalismo) cierra la posibilidad de esa perspectiva totalizadora, alimentándose políticamente de la reproducción ad aeternum del movimiento de resistencia y abjurando, en las palabras o de hecho, de cualquier objetivo final, como ya escribió el honesto oportunista Bernstein. Pero detenerse aquí es, hoy en día, insuficiente.

La calificación de Engels se enuncia en una época en la que el partido de los trabajadores era el partido socialdemócrata de masas . En ese contexto, el oportunismo era y no podía ser más que la absolutización de los mecanismos de esa primera configuración política del proletariado: el sindicato como eje de la organización obrera (sobre el cual se construyeron los partidos socialdemócratas nacionales) y la lucha para reformas. y por los derechos políticos como motor de la constitución de la identidad de la clase trabajadora , de su conciencia de sí misma en oposición a la clase burguesa, todo esto incrustado en el marco nacional correspondiente. El líder táctico , que maniobra según un determinado movimiento en la calle o en el parlamento, era el modelo de cuadro del partido de masas. Precisamente, lo que distinguirá a la izquierda, la socialdemocracia revolucionaria , será su énfasis en el objetivo final de la clase obrera y su dimensión necesariamente internacional e internacionalista, tal como lo establece aquel programa de la revolución que fue El Manifiesto del Partido Comunista . [1]

Pero esto se derrumbó en 1914. Los partidos socialdemócratas firmaron la Unión Sagrada con el imperialismo y se unieron eufóricamente a la dialéctica de estados e imperios . Ponen su gigantesca maquinaria de sindicatos, propaganda e instituciones al servicio de la causa nacional y siembran discordia entre los trabajadores de los pueblos de Europa. Desata el terror blanco en la izquierda internacionalista, terrorismo con el que se comprometen las masas socialdemócratas organizadas, cuando no la apoyan directamente. La antigua coexistencia dentro del movimiento obrero se convierte en su opuesto, en la represión armada del ala internacionalista, llevada a cabo con siniestra disciplina por el ala oportunista en estrecha colaboración con el Estado Mayor imperialista y la policía. Combinando como un zorro la zanahoria de las reformas sociales con el garrote militar, el oportunismo ha madurado hasta convertirse en un auténtico estratega de la contrarrevolución , recompensa merecida por los héroes del SPD que se sacrificaron para proclamar la república alemana, la de las ocho horas. jornada laboral... y organizar la matanza en Berlín y Munich, instruyendo a los Freikorps y a los Cascos de Acero sobre cómo se hacen estas cosas y educando a las masas trabajadoras en la defensa fanática de su estado imperialista.

Este nuevo modelo de cuadro burgués, que se mueve con igual facilidad en las organizaciones de masas que en los departamentos de Estado, es el corolario imperialista del líder revolucionario comunista , del estratega leninista de la revolución, [2] un fenómeno similar a la escisión del socialismo en dos alas , en dos partidos . Para la burguesía, enfrentar estratégicamente la guerra de clases significa combinar, coordinar, distribuir y priorizar todos los recursos disponibles, desde la inteligencia, el desarrollo militar y las tácticas de contrainsurgencia hasta las reformas políticas y sociales, la inversión en la educación de las masas (en los tótems ideológicos burgueses) y la sacrificio de los intereses momentáneos o particulares de tal o cual capa de la burguesía en favor del sentido de Estado: cierre de filas que se expresa, naturalmente, como chovinismo. En cierto modo, y así como la primera experiencia revolucionaria madura del proletariado da origen al molde político de todo el proceso de la revolución hasta el comunismo (el Partido Comunista), la primera gran guerra anticomunista de la burguesía imperialista —conjuntamente con la socialdemocracia— proporciona las claves políticas de esa reacción en toda la línea que es el imperialismo .

Detengámonos brevemente en esto. Como la contradicción entre fuerzas productivas y apropiación privada conlleva la tendencia al comunismo pero también la tendencia a la reestructuración del capital, la supervivencia de la burguesía como clase depende de detener por todos los medios la descomposición de su mundo, hundiendo su dominación en mayores niveles sociales. profundidad, de las masas —profundización cuyas condiciones económicas provocadoras son la subsunción material de todas las esferas sociales bajo los ciclos de acumulación de capital, la distribución del globo, del globo entero , y la constitución del proletariado como clase; es decir, las mismas condiciones objetivas que están en la base del surgimiento del Partido Comunista. [3] La dinamización subjetiva de estas condiciones pasa, como decimos, por la formación de cuadros burgueses capaces, en su conjunto, de manejarse hábilmente en todos los campos del conocimiento y de la práctica, constituyendo el equivalente burgués del intelectual colectivo proletario , que proporciona operatividad al Estado imperialista y permite combinar, sistemáticamente y con gran sinergia, todas las formas y tácticas de lucha contrarrevolucionaria o simplemente contrainsurgente.

Y esta pregunta es clave porque la enseñanza central de la revolución moderna, según Lenin, es que “sólo cuando las 'clases bajas' no quieran vivir a la antigua usanza y las 'clases altas' no puedan seguir viviendo a la antigua usanza, que la revolución puede triunfar”. [4] La crisis del modo de producción capitalista engendra la revolución si y sólo si los proletarios no quieren seguir viviendo a la antigua usanza , si tienen su forma más elevada de organización de clase proletaria , [5] el Partido Comunista, en su poder. disposición, si han logrado articular el factor subjetivo de la revolución. De lo contrario, la crisis del capital termina con su reestructuración, que se basa históricamente en la antes mencionada penetración ideológica y política del imperialismo en las profundidades de la sociedad contemporánea, una sociedad de masas por definición y que se convierte, en su totalidad , en el teatro estratégico de operaciones del capital. el enemigo de clase.

Desde el punto de vista de la burguesía, este proceso trastorna profundamente los fundamentos ideológicos de su dominación. El creciente peso del movimiento espontáneo y reformista de la clase trabajadora en el proceso mismo de acumulación de capital cuestiona la base individualista-liberal sobre la que la burguesía había basado, en términos generales, su visión del mundo. El reconocimiento del sindicato como representante corporativista de la clase trabajadora es, implícitamente, el reconocimiento de que la apropiación del producto social es también eso, una cuestión social. [6] La polilla negra del imperialismo emerge de este capullo renovado por la subversión reaccionaria del programa comunista de socialización de la propiedad, convenientemente regulado y desmenuzado en base a cuotas, y ciertamente no como premisa de ese desarrollo integral del individuo del que hablaba Marx. sino como garantía del orden entre las distintas ramas de la producción, por un lado, y todas las esferas sociales, por el otro. [7] El Estado se convierte en un comité para gestionar los asuntos de la burguesía en un grado que Engels no podía prever cuando escribió esa declaración. Si su aparato burocrático era ya un picor amenazador en los pliegues sudorosos de la carne de la vieja burguesía liberal, ahora se ha convertido en una costra supurante que rodea toda su piel. El Estado, alguna vez limitado a eliminar los obstáculos de la libre acumulación capitalista y aparentemente situado por encima de la suma de individuos iguales que siempre fue la sociedad civil para el credo liberal, está adquiriendo cada vez más la apariencia de un organismo vivo , en el que cada elemento de la sociedad tiene su papel y función corporativista: un auténtico sistema de vínculos que va desde la dirección ejecutivo-administrativa de los asuntos públicos y su aparato militar hasta las organizaciones más abiertas y espontáneas; desde el núcleo duro del Estado hasta el sindicato, pasando por el partido, pasando por la prensa, pasando por la asociación de vecinos, pasando por el soplón en el balcón y los policías sin placa.

Hasta este punto nos hemos limitado al vértice más alto de este sistema, el intelectual colectivo burgués (que engloba el aparato burocrático y ejecutivo estatal, el Parlamento, las organizaciones de inteligencia y seguridad, los lobbies , la academia, etc.), y las correas de transmisión que Incrustar su dirección en toda la sociedad. Pero “cinturón de transmisión” no significa otra cosa que la línea de masas contemplada desde el ángulo organizativo : de lo que se trata es del contenido político que encarna, y en el que se despliega el juego político burgués sin cuestionar los objetivos duros, económicos y nervio ejecutivo de su sistema de dominación. Precisamente porque el imperialismo neutraliza la espontaneidad desde sus propios presupuestos, ésta se preserva como lógica política elemental de la sociedad de última clase (expresión de la anarquía de la producción), por más incorporada que esté a los mecanismos de control, disciplina y dirección de sus necesidades necesarias. contraparte, el Estado. En este juego de fuerzas, los partidos burgueses sólo se distinguen por el grado en que aspiran a llevar esa incorporación como última barrera contra la descomposición social o contra la superación revolucionaria del sistema. [8]

Por otra parte, si esta relación entre el movimiento espontáneo y el Estado imperialista es interna en el nivel histórico general (que hemos analizado hasta este punto), en el nivel político inmediato ambos elementos aparecen como externos, uno frente al otro. otro. Esta particularidad engendra innumerables ilusiones espontáneas en la vanguardia teórica, educada durante décadas en el empirismo político y la presbicia oportunista. Pero apariencia no significa ficción ; no significa irrealidad . Tiene un momento de la verdad, porque es a través de esta brecha de relativa exterioridad política donde la espontaneidad penetra disruptivamente la vida oficial , y la obliga a reconfigurarse permanentemente para garantizar una vez más la acumulación pacífica del capital. El hecho de que el capital sea la revolución continua de todas las condiciones de producción hace que esta perturbación sea sistemática e inevitable, del mismo modo que es sistemática e inevitable la obligación de la burguesía de encontrar nuevos puntos de control del equilibrio político para condiciones que cambian incesantemente. Ese es el contenido objetivo de la reforma bajo la dictadura de la burguesía y en ausencia del sujeto revolucionario —ausencia que sólo hoy, al cierre del Ciclo de Octubre, nos permite contemplar ese contenido en su forma “más pura”, no ya no es un subproducto de la revolución proletaria. Por eso la política burguesa contemporánea es, necesariamente , política de masas, y en primera instancia dirigida al sector de las masas que se destaca en esta disrupción de sus demandas inmediatas: la vanguardia práctica .

Como sabrá el lector, la conquista de la vanguardia práctica es la cuestión central de la reconstitución política del comunismo, es decir, de la reconstitución del Partido Comunista , del movimiento revolucionario organizado. Y bendita sea la intuición proletaria de la Internacional Comunista, porque cuando pone la etiqueta de socialfascistas a los perros sedientos de sangre del SPD, lo hace en el contexto de esa batalla estratégica por la recomposición revolucionaria del proletariado alemán después de la guerra. [9] Y esa es la clave del asunto: la vanguardia práctica. La crisis política del sistema liberal-parlamentario, carcomido desde abajo por movimientos espontáneos que son expresión viva de la anarquía de la producción, tiene varias soluciones posibles. Señalaremos, para los efectos de este análisis, los dos extremos: la revolución proletaria como solución real a los problemas de las masas, que implica inevitablemente la (re)constitución del Partido Comunista; o la posibilidad, en última instancia y entre otras , de recomponer el orden burgués sobre la base de un movimiento de masas organizado, fascista y reaccionario , en el que esa vanguardia práctica —la clave del movimiento espontáneo— no se incorpore a las correas de transmisión de la revolución, sino a los de la contrarrevolución . Esta fusión orgánica tiende a suprimir, a su vez, las coordenadas liberales de la dominación política tradicional de la burguesía, pero no en la dirección del Estado comuna proletario, sino en la del Estado corporativista , lo que implica la reducción de la democracia para los gobernantes. clase misma y la expulsión del juego político de sectores de la burguesía que alguna vez participaron plenamente en él (una de las características que la RL viene señalando como fundamental del fascismo). Ésta es la lógica estructural de la cuestión, sus condiciones de posibilidad. Si esta posibilidad se convierte en una realidad efectiva, y en qué medida, es una cuestión que pertenece al desarrollo histórico real; es en ese nivel, en el análisis concreto de la situación concreta , donde ésta debe ser examinada y determinada ( línea política ).

En efecto, estamos hablando de una lógica: el corporativismo anida en lo más profundo de la lógica política del Estado imperialista, y el fascismo es, considerado desde este ángulo, su desarrollo extremo, la consumación de la concentración de las masas como pilar organizativo del sistema. el estado. Ésta no es una ley apodíctica; no se trata de la consumación determinista, inexorable y finalista de unas premisas. De hecho, y como ya hemos dicho, la propia naturaleza revolucionaria del modo de producción burgués hace que cualquier forma de Estado, cualquier equilibrio político alcanzado en este o aquel momento, sea en sí mismo algo precario ( el equilibrio sugiere una idea de suma cero contradictoria). fuerzas, no una estabilidad muerta y desinflada). El monopolio del poder político por parte de una sola facción de la burguesía es una forma excepcional , no normal , para una sociedad basada en la producción de bienes y la competencia.

Por tanto, específicamente, y evitando tanto el abuso de esta categoría como su desvirtuación sociológico-científica, el corporativismo expresa una cierta correlación de fuerzas, un cierto estado de la lucha de clases, cuyo termómetro natural es la vanguardia práctica. Es la naturaleza política de sus ideas, costumbres y tradiciones, es decir, de su conciencia , la que determina su receptividad a una posible resolución autoritaria o fascista de la crisis del Estado, más allá de especulaciones sobre las frías tendencias objetivas, estructurales y deterministas que han tenido lugar. poco que ver con el análisis marxista —y suelen estar detrás de las asimilaciones simplistas de la democracia burguesa imperialista y del fascismo, estrictamente reducidas a la represión , o a la abierta dictadura terrorista de la burguesía , según la fórmula limitada del Séptimo Congreso del Internacional Comunista. Y sí, en el Ciclo de Octubre la amenaza de la revolución proletaria fue el factor que precipitó la adopción de la forma fascista de dominación por parte de la burguesía. Pero, precisamente, la ausencia de la revolución como referente ideológico, político, cultural y moral de las masas crea un ambiente más que favorable para que, en situaciones de crisis social, hoy más o menos permanentes, se implemente la tendencia objetiva al corporativismo. naturalmente, como la lógica política predeterminada en todos los niveles de la sociedad, incluida, por supuesto, la vanguardia práctica de la clase. Y es en este último donde cobra sentido la tesis del socialfascismo .

La tesis del socialfascismo es la generalización de la tesis leninista de que el desarrollo espontáneo del movimiento obrero conduce a su subordinación a la ideología burguesa , [10] pero visto desde el lado del papel contrarrevolucionario del oportunismo cuando el proletariado ha conquistado históricamente su forma más elevada de organización de clases y escindió el movimiento obrero. De acuerdo con esa concepción del Estado como una cadena de eslabones, en la que cada sinvergüenza tiene su lugar bajo el sol negro del imperialismo, es el partido obrero burgués el que históricamente encarna la reforma, el que dirige espontáneamente el movimiento de resistencia de la clase ( que abarca todas sus expresiones parciales, no sólo la económica y sindical) y que tiene una responsabilidad inmediata en la formación de la cultura, tradiciones y certezas que definen a los líderes de dicho movimiento, su vanguardia práctica. Por ello, y si por su ideología se distingue al Partido Comunista del partido obrero reformista, [11] el estado de dicha capa expresa no sólo el grado de madurez social de la revolución proletaria, sino también el de la contrarrevolución, el de las condiciones ideológicas y políticas para la constitución de un movimiento de masas reaccionario. Desde que murió el progreso universal que alguna vez propugnó la burguesía revolucionaria, la febril apología de la mejora particular que celebra el imperialismo no puede tener otro propósito que alimentar al sector sectorial, egoísta, corporativo, gregario, estrecho, mediocre, satisfecho de sí mismo, complaciente y mezquino. conciencia de masas, cretinismo, oportunismo, ignorancia, arribismo, sumisión, servilismo; una cultura situada a tiro de piedra de la reestructuración fascista del movimiento de masas, con o en contra de los mismos reformistas que lo impulsaron. [12] El derecho y la igualdad ante la ley parecen incapaces de ofrecer más democracia , de ofrecer soluciones a los problemas de las masas, y deben ser transgredidos si se quiere garantizar el estado de cosas dominante. Y ya no hay lugar para las prevenciones liberales de alguien como Sieyès, que recomendaba mantener los intereses particulares fuera de la política para que la Ré-publique no degenerara en Ré-totale . Hoy en día, el carácter espontáneamente reformista del Estado imperialista se alimenta generalmente de las mismas condiciones subjetivas que su transmutación autoritaria y fascista.

Y esto es válido para toda la transición del capitalismo al comunismo; La tesis del socialfascismo significa que “la permanencia del tipo de organización reformista expresa que, en primer lugar, el proceso de elevación consciente de las masas hacia el lugar de vanguardia comunista es necesariamente gradual”, [13] pero enfocado desde desde el punto de vista de la reacción , desde el punto de vista de los pasos que da el movimiento obrero burgués para preservar sus privilegios y oponerse a la transformación revolucionaria de la clase. Esto incluye, por supuesto, también el estado de la dictadura del proletariado, como sugirió perspicazmente Mao cuando se refirió a la URSS revisionista como socialfascista y señaló que la República Popular China corría exactamente el mismo riesgo, un riesgo trágicamente materializó después de 1976. De hecho, la Gran Revolución Cultural Proletaria, el punto más alto de la lucha de clases revolucionaria del Ciclo, fue también el punto de mayor madurez de la contrarrevolución: desde el punto de vista de la ideología promovida por la derecha del PCC (productivismo, incentivos materiales, chauvinismo, feminismo, etc., todos pintados de rojo ) y desde el punto de vista de la articulación política de su trabajo contrarrevolucionario. Agitar la bandera roja contra la bandera roja era levantar a los Guardias Rojos contra los Guardias Rojos, enviar a los trabajadores de choque de la contrarrevolución contra los trabajadores de choque de la revolución; es decir, enfrentar a los sectores que estaban objetivamente situados en la vanguardia práctica tal como existía en las condiciones del socialismo y que representaban, respectivamente, la conciencia reformista y la conciencia revolucionaria de la clase. Esa es precisamente la forma que asume la revolución proletaria madura: guerra civil entre las masas revolucionarias organizadas y las masas contrarrevolucionarias organizadas, entre la forma más alta de organización del proletariado (el Partido Comunista) y la forma más alta de organización de la burguesía (el Partido Comunista). estado más sus correas de transmisión). Y no es en absoluto casual que su última línea de defensa sea el partido reformista de los trabajadores, estratega de la contrarrevolución, ya que es el que mejor puede pilotar sus raíces sociales en la última y más profunda guerra de clases de la historia explotando la conciencia espontánea y reformista del proletariado [14] (que es también un índice negativo de la potencialidad de esta clase, dado el lugar objetivo que ocupa en las relaciones sociales capitalistas y que la burguesía no puede ignorar para articular las condiciones políticas de su dominio).

La tesis del socialfascismo requiere, por tanto, analizar la correlación entre reacción y revolución en un momento dado , y también las luchas de clases entre las fracciones de la propia burguesía, especialmente cuando, como es el caso, la revolución está ausente del plano social. escena. En ese sentido, no hace falta mirar más allá del cliché de España es diferente : el Estado español es un Estado imperialista, donde la revolución comunista y la dictadura del proletariado están a la orden del día, y donde el poder hegemónico del El movimiento obrero burgués, el PSOE, está ampliamente acreditado como la mano izquierda de la dictadura burguesa y su punta de lanza ultrareaccionaria. Desde su debut como partido de gobierno tras la Transición, el socialismo español se ha destacado como un eficiente gestor antiobrero, ha librado una auténtica guerra terrorista contra el movimiento nacional vasco, atizando la discordia entre los pueblos, y se ha sumado con entusiasmo al aventuras militares de su bloque imperialista en la ex Yugoslavia, en Libia, en Ucrania, etc., además de otras sutilezas que harían la lista interminable. De sus filas han salido los González y los Zapateros, los Solanas y los Chacones, los Borrell, los Calvos y otros fanáticos. No cabe duda de su carácter siniestro y del destino que le tiene reservado el proletariado.

Ahora, cuando la fracción del capital financiero representada por Aznar y los halcones del Partido Popular rompió unilateralmente con parte del viejo consenso de 1975-1982 (con la intervención en Irak, el giro atlantista a costa de Europa y del gobierno a base de decretos ) y espoleó una cierta tendencia fascista —no tanto por su retórica nostálgica e irredentista como porque significó la marginación de un sector de la propia clase dominante, incluida la aristocracia obrera—, el PSOE y toda su izquierda se lanzaron a las movilizaciones contra la guerra. Y no lo hicieron, claro está, por convicciones pacifistas (UGT convocó una aterradora huelga de dos horas), sino porque los intereses estratégicos del Estado europeísta español y la derecha de los sectores representados por los socialistas e Izquierda Unida estaban en juego su trozo del pastel imperialista. Entonces, demostraron plenamente su capacidad para redirigir las movilizaciones de la época en su propio beneficio (contra la guerra, por el caso Prestige , por las mentiras sobre el 11-M…), sin hablar, por supuesto, de manipulación o desviación de sus objetivos. Curso natural : las consignas del movimiento pacifista no eran otras que las del pacifismo y su máximo alcance fue el voto de castigo contra el Partido Popular. Pero en un contexto en el que la contradicción dominante en el mundo era entre los países imperialistas y los pueblos oprimidos, y con el Estado español atravesando un momento de estabilidad económica, el primer gobierno de Zapatero se presentó como la restauración del viejo consenso, de la viejas reglas del juego, como defensor de las esencias de la democracia liberal contra el mezquino partidismo de Aznar. La crisis política de 2002-2004 no terminó con la profundización de la vía fascista iniciada por el aznarismo, sino con su interrupción y la canalización del malestar social a través de una mayor apertura democrática para la aristocracia obrera, las burguesías de las naciones oprimidas y los sectores de la burguesía española marginada por el Partido Popular, resultado que se reflejó en la vanguardia en forma de un republicanismo resucitado insufrible y demagógico, auspiciado por el propio Zapatero y cuyo auge duró más de una década.

Estas condiciones comenzaron a cambiar cuando llegó la segunda década del siglo, tras el crack de 2008 y con la guerra en Siria, cuando los buenos tiempos terminaron y el unilateralismo imperialista de Estados Unidos comenzó a ser cuestionado por el imperialismo ruso y chino. . En el Estado español se expresó como lo que hemos llamado Crisis de la Restauración 2.0 , cuyas primeras etapas estuvieron marcadas por el 15-M y la explosión de la cuestión nacional en Cataluña —expresión de la desorganización de la aristocracia obrera y de diversos estratos de la sociedad catalana—. burguesía, respectivamente. Como señaló en su momento RL, el ascenso de Podemos vino a demostrar la total quiebra de los esquemas del revisionismo y la absoluta superfluidad de la identidad roja para montarse en el movimiento espontáneo y sentarse en el Congreso a legislar algunas pequeñas reformas.

El ciclo del 15-M, como movilización de izquierdas , inevitablemente dominada por la rencorosa aristocracia obrera, sí, pero también encarnación de la crisis social más profunda desde la Transición, contribuyó al desarrollo de la revolución en el Estado español en el ámbito en que está desarrollando hoy: desató la crisis abierta del revisionismo y catalizó la proliferación de círculos de propagandistas adscritos a RL, base sobre la cual pudo saltar de una corriente de opinión a un movimiento político por derecho propio. Pero, a nivel social general, el 15-M y Podemos no aspiraban ni podían aspirar a otra cosa que la restauración de las viejas posiciones perdidas por la aristocracia obrera, la resolución de la crisis no hacia adelante, sino hacia atrás. En consecuencia, el Estado español era su marco natural y lógico de actuación, las venerables instituciones democráticas eran el nivel más alto al que aspirar (ese cielo estrecho, o pequeño cielo , que había que tomar por asalto ) y la usurpación del lugar del PSOE era la hoja de ruta lógica y coherente, por no hablar de su descarada vocación de que el Estado español escalara posiciones en la cadena imperialista europea.

Pero el viejo pacto social quedó roto en pedazos. No era el río Rubicón, sino el río Estigia, el que estaba cruzando la socialdemocracia renovada. Al contrario de la restauratio de Zapatero, la refundación de la alianza de la aristocracia obrera con la burguesía imperialista no pudo llevarse a cabo con un vulgar encantamiento parlamentario. Los poderes demoníacos conjurados corrían a su libre albedrío, sin que el aprendiz de brujo se molestara demasiado en intentar domarlos: ya hemos comentado en otra ocasión [15] el desprecio liberal de Podemos por erigirse como un partido de masas , sacrificando vínculos con el Movimiento espontáneo en el altar de España y de las instituciones. Esta torpeza del enemigo —que el proletariado debe tener presente aunque no pueda contar siempre con él— condicionó la forma en que se resolvió el primer acto de la Crisis de la Restauración 2.0: la recuperación del PSOE como hegemonía de los trabajadores burgueses. 'partido y partido de Estado (que ha conseguido arrastrar a Podemos, IU-PCE y buena parte del revisionismo) y hambre del 15-M y del movimiento nacional catalán ante la soberbia de sus dirigentes reformistas y nacionalistas, certificando su la quiebra como referentes del reformismo y de la liberación nacional democrático-burguesa , respectivamente.

Y las gallinas se han acostado. Cuando triunfa la moción de censura contra Rajoy, y especialmente cuando Unidas Podemos (UP) entra en el gobierno del PSOE, el movimiento de izquierda espontáneo está prácticamente desecado y lo único que sostiene al gobierno más progresista de la historia es el estado de alarma permanente. : primero la alerta antifascista , luego la alerta COVID y, últimamente, el cierre de filas borrelliano en torno al bloque imperialista euroatlántico (con todo lo que ello ha sumado al fortalecimiento del aparato represivo del Estado). Las recientes elecciones generales nos han traído otra ración de chantaje emocional, unidad contra el fascismo y clichés reaccionarios manidos sobre las “dos Españas”. Todo esto no sólo indica el descrédito y la falta de un programa prometedor , e incluso creíble, del campo “socialcomunista” , como no se cansan de repetir todos los comentaristas políticos. Expresa, sobre todo, su incapacidad objetiva para encontrar las condiciones, consensos y reglas de juego que establezcan un nuevo punto de equilibrio político para el Estado español. No es un problema de falta de voluntad, sino que es la crisis de los fundamentos económicos del Estado de bienestar , basado en el desarrollo tecnológico sostenido por una fuerte intervención pública y el aumento más o menos continuo de la fuerza productiva del trabajo, así como como su tasa de explotación. Este modelo, que con sus altibajos corresponde aproximadamente a un ciclo completo, podría combinar el crecimiento económico y la competitividad internacional con el aumento de los salarios reales, la participación afirmativa del Estado monopolista-imperialista en la reproducción de la fuerza laboral y el mantenimiento de la un amplio sector público —estatal, regional, provincial y municipal— que redistribuía parte de la plusvalía producida (seguridad social, salud, políticas sociales, gran cuerpo de funcionarios, subsidios a los sindicatos y sus aparatos, etc.). Pero todo dependía de no detener ese movimiento. Este delicado ritmo se rompió a finales de la primera década del siglo y, al menos en los países del Occidente imperialista, no se vislumbra que pueda recomponerse sin el sacrificio del excedente material y humano.

En resumen: la aristocracia obrera ha perdido parte de sus tradicionales privilegios como clase dominante reaccionaria, y el fallido asalto a los cielos del 15-M y Podemos ha acabado con las viejas certezas socioliberales que le permitieron recuperar su posición. en 2004-2008. No en vano, gente como Losantos ha señalado a Zapatero el Bolivariano como el padre político de Iglesias, y desde ese punto de vista tienen toda la razón . Es un arco que va desde la Ley Integral sobre Violencia de Género hasta el reaccionario paro de mujeres del 8 de marzo de 2018 y la ley del sólo “sí” es “sí”, desde el encaje federalizador del Estatuto Miravit y la nación de naciones hasta la actitud tibia de Podemos y compañía ante la opresión nacional de Catalunya (más preocupada por el marketing que por la democracia), desde la alianza de civilizaciones y el multilateralismo de Moratinos hasta la apuesta europeísta del tándem PSOE-UP, desde la Ley de Memoria Histórica al último programa republicano “rojo” del revisionismo, etc.

Todas estas claves reformistas han ido definiendo no tanto un estilo de hacer política, sino el programa con el que la aristocracia obrera y el sector pactista de la burguesía resolvieron la crisis provocada por el segundo mandato de Aznar, pero que está fracasando sin paliativos para soldar las articulaciones que estallan con la Crisis de la Restauración 2.0. La figura de Yolanda Díaz expresa como ninguna la actual volatilidad y precariedad de las bases objetivas del partido reformista. Por un lado, la revalidación de todos los elementos esenciales de la reforma laboral del Partido Popular, es decir, la reforma que sancionó la reducción del volumen de participación estructural de la aristocracia laboral en la distribución de la plusvalía. [16] Por otro, un cuantioso soborno compensatorio de 17 millones para las centrales sindicales en los Presupuestos Generales del Estado de 2022 (un aumento de casi el 100% desde que el ministro comunista tomó posesión de la cartera de Trabajo)… pero que, como todos El soborno de esta naturaleza es específico y debe ser revalidado cada año, sin restaurar la posición de los sindicatos en el estado ni protegerlos de vaivenes políticos y electorales. Irene Montero, por su parte, es quien mejor personifica la crisis de sus fundamentos subjetivos. La llamada guerra civil del feminismo y, sobre todo, el escándalo de la ley de que sólo “sí” es “sí” constituyen el indicador natural de hasta qué punto el feminismo —no hace mucho uno de esos pilares de consenso— se ha convertido incapaz de generar acuerdos ni siquiera dentro del campo reformista. Por supuesto, mucho menos ha podido el partido obrero burgués congraciarse con el sector social encarnado en VOX y el Partido Popular, cuya lucha contra el Estado sanchista es elocuente sobre hasta qué punto la unidad de las diferentes fracciones de la burguesía Se ha desmoronado para seguir dominando de manera conjunta o por turnismo . Y está claro que el partido de los descontentos no está hoy en el lado izquierdo del espectro político burgués. El progresismo se atrinchera firmemente en sus viejas posiciones; la reacción requiere acción e iniciativa. Los subversivos y sediciosos defienden celosamente la legalidad vigente; los inmovilistas claman por su subversión. El partido de la rebelión vota contra la rebelión; el partido del orden , contra sí mismo. La España dinámica se queda en casa; La España atrasada adelanta por la derecha. La integridad política está representada por una chaqueta; clientelismo , fanático de sus principios inexorables. Los secesionistas trabajan diligentemente por la unidad de España; los españolistas , para su disolución. Los rojos miran al pasado; los blancos , al futuro. El sentido de Estado es el interés del partido; política , tecnocracia. El partido conservador es el PSOE; el partido revolucionario , la Guardia Civil.

En este lío, la burguesía es incapaz de entenderse a sí misma y clama por certeza. Y de la misma manera que después de los días buenos vinieron los días malos, después de los días malos vinieron los días peores. La actual plaga socialchovinista —en absoluto reducible a una serie de organizaciones o individuos— es el reflejo, en la vanguardia de la clase, de la crisis del tradicional programa liberal-reformista , fundamentalmente compartido por el revisionismo, y el intento de una fracción de la aristocracia obrera para idear un programa oportunista de nuevo estilo , libre de los compromisos y complejos que hasta ahora ordenaban la forma que tenía esta clase de entender su reaccionario proyecto político de dominación compartida con el gran capital. Ése es todo el contenido de las batallas entre la izquierda indefinida y los inquisidores políticamente incorrectos del posmodernismo progresista : si preservar la vieja táctica de la aristocracia obrera o buscar una nueva bajo las faldas del oportunismo maduro , con todas las posiciones intermedias y razas mixtas que encajan entre las dos. Nadie es inocente en este juego: la fuerza con la que ha estallado el socialchovinismo es directamente proporcional a la tenacidad con la que los falsos comunistas han insistido durante décadas en vender el comunismo a los consensos sindicalistas, republicanos, feministas y otros, obstaculizando la recuperación. del marxismo revolucionario como concepción del mundo y como referente ideológico de la propia vanguardia. No son más que dos eslabones sucesivos de la misma cadena arribista, de la misma clase mezquina resentida por la pérdida de sus polvorientos privilegios de clase dominante.

El socialchovinismo aparece así como la crítica oportunista del oportunismo , en un momento en que la crisis del programa reformista anterior abre la puerta a una mayor reverberación de su crítica revolucionaria : mientras el marxismo revolucionario defiende la aplicación coherente del derecho de autodeterminación contra el marketing del nacionalismo de las naciones pequeñas, el socialchovinismo clama por la unidad de España; mientras el marxismo revolucionario señala el imperativo de destruir el Estado imperialista, el socialchovinismo exige su mejor fortalecimiento ejecutivo-policial y su salida de las estructuras euroatlánticas para llevar a cabo su política exterior carroñera de manera soberana y sin supuestas restricciones; mientras el marxismo revolucionario dispara contra la izquierda plural por el carácter reaccionario de la construcción del movimiento como suma de frentes parciales, el socialchovinismo lo hace por su exclusivismo obrerista; mientras que el marxismo revolucionario apunta al feminismo por su naturaleza contrarrevolucionaria y corporativista, el socialchovinismo lo critica por su incapacidad de servir a su proyecto político, es decir, por no ser lo suficientemente corporativista (de ahí que contraste el corporativismo feminista con el igualmente reaccionario y identitario). corporativismo sindicalista, obrerista); mientras el grito de guerra del marxismo revolucionario es ¡Proletarios de todos los países, uníos! , el socialchovinismo solloza sobre las fronteras y se masturba morbosamente con tonterías sobre la hispanosfera y el capitalismo angloalemán , con la nación obrera española, con un solo país para la clase obrera , etc., etc.

Este giro ideológico dentro de la vanguardia teórica conlleva la posibilidad de que el grueso de la población, y especialmente esa decisiva vanguardia práctica, acabe fusionando el comunismo con el socialchovinismo y la retórica de escuadrón, parapolicial , en la que una parte no despreciable de La vanguardia teórica se divierte hoy. Esta última cuestión no sólo determina el beneficio político que esta tendencia puede obtener a corto plazo, máxime cuando el panorama político español se ha girado ostensiblemente hacia la derecha y cuando son muchos los cuadros burgueses que vigilan sin complejos a la izquierda (como ayer los mantuvieron en plural a la izquierda ). Plantea también un problema estratégico para la reconstitución del comunismo, en la medida en que atiza la desconfianza nacional en nombre del socialismo y distribuye su indigerible guiso ideológico entre las masas, desacreditando (además) al marxismo y dificultando la lucha por recuperar su referencialidad. . No sólo entre la vanguardia teórica; también en la vanguardia práctica, haciéndola más receptiva a la demagogia chauvinista y autoritaria como forma de resolver la crisis, lo que ya nos colocaría en el umbral de un posible movimiento fascista de masas. Esto puede obligar a un ajuste táctico considerable del Plan de Reconstitución, en la medida en que el comunismo se encontraría en contradicción entre el bajo grado de desarrollo de su reconstitución (hoy ideológica , centrada en la vanguardia teórica de la clase) y el desarrollo de una movimiento reaccionario, fascista, de masas (cuya lucha contra el cual requiere mecanismos que, por su naturaleza, se ubican más bien en el conjunto de tareas correspondientes a la reconstitución política , a la reconstitución del Partido Comunista).

Si el capítulo anterior de la Crisis de Restauración 2.0 fue el canto del cisne de los viejos dogmas, en el presente arco se desarrolla la articulación de los nuevos. En cuanto a la vanguardia de la clase obrera, se puede esperar que el desarrollo de la tendencia socialchovinista la aleje de todos los problemas relacionados con el comunismo y la construcción del partido, o continúe digiriendo el revisionismo “clásico” y canalice su crisis hacia la vanguardia. dirección de construir una nueva plataforma política revisionista que sea más o menos operativa y oportunistamente madura . Pueden ocurrir ambas posibilidades. En ese sentido, el socialchovinismo tiene ventaja, tanto porque rema a favor de la corriente política del Estado español como porque sus histéricos representantes se toman muy en serio la tarea de conquistar la opinión pública y tejer una mínima sintonía ideológica con su audiencia. explotando precisamente la quiebra del anterior ciclo reformista y el cansancio de buena parte de la vanguardia con sus clichés y fetiches. Por otro lado, ya estamos viendo que los heraldos póstumos de este último responden al desarrollo del socialchovinismo en la vanguardia intentando revertir la historia e insistiendo en el viejo programa reformista plural y el viejo “comunismo” multicolor (el “comunismo ” multicolor). suma de luchas” ), a pesar de que ha fracasado, a pesar de que su fracaso ha sido la causa inmediata de la fiebre española y a pesar de que esta apuesta les lleva a una mayor irrelevancia política a medida que se profundiza la crisis del Estado. El marxismo revolucionario aquí no toma partido, y al proletariado sólo le corresponde denunciar a unos y a otros y el vínculo interno que los une, que es el que fundamenta la tesis del socialfascismo en las actuales circunstancias de la lucha de clases en el Estado español. y, en particular, en el campo de la vanguardia teórica. Sólo la aplicación consecuente del Plan de Reconstitución permitirá que la crisis del revisionismo se traduzca en el desarrollo de la revolución, que hoy requiere la construcción de un referente de vanguardia y, en particular, la defensa del internacionalismo proletario y la lucha incondicional contra la sociedad. -chovinismo . Éstas son las bases inalienables de la línea política revolucionaria hoy.

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1. - THESIS ON SOCIAL-FASCISM “Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoise nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too.” Lenin Nobody is unaware that the shift towards the right of the political panorama in the Spanish state has been corresponded in the communist movement with the feverish spread of an unapologetic socialchauvinism. But few dare to draw the ultimate consequences of a problem that has already arisen numerous times in the history of our class. The reader of Línea Proletaria will know that, in recent years, the Reconstitution Line (RL) has found the category of social-fascism useful to explain the white thread that leads from opportunism (and worker opportunism in particular, but not only) to the development of a fascist mass movement. Today, unapologetic opportunism fantasizes about barbed wire, about seducing the armed forces, about the workers’ fatherland, and about beating up, in the name of communism, those who—like us—offend the national flag (rojigualda or tricolor, which is the same at this point). Their German grandparents already put on the Prussian hussar’s jacket to order the proletarians to go die in the name of the country, and, when Spartacus rose up, they did the same to order the patriots to kill him in the name of socialism. Their parents, the Khrushchevs, the Brezhnevs and company, also spread socialism in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan (in the same way that their legitimate children, the ultra-conservative Putin and the ultra-conservative Russia, spread decommunization in Ukraine). And they all received, then, the same adjective from revolutionary communism:

social-fascists. Not by chance, this term is strongly placed in the foreground in the context of two of the three great changes that the contemporary labor movement has experienced:

the historical emergence of the Communist Party at the beginning of the October Cycle (1917-1989) and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR in the 1950s, its transformation into “socialimperialist abroad and social-fascist at home,” according to Mao (the third great turn being the symbolic fall of the Wall, at the end of the 80s). In these junctures, however, the concept of social fascism had a mainly political projection, often leaving the connection of this category in the body of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine up in the air. And while no one verbally questions the centrality that the dictatorship of the proletariat or 1 the Communist Party has in this current of revolutionary thought, the notion of social-fascism has been and is more problematic among those who call themselves Marxist-Leninists. Also among the declared enemies of the proletariat, whose attitude towards the subject usually alternates between confusion and simplicity. Long before his political suicide, the young Pablo Iglesias challenged the Comintern of the roaring twenties, with its class against class doctrine plus its use of the social-fascist adjective against social democracy, and praised the sensible Comintern of the Popular Front, reasonable and open in matter of political tactics. Prudent advice kills more than the sword. Revolutionaries should decide against childishly contrasting two chapters in the history of our class. Also of discarding and adopting concepts based on the narrow margin of political calculation, which is the barometer of Iglesias’ judgments on the Communist International (although the ideological-bourgeois character of this type of reasoning is clear when considering that the line of the Popular Front was not exactly successful, not even from the point of view of immediate political success, as was clear from its experience in these lands). Whatever the case, the idea of social-fascism occupies a strange place in the eyes of the majority who, friendly or unfavorably, talk about Marxism. It is intuitively associated with chauvinism and red-fascist nationalism, with class collaborationism, with the worker lieutenants of the imperialist bourgeoisie and also with the blind communist intransigence towards the social democrats (apparently, they did not exterminate enough vanguard proletarians to justify that the Comintern considered them class enemies). Since intuition is made up of a mixture of empirical, political, sentimental and other criteria, it cannot replace precise theoretical and scientific delimitation, which is what grants universal nature to a given idea. The plane of analysis that best positions us to address this task is that of history. With the Cycle of proletarian revolutions of the 20th century closed, we communists find ourselves in the right position to elucidate the assumptions, logic and meaning of that concept, as well as the place it should occupy in the vanguard theory that summarizes the requirements of the revolution today. Let’s start with some results that are already well established in the work that the RL has been carrying out in this regard. The Communist Party is characterized by highlighting the conscious factor as the determining factor in the construction of communism, providing means and tools based on the ultimate goal of a classless society —hence, for its (re)constitution, the forging of vanguard cadres educated in a comprehensive conception of the world and in the fight against schematism and determinism in general, and economism in 2 particular, is essential. The RL has pointed out this question, which Leninism substantiates, as the key to the beginning of the new Cycle of the World Proletarian Revolution (WPR), and this has led it to focus, theoretically, on the question of the historical limitations that have led to the crisis of said subject (Summation of the October Cycle). This internal aspect is the main one. But from here we can draw a derivative towards the external aspect, which is none other than the reflection in the bourgeoisie of the emergence of the Communist Party, the transformation of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the communist proletariat, which also gives a new content to the old workers’ opportunism —of which Lenin already said that its highest form is, precisely, social-chauvinism. At this intersection is where we can best understand the deep content of the concept of social-fascism and its implications. The point of view of strategy can be useful as a first approach to this historical phenomenon. The strategy forces us to consider all aspects of the problem (elementary basis of the Marxist class analysis) and, in addition, emphasizes its relationship with the final intention of the actor in question, of the subject, with the order, arrangement and hierarchy of said elements to achieve the projected goal (tactics-as-plan). And, although Marxism has defined opportunism as the renunciation of long-term objectives in favor of momentary success (Engels), this qualification has long ceased to be accurate in historical (not necessarily political) terms. It is true that the dogmatic and anti-Marxist reductionism that restricts the working class to its dimension as variable capital (economism, unionism) closes the possibility of that totalizing perspective, feeding politically on the ad aeternum reproduction of the resistance movement and abjuring, in the words or in fact, of any final objective, as the honest opportunist Bernstein already wrote. But stopping at this is, today, insufficient. Engels’ qualification is enunciated at a time when the workers’ party was the social democratic mass party. In that context, opportunism was and could not be more than the absolutization of the mechanisms of that first political configuration of the proletariat:

the union as the axis of the workers’ organization (on which the national social democratic parties were built) and the fight for reforms. and for political rights as the engine of the constitution of the working class identity, of its consciousness of itself in opposition to the bourgeois class, all of this embedded in the corresponding national framework. The tactical leader, who maneuvers on the given movement on the street or in parliament, was the cadre model of the mass party. Precisely, what will distinguish the left, revolutionary social democracy, will be its emphasis 3 on the final objective of the working class and its necessarily international and internationalist dimension, as established by that program of the revolution that was The Manifesto of the Communist Party.1 But this collapsed in 1914. The social democratic parties signed the Sacred Union with imperialism and euphorically joined the states and empires dialectic. They put their gigantic machine of trade unions, propaganda and institutions at the service of the national cause and sow discord among the workers of the peoples of Europe. They unleash white terror on the internationalist left, terrorism with which the organized social democratic masses compromise, when they do not directly support it. The former coexistence within the labor movement becomes its opposite, in the armed repression of the internationalist wing, carried out with sinister discipline by the opportunist wing in close collaboration with the imperialist General Staff and the police. Combining like a fox the carrot of social reforms with the military stick, opportunism has matured to become a true strategist of the counterrevolution, a reward deservedly earned by the heroes of the SPD who sacrificed themselves to proclaim the German republic, the of eight-hour workday... and to organize the carnage in Berlin and Munich, instructing the Freikorps and the Steel Helmets in how these things are done and educating the working masses in the fanatical defense of their imperialist state. This new model of bourgeois cadre, which moves with equal ease in mass organizations as in state departments, is the imperialist corollary of the communist revolutionary leader, of the Leninist 1 “The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only:

1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality.

2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section working-class parties of every of the country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.” MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. The Communist Manifesto. Penguin Classics. London, 2014, pp. 342–343.

4 strategist of the revolution, a phenomenon similar to the split of 2 socialism into two wings, into two parties. For the bourgeoisie, strategically facing class war means combining, coordinating, distributing and prioritizing all available resources, from intelligence, military development and counterinsurgency tactics to political and social reforms, investment in the education of the masses (in the bourgeois ideological totems) and the sacrifice of the momentary or particular interests of this or that layer of the bourgeoisie in favor of the sense of state —closing of ranks that is expressed, naturally, as chauvinism. In a certain way, and just as the first mature revolutionary experience of the proletariat gives rise to the political mold for the entire process of revolution up to communism (the Communist Party), the first great anticommunist war of the imperialist bourgeoisie —jointly with social democracy—provides the political keys of that reaction all along the line that is imperialism. Let’s dwell briefly on this. As the contradiction between productive forces and private appropriation entails the tendency towards communism but also the tendency towards the restructuring of capital, the survival of the bourgeoisie as a class depends on stopping the decomposition of its world by all means, plunging its domination into greater social depth, of the masses —deepening whose provoking economic conditions are the material subsumption of all social spheres under the cycles of capital accumulation, the distribution of the globe, of the entire globe, and the constitution of the proletariat as a class; that is, the same objective conditions that are at the basis of the emergence of the 2 “Lenin is the first great revolutionary leader to adopt the position of the strategist in the political leadership of the proletarian class struggle. . . . Unlike the barricade leader, who can only direct a military action, who identifies himself with it and who makes the entire course of the struggle depend on that action alone, thereby reducing all the capacity, intensity and depth of the political movement to the extent that a few tactical maneuvers can confer, Lenin, on the other hand, applies to the leadership of the movement a strategic perspective, that is, the method of combining tactical actions according to the strategic objective, always subordinating the former to the latter and using absolutely all possible means, political and military, in relation to each phase of the movement.” New Orientation on the Path of the Reconstitution of the Communist Party, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/Documentos/ Fundamentales/NO_idiomas/Nueva_Orientacion_I_ENG.html [Bold from source – Editor’s Note.]

5 Communist Party. The subjective dynamization of these conditions 3 passes, as we say, through the formation of bourgeois cadres capable, as a whole, of handling themselves skillfully in all fields of knowledge and practice, constituting the bourgeois equivalent of the proletarian collective intellectual, which provides operability to the imperialist state and allows combining, systematically and with great synergy, all forms and tactics of counterrevolutionary or simply counterinsurgency struggle. And this question is key because the central teaching of the modern revolution, according to Lenin, is that “only when the ‘lower classes’ do not want to live in the old way and the ‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.” The crisis of the capi- 4 talist mode of production engenders revolution if and only if the proletarians do not want to continue living in the old way, if they have their highest form of proletarian class organization, the Communist Party, at their 5 disposal, if they have managed to articulate the subjective factor of the revolution. Otherwise, the crisis of capital ends with its restructuring, which is historically based on the aforementioned ideological and political penetration of imperialism into the depths of contemporary society, a mass society by definition and which becomes, in its entirety, the strategic theater of operations of the class enemy. From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, this process deeply disrupts the ideological foundations of its domination. The growing weight of the spontaneous and reformist movement of the working class in the process of capital accumulation itself questions the individualistliberal basis on which the bourgeoisie had based, in general terms, its view of the world. The recognition of the trade union as the corporatist 3 It is interesting that the science of geopolitics emerged at this same time, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and is the closest thing to what we could call the subjectivity of imperialism. To the extent that capital accumulation is carried out at a global level and to the extent that any pre-capitalist geographical outside or only formally subsumed by capital disappears; to that extent, we say, the geostrategic doctrine of each imperialist state expresses its self-consciousness of the (geo)political conditions of the reproduction of its position in the process of capital accumulation, as well as those of its rise in the imperialist chain. It is enough to consider the theories of Mackinder, Ratzel/Haushofer and Spykman/Mahan, which correspond, clearly and respectively, with the position and expectations of British, German and American imperialism throughout the last century, in the same way as the rise of China today defines its Far Seas doctrine. But this topic, although suggestive, is not the subject of this work. 4 “Left-Wing” Communism—an Infantile Disorder; in LENIN, V. I. Collected Works, volume 31. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 85. 5 Ibidem, p. 50. 6 representative of the working class is, implicitly, the recognition that the appropriation of the social product is also just that, a social issue. The 6 black moth of imperialism emerges from this cocoon renewed by the reactionary subversion of the communist program of socialization of property, conveniently regulated and crumbled based on quotas, and certainly not as a premise of that integral development of the individual that Marx talked about, but as guarantee of the order between the various branches of production, on the one hand, and all social spheres, on the other. The state becomes a committee for managing the affairs of the 7 bourgeoisie to a degree that Engels could not foresee when he wrote that statement. If its bureaucratic apparatus was an already threatening itch in the sweaty folds of the flesh of the old liberal bourgeoisie, it has now become a suppurating scab that surrounds its entire skin. The state, once limited to clearing the obstacles of free capitalist accumulation and apparently situated above the sum of equal individuals that civil society always was for the liberal creed, is increasingly taking on the appearance of a living organism, in which each element of society has its corporatist role and function: an authentic system of links that goes from the executive-administrative direction of public affairs and its military apparatus to the most open and spontaneous organizations; from the hard core of the state to the trade union, to the party, to the press, to the neighborhood association, to the snitch on the balcony and the police without a badge. Up to this point we have limited ourselves to the highest vertex of this system, the bourgeois collective intellectual (which encompasses the state bureaucratic and executive apparatus, Parliament, intelligence and security organizations, lobbies, academia, etc.), and the transmission 6 “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. In this regard, see El sindicalismo que viene [The Trade Unionism to Come]; in LA FORJA # 35, 2006, pp. 50–63. 7 Ellas quieren la libertad y el comunismo [Women Want Freedom and Communism], in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #6, December 2021, p. 39. 7 belts that embed their direction in the whole of society. But “transmission belt” does not mean anything other than the mass line contemplated from the organizational angle: what it is about is the political content that it embodies, and in which the bourgeois political game is deployed without calling into question the hard, economic and executive nerve of its system of domination. Precisely because imperialism neutralizes spontaneity from its very presuppositions, it is preserved as the elemental political logic of the last class society (expression of the anarchy of production), no matter how incorporated it is in the mechanisms of control, discipline and direction of its necessary counterpart, the state. In this game of forces, the bourgeois parties are only distinguished by the degree to which they aspire to carry this incorporation as the last barrier against social decomposition or against the revolutionary overcoming of the system.8 On the other hand, if this relationship between spontaneous movement and the imperialist state is internal on the general-historical level (which we have analyzed up to this point), on the immediate political level both elements appear as external, one in front of the other. This particularity engenders countless spontaneous illusions in the theoretical vanguard, educated for decades in political empiricism and opportunistic presbyopia. But appearance does not mean fiction; it does not mean unreality. It has a moment of truth, because it is through this gap of relative political exteriority where spontaneity disruptively penetrates official life, and forces it to permanently reconfigure itself in order to once again guarantee the peaceful accumulation of capital. That capital is the continuous revolution of all the conditions of production makes this disruption systematic and inevitable, just as systematic and inevitable is the obligation of the bourgeoisie to find new checkpoints of political balance for incessantly changing conditions. That is the objective content of reform under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and in the absence of the revolutionary subject —an absence that only today, at the closing of the October Cycle, allows us to contemplate that content in its “purest” form, no longer as a by-product of the proletarian revolution. That is why contemporary bourgeois politics is, necessarily, mass politics, and in the first instance directed at the sector of the masses that stands out in this disruption from its immediate demands:

the practical vanguard. 8 “The fact that imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism is manifested first of all in the tendency to decay, which is characteristic of every monopoly under the system of private ownership of the means of production. The difference between the democraticrepublican and the reactionary-monarchist imperialist bourgeoisie is obliterated precisely because they are both rotting alive.” LENIN: C.W., vol. 23, p. 106 [Bold our own – Editor’s Note.] 8 As the reader will know, the conquest of the practical vanguard is the central question of the political reconstitution of communism, that is, of the reconstitution of the Communist Party, of the organized revolutionary movement. And blessed be the proletarian intuition of the Comintern, because when it puts the label of social-fascists on the bloodthirsty dogs of the SPD, it does so in the context of that strategic battle for the revolutionary recomposition of the German proletariat after the war. And that is the key to the matter:

the practical vanguard. The 9 political crisis of the liberal-parliamentary system, eaten away from below by spontaneous movements that are the living expression of the anarchy of production, has several possible solutions. We will point out, for the purposes of this analysis, the two extremes:

the proletarian revolution as a real solution to the problems of the masses, which inevitably involves the (re)constitution of the Communist Party; or the possibility, ultimately and among others, of recomposing the bourgeois order on the basis of an organized, fascist, reactionary mass movement, in which that practical vanguard —the key to spontaneous movement— is incorporated not into the transmission belts of the revolution, but to those of the counterrevolution. This organic fusion tends to suppress, in turn, the liberal coordinates of the traditional political domination of the bourgeoisie, but not in the direction of the proletarian commune state, but in that of the corporatist state, which implies the shrinking of democracy for the ruling class itself and the expulsion from the political game of sectors of the bourgeoisie that once fully participated in it (one of the characteristics that the RL has been pointing out as fundamental to fascism). This is the structural logic of the matter, its conditions of possibility. Whether this possibility becomes an effective reality, and to what degree, is a question that belongs to real historical development; it is at that level, in the 9 An example of how, for the KPD in the late 1920s, the practical vanguard was not focused in the trade unions:

“Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. 9 concrete analysis of the concrete situation, where it must be examined and determined (political line). In effect, we are talking about a logic: corporatism nests in the depths of the political logic of the imperialist state, and fascism is, considered from this angle, its extreme development, the consummation of the assembling of the masses as the organizational pillar of the state. This is not an apodictic law; it is not about the deterministic, inexorable and finalistic consummation of some premises. In fact, and as we have already said, the very revolutionary nature of the bourgeois mode of production makes any form of state, any political balance reached at this or that moment, in itself something precarious (equilibrium suggests an idea of zero-sum contradictory forces, not a dead, deflated stability). The monopoly of political power by a single faction of the bourgeoisie is an exceptional form, not the normal one for a society based on the production of goods and competition. Therefore, specifically, and preventing both the abuse of this category and its sociological-scientistic deturpation, corporatism expresses a certain correlation of forces, a certain state of the class struggle, whose natural thermometer is the practical vanguard. It is the political nature of its ideas, customs and traditions, that is, of its consciousness, that determines its receptivity to a possible authoritarian or fascist resolution of the crisis of the state, beyond speculations about cold objective, structural and deterministic tendencies that have little to do with the Marxist analysis —and they tend to be behind the simplistic assimilations of imperialist bourgeois democracy and fascism, strictly reduced to repression, or to the open terrorist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, according to the limited formula of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. And yes, in the October Cycle the threat of the proletarian revolution was the factor that precipitated the adoption of the fascist form of domination by the bourgeoisie. But, precisely, the absence of the revolution as an ideological, political, cultural and moral referent for the masses creates a more than favorable environment so that, in situations of social crisis, more or less permanent today, the objective tendency towards corporatism is implemented naturally as the default political logic at all levels of society, including, of course, the practical vanguard of the class. And it is in the latter where the thesis of social-fascism acquires sense. The thesis of social-fascism is the generalization of the Leninist thesis that the spontaneous development of the labor movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology, but seen from the side of the 10 10 What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement; in LENIN, C.W., v. 5, p. 384. 10 counterrevolutionary role of opportunism when the proletariat has historically conquered its highest form of class organization and split the labor movement. In line with that conception of the state as a chain of links, in which every scoundrel has his place under the black sun of imperialism, it is the bourgeois workers’ party that historically embodies reform, which spontaneously directs the resistance movement of the class (which encompasses all its partial expressions, not only the economic and trade unionist) and which has an immediate responsibility in the formation of the culture, traditions and certainties that define the leaders of said movement, its practical vanguard. For this reason, and if the Communist Party is distinguished from the reformist workers’ party by ideology, the 11 state of said layer expresses not only the degree of social maturity of the proletarian revolution, but also that of the counterrevolution, that of the ideological and political conditions for the constitution of a reactionary mass movement. Since the universal progress that the revolutionary bourgeoisie once advocated died, the feverish apology for the particular improvement that imperialism celebrates cannot have any further purpose than to feed the sectoral, selfish, corporate, gregarious, narrow, mediocre, self-satisfied, accommodating and petty consciousness of the masses, cretinism, opportunism, ignorance, careerism, submission, servility; a culture located a stone’s throw away from the fascist restructuring of the mass movement, with or against the very reformists who fueled it. Right 12 and equality before the law appear incapable of offering more democracy, of offering solutions to the problems of the masses, and must be transgressed if the dominant state of affairs is to be ensured. And there is no longer any place for the liberal preventions of someone like Sieyès, who recommended keeping particular interests out of politics so that the République would not degenerate into Ré-totale. Today, the spontaneously reformist character of the imperialist state is generally fed by the same subjective conditions as its authoritarian, fascist transmutation. 11 Thesis of Reconstitution of the Communist Party, p. 9, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/ Documentos/Fundamentales/Tesis_idiomas/Tesis_Reconstitucion_PC_ENG.pdf 12 At the beginning of 1933, as “the political repression and marginalization of the Social Democrats rapidly became more obvious, so the trade unions under Theodor Leipart began to try to preserve their existence by distancing themselves from the Social Democratic Party and seeking an accommodation with the new regime. On 21 March the leadership denied any intention of playing a role in politics and declared that it was prepared to carry out the social function of the trade unions ‘whatever the kind of state regime’ in power. . . . On 28 April they concluded an agreement with the Christian and Liberal Trade Unions that was intended to form the first step towards a complete unification of all trade unions in a single national organization.” EVANS: Op. cit., pp. 355–356. 11 And this is true for the entire transition from capitalism to communism; the thesis of social-fascism means that “the permanence of the reformist organization type expresses that, in the first place, the process of conscious elevation of the masses towards the place of the communist vanguard is necessarily gradual,” but focused from the point of 13 view of reaction, from the in view of the steps that the bourgeois labor movement takes to preserve its privileges and oppose the revolutionary transformation of the class. This includes, of course, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat too, as Mao perceptively suggested when he referred to the revisionist USSR as social-fascist and pointed out that the People’s Republic of China was under the exact same risk, a risk tragically materialized after 1976. Indeed, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the highest point of the revolutionary class struggle of the Cycle, was also the point of greatest maturity of the counterrevolution: from the point of view of the ideology promoted by the right of the CPC (productivism, material incentives, chauvinism, feminism, etc., all of them painted red) and from the point of view of the political articulation of their counterrevolutionary work. Waving the red flag against the red flag was to raise the Red Guards against the Red Guards, to send the shock workers of the counterrevolution against the shock workers of the revolution; that is, confronting the sectors that were objectively situated in the practical vanguard as it existed under the conditions of socialism and that represented, respectively, the reformist consciousness and the revolutionary consciousness of the class. That is precisely the form that the mature proletarian revolution assumes: civil war between the organized revolutionary masses and the organized counterrevolutionary masses, between the highest form of organization of the proletariat (the Communist Party) and the highest form of organization of the bourgeoisie (the state plus its transmission belts). And it is not at all coincidental that its last line of defense is the reformist workers’ party, the strategist of the counterrevolution, since it is the one which can best pilot its social roots in the last and deepest class war in history by exploiting the spontaneous, 13 Thesis of Reconstitution, p. 7. 12 reformist consciousness of the proletariat (which is also a negative index 14 of the potentiality of this class, given the objective place it occupies in capitalist social relations and that the bourgeoisie cannot ignore to articulate the political conditions of its domain). The thesis of social-fascism requires, therefore, analyzing the correlation between reaction and revolution at a given moment, and also the class struggles between the fractions of the bourgeoisie itself, especially when, as is the case, the revolution is absent from the social scene. In that sense, we do not need to look further than to the Spain is different cliché: the Spanish state is an imperialist State, where the communist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat are the order of the day, and where the hegemon of the bourgeois labor movement, the PSOE, is amply accredited as the left hand of the bourgeois dictatorship and as its ultra-reactionary spearhead. Since its debut as a party of government after the Transition, Spanish socialism has stood out as an efficient anti-worker manager, it has waged an authentic terrorist war against the Basque national movement, stirring up discord between peoples, and it has enthusiastically joined the military adventures of its imperialist bloc in the former Yugoslavia, in Libya, in Ukraine, etc., in addition to other niceties that would make the list endless. From their ranks have come the González and the Zapateros, the Solanas and the Chacones, the Borrells, the Calvos and other fanatics. There can be no doubt about its sinister nature and the destiny that the proletariat has to reserve for it. Now, when the fraction of financial capital represented by Aznar and the Partido Popular hawks unilaterally broke with part of the old consensus of 1975–1982 (with the intervention in Iraq, the Atlanticist turn at the expense of Europe and the government based on decrees) and spurred a certain fascistic tendency —not so much because of its nostalgic 14 This problem was clearly seen, although from liberal coordinates, by some of the most astute scholars of the Cultural Revolution: “[Mao] shares at least one conviction with Western liberals: that, while the difference between paternalistic socialism and fascism is a real one, the line between them is easily crossed. The Kuomintang crossed it; Mao believes that the Soviet Union has crossed it; and he fears that his own party is only a few short steps from it. . . . To both Mao and his liberal opponents in China, the enemy is the same: bureaucracy; but they diverge entirely on the means by which it should be combated. The liberals believe, essentially, in gradually improving the elite. Mao believes in destroying the foundations of the elite. He faces one of the fundamental problems of politics: the tendency for a levelling revolution to produce its own new privileged establishment. But he does not hope to defeat this possibility, as is widely believed in the West, simply by perpetually recurrent, disruptive mass protest.” GRAY, J.; CAVENDISH, P. Chinese Communism In Crisis. Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. Frederick A. Praeger. New York, 1968, pp. 67–68. 13 and irredentist rhetoric as because it meant the marginalization of a sector of the ruling class itself, including the labor aristocracy—, the PSOE and everything to its left threw themselves into the mobilizations against the war. And they did not do it, of course, out of anti-war convictions (UGT called a terrifying two-hour strike), but because the strategic interests of the Europeist Spanish state and the right of the sectors represented by the socialists and Izquierda Unida to their piece of the imperialist cake were at stake. Then, they fully demonstrated their ability to redirect the mobilizations of the time to their own benefit (against the war, for the Prestige case, for the lies about 11-M…), without, of course, talking about manipulation or deviation from its natural course: the slogans of the anti-war movement were none other than those of pacifism and its maximum reach was the punishment vote against the Partido Popular. But in a context in which the dominant contradiction in the world was between the imperialist countries and the oppressed peoples, and with the Spanish state going through a time of economic stability, Zapatero’s first government was presented as the restoration of the old consensus, of the old rules of the game, as champion of the essences of liberal democracy against Aznar’s petty partisanship. The political crisis of 2002–2004 did not end with the deepening of the fascist path initiated by Aznarism, but with its interruption and the channeling of social unrest through a greater democratic opening for the labor aristocracy, the bourgeoisies of the oppressed nations and the sectors of the Spanish bourgeoisie marginalized by the Partido Popular—a result that was reflected in the vanguard in the form of an insufferable and demagogic resurrected republicanism, sponsored by Zapatero himself and whose high tide lasted more than a decade. These conditions began to change when the second decade of the century arrived, after the crack of 2008 and with the war in Syria, when the good times ended and the imperialist unilateralism of the United States began to be called into question by Russian and Chinese imperialism. In the Spanish state it was expressed as what we have called Restoration Crisis 2.0, whose first stages were marked by 15-M and the explosion of the national question in Catalonia —an expression of the disorganization of the labor aristocracy and various strata of the Catalonian bourgeoisie, respectively. As the RL pointed out at the time, the rise of Podemos came to demonstrate the total bankruptcy of the schemes of revisionism and the absolute superfluity of the red identity to ride the spontaneous movement and sit in Congress to legislate some small reforms. The 15-M cycle, as left-wing mobilization, inevitably dominated by the spiteful labor aristocracy, yes, but also the embodiment of the deepest 14 social crisis since the Transition, contributed to the development of the revolution in the Spanish state in the sphere in which it is developing today: it unleashed the open crisis of revisionism and catalyzed the proliferation of circles of propagandists attached to the RL, the basis on which it was able to jump from opinion trend to a political movement in its own right. But, at a general social level, 15-M and Podemos did not and could not aspire to anything other than the restoration of the old positions lost by the labor aristocracy, the resolution of the crisis not forward, but backward. Consequently, the Spanish state was its natural and logical framework of action, the venerable democratic institutions were the highest level to which to aspire (that narrow heaven, or lil’heaven, that had to be taken by storm) and the usurpation of the place of the PSOE was the logical and coherent roadmap, not to mention its shameless vocation for the Spanish state to climb positions in the European imperialist chain. But the old social pact laid broken in pieces. It was not the river Rubicon, but the Styx, that re-hashed social democracy was crossing. Contrary to Zapatero’s restauratio, the refoundation of the alliance of the labor aristocracy with the imperialist bourgeoisie could not be carried out with a vulgar parliamentary incantation. The conjured demonic powers ran at their free will, without the sorcerer’s apprentice bothering too much to try to tame them: we have already commented on another occasion15 about Podemos’ liberal disregard for establishing itself as a mass party, sacrificing links with the spontaneous movement in the altar of Spain and the institutions. This clumsiness of the enemy—which the proletariat must keep in mind even if it cannot afford to always count on it— conditioned the way in which the first act of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was resolved: recovery of the PSOE as hegemon of the bourgeois workers’ party and state party (which has managed to drag Podemos, IU-PCE and a good part of revisionism) and starvation of the 15-M and the Catalan national movement in the face of the arrogance of its reformist and nationalist leaders, certifying their bankruptcy as referents of reformism and of national bourgeois-democratic liberation, respectively. And the chickens have come to roost. By the time the motion of censure against Rajoy triumphs, and especially by the time Unidas Podemos (UP) enters the PSOE government, the spontaneous leftist movement is practically desiccated and the only thing sustaining the most progressive government in history is the permanent state of alarm: first the 15 Editorial: Ni nueva normalidad, ni vieja normalidad: ¡Revolución o barbarie! [Neither new normalcy nor old normalcy:

Revolution or barbarism!]; in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #5, December 2020, pp. 12–13. 15 anti-fascist alert, then the COVID alert and, lately, the Borrellian closing of ranks around the Euro-Atlantic imperialist bloc (with all that this has added to the strengthening of the repressive apparatus of the state). The recent general elections have brought us another helping of emotional blackmail, unity against fascism and hackneyed reactionary clichés about the “two Spains.” All of this not only indicates the discredit and lack of an promising, and even credible, program of the “social-communist” camp, as all political commentators never tire of repeating. It expresses, above all, its objective inability to find the conditions, consensus and rules of the game that establish a new point of political balance for the Spanish state. It is not a problem of lack of will, but rather it is the crisis of the economic foundations of the welfare state, based on technological development sustained by strong public intervention and the more or less continuous increase in the productive force of labor, as well as its rate of exploitation. This model, which with its ups and downs roughly corresponds to an entire cycle, could combine economic growth and international competitiveness with the increase in real wages, the affirmative involvement of the monopolistic-imperialist state in the reproduction of the labor force and the maintenance of a broad public sector —state, regional, provincial and municipal— that redistributed part of the surplus value produced (social security, health, social policies, a large body of civil servants, subsidies for trade unions and their apparatus, etc.). But it all depended on not stopping that movement. This delicate rhythm broke down at the end of the first decade of the century and, at least in the countries of the imperialist West, it is not in sight that can be recomposed without the sacrifice of the material and human surplus. In summary: the labor aristocracy has lost part of its traditional privileges as a reactionary dominant class, and the failed assault on the heavens of 15-M and Podemos has put an end to the old socio-liberal certainties that allowed it to recover its position in 2004–2008. Not in vain, people like Losantos have pointed to Zapatero the Bolivarian as the political father of Iglesias, and from that point of view they are absolutely right. It is an arc that goes from the Comprehensive Law on Gender Violence to the reactionary women’s strike of March 8, 2018 and the law of only “yes” is “yes,” from the federalizing fit of the Miravit Statute and the nation of nations to the lukewarm attitude of Podemos and company in the face of the national oppression of Catalunya (more concerned with marketing than with democracy), from the alliance of civilizations and Moratinos’ multilateralism to the Europeist commitment of the PSOE-UP tandem, from the Law of Historical Memory to the last “red” republican program of revisionism, etc. 16 All these reformist keys have been defining not so much of a style of doing politics, but of the program with which the labor aristocracy and the pactist sector of the bourgeoisie resolved the crisis caused by Aznar’s second term, but which is failing without palliatives to solder the joints that burst with the Restoration Crisis 2.0. The figure of Yolanda Díaz expresses like no other the current volatility and precariousness of the objective bases of the reformist party. On the one hand, revalidation of all the essentials of the Partido Popular’s labor reform, that is, the reform that sanctioned the reduction of the amount of structural participation of the labor aristocracy in the distribution of surplus value. On the other, a 16 large compensatory bribe of 17 million for the trade union centrals in the General State Budgets of 2022 (an increase of almost 100% since the communist minister took possession of the Labor portfolio)… but that, like all bribery of this nature, it is specific and must be revalidated every year, without restoring the position of the trade unions in the state or protecting it from political and electoral wobbles. Irene Montero, for her part, is the one who best personifies the crisis of its subjective foundations. The so-called civil war of feminism and, above all, the scandal of the law of only “yes” is “yes” constitute the natural indicator of the extent to which feminism —not long ago one of those pillars of consensus— has become incapable of generating agreement even within the reformist camp. Of course, much less has the bourgeois workers’ party been able to ingratiate itself with the social sector embodied in VOX and the Partido Popular, whose fight against the Sanchista state is eloquent about the extent to which the unity of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie has broken down to continue dominating jointly or by turnism. And it is clear that the party of the discontented is not, today, on the left side of the bourgeois political spectrum. Progressivism entrenches itself firmly in its old positions; reaction takes action and initiative. The subversives and seditionists jealously defend the current legality; the immobilists cry out for its subversion. The party of rebellion votes against the rebellion; the party of order, against itself. Dynamic Spain stays at home; backward Spain overtakes from the right. Political integrity is represented by a jacket; clientelism, a fanatic of its inexorable principles. The secessionists work diligently for the unity of Spain; the Spainists, for their dissolution. The reds look to the past; 16 The difficulties posed to temporary hiring, for their part, have already been successfully circumvented by the natural laws of competition: employers, large and small, quickly learned to use the trial period as an efficient substitute for the temporary contract. Dismissals before the end of the trial period (which do not require prior notice, reasoned cause, or compensation) skyrocketed by 620% last year: if in 2021 there were 75000 employees who did not exceed said period, the end of 2022 recorded a total of 540000. 17 the whites, to the future. The sense of state is the interest of the party; politics, technocracy. The conservative party is the PSOE; the revolutionary party, the Civil Guard. In this mess the bourgeoisie is unable to understand itself and cries out for certainty. And in the same way that after the good days came the bad days, after the bad days came the worst days. The current socialchauvinist plague —not at all reducible to a series of organizations or individuals—is the reflection, on the vanguard of the class, of the crisis of the traditional liberal-reformist program, fundamentally shared by revisionism, and the attempt of a fraction of the labor aristocracy to devise an opportunist program of a new style, free of the commitments and complexes that until now gave order to the way this class had of understanding its reactionary political project of shared domination with big capital. That is the entire content of the battles between the undefined lef and the politically incorrect inquisitors of progressive postmodernism: whether to preserve the old tactic of the labor aristocracy or look for a new one under the skirts of mature opportunism, with all the intermediate positions and mixed breeds that fit between the two. No one is innocent in this game: the strength with which social-chauvinism has erupted is directly proportional to the tenacity with which the false communists have insisted on selling communism to the trade unionist, republican, feminist and other consensuses for decades, hindering the recovery of revolutionary Marxism as a conception of the world and as an ideological referent for the vanguard itself. They are nothing more than two successive links in the same careerist chain, of the same petty class resentful of the loss of its dusty dominant class privileges. Social-chauvinism thus appears as the opportunist critique of opportunism, at a time when the crisis of the previous reformist program opens the door to a greater reverberation of its revolutionary critique: while revolutionary Marxism champions the consistent application of the right of self-determination against the marketing of small-nation nationalism, social-chauvinism cries out for the unity of Spain; while revolutionary Marxism points out the imperative to destroy the imperialist state, socialchauvinism demands its best executive-police strengthening and its departure from Euro-Atlantic structures to carry out its scavenger foreign policy in a sovereign manner and without supposed restraints; while revolutionary Marxism shoots against the plural lef due to the reactionary nature of the construction of the movement as a sum of partial fronts, social-chauvinism does so due to its workerist exclusivism; while revolutionary Marxism takes aim at feminism for its counterrevolutionary and corporatist nature, social-chauvinism criticizes it for its inability to serve 18 its political project, that is, for not being corporatist enough (hence it contrasts feminist corporatism with the equally reactionary and identitybased trade unionist, workerist corporatism); while the war cry of revolutionary Marxism is proletarians of all countries, unite!, social-chauvinism sobs over the borders and masturbates morbidly with nonsense about the Hispanosphere and Anglo-German capitalism, with the Spanish workers’ nation, with one country for the working class, etc., etc. This ideological shift within the theoretical vanguard carries with it the possibility that the bulk of the population, and especially that decisive practical vanguard, ends up conflating communism with social-chauvinism and the squadron, para-police rhetoric, in which a not inconsiderable part of the theoretical vanguard frolics today. This last question not only determines the political profit that this trend can obtain in the short term, especially when the Spanish political panorama has ostensibly turned to the right and when there are many bourgeois cadres who keep an eye on the left without complexes (as yesterday they kept them on the plural lef). It also poses a strategic problem for the reconstitution of communism, to the extent that it stokes national distrust in the name of socialism and distributes its indigestible ideological stew among the masses, discrediting Marxist (further) and making it difficult the fight to recover its referentiality. Not only among the theoretical vanguard; in the practical vanguard too, making it more receptive to chauvinist and authoritarian demagoguery as a way to solve the crisis, which would already place us on the threshold of a possible fascist mass movement. This may force a considerable tactical adjustment of the Plan of Reconstitution, to the extent that communism would find itself in contradiction between the low degree of development of its reconstitution (today ideological, centered on the theoretical vanguard of the class) and the development of a reactionary, fascist, mass movement (the fight against which requires mechanisms that, by their nature, are rather located in the set of tasks corresponding to the political reconstitution, to the reconstitution of the Communist Party). If the previous chapter of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was the swan song of the old dogmas, in the present arc the articulation of the new ones is played out. Regarding the vanguard of the working class, it can be expected that the development of the social-chauvinist trend will either distance it from all problems related to communism and party construction, or will continue to digest “classical” revisionism and channel its crisis into the direction of building a new revisionist political platform that is more or less operational and opportunistically mature. Both possibilities can occur. In that sense, social-chauvinism has an advantage, both because it 19 rows in favor of the political current of the Spanish state and because its hysterical representatives are taking the task of conquering public opinion and weaving a minimum ideological harmony with their audience very seriously, exploiting precisely the bankruptcy of the previous reformist cycle and the fatigue of a good part of the vanguard with its clichés and fetishes. On the other hand, we are already seeing that the posthumous heralds of the latter respond to the development of socialchauvinism in the vanguard by attempting to reverse history and insisting on the old plural reformist program and the old multicolored “communism” (the “sum of struggles”), despite the fact that it has failed, despite the fact that its failure has been the immediate cause of the Spanish fever and despite the fact that this bet leads them to greater political irrelevance as the crisis of the state deepens. Revolutionary Marxism takes no sides here, and the proletariat is only responsible for denouncing the ones and the others and the internal bond that unites them, which is what substantiates the thesis of social-fascism in the current circumstances of the class struggle in the Spanish state and, in particular, in the field of the theoretical vanguard. Only the consistent application of the Plan of Reconstitution will allow the crisis of revisionism to be translated into the development of the revolution, which today requires the construction of a vanguard referent and, in particular, the defense of proletarian internationalism and the unconditional fight against socialchauvinism. These are the inalienable bases of the revolutionary political line today. We can only move forward. If Esau, the disowned, is to rise and break the yoke from his neck, he will do so knowing that we do not have reserves in the rear to back us up nor a stronger wall to shield our men from disaster.

Committee for Reconstitution (Spanish State)

August 2023

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... Thesis on Social-Fascism – Comuna Roja (wordpress.com) --- kunturchawa. 18 de febrero de 2.024. --

[This is an unofficial translation, the text by the Committee for Reconstitution (Spanish State) can be read in Spanish here. You can download the PDF version of this translation by clicking here.] -- “Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoise nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too.”

Lenin

... Nobody is unaware that the shift towards the right of the political panorama in the Spanish state has been corresponded in the communist movement with the feverish spread of an unapologetic social-chauvinism. But few dare to draw the ultimate consequences of a problem that has already arisen numerous times in the history of our class. The reader of Línea Proletaria will know that, in recent years, the Reconstitution Line (RL) has found the category of social-fascism useful to explain the white thread that leads from opportunism (and worker opportunism in particular, but not only) to the development of a fascist mass movement. Today, unapologetic opportunism fantasizes about barbed wire, about seducing the armed forces, about the workers’ fatherland, and about beating up, in the name of communism, those who —like us— offend the national flag (rojigualda or tricolor, which is the same at this point). Their German grandparents already put on the Prussian hussar’s jacket to order the proletarians to go die in the name of the country, and, when Spartacus rose up, they did the same to order the patriots to kill him in the name of socialism. Their parents, the Khrushchevs, the Brezhnevs and company, also spread socialism in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan (in the same way that their legitimate children, the ultra-conservative Putin and the ultra-conservative Russia, spread decommunization in Ukraine). And they all received, then, the same adjective from revolutionary communism: social-fascists.

Not by chance, this term is strongly placed in the foreground in the context of two of the three great changes that the contemporary labor movement has experienced: the historical emergence of the Communist Party at the beginning of the October Cycle (1917-1989) and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR in the 1950s, its transformation into “social-imperialist abroad and social-fascist at home,” according to Mao (the third great turn being the symbolic fall of the Wall, at the end of the 80s). In these junctures, however, the concept of social fascism had a mainly political projection, often leaving the connection of this category in the body of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine up in the air. And while no one verbally questions the centrality that the dictatorship of the proletariat or the Communist Party has in this current of revolutionary thought, the notion of social-fascism has been and is more problematic among those who call themselves Marxist-Leninists. Also among the declared enemies of the proletariat, whose attitude towards the subject usually alternates between confusion and simplicity. Long before his political suicide, the young Pablo Iglesias challenged the Comintern of the roaring twenties, with its class against class doctrine plus its use of the social-fascist adjective against social democracy, and praised the sensible Comintern of the Popular Front, reasonable and open in matter of political tactics. Prudent advice kills more than the sword. Revolutionaries should decide against childishly contrasting two chapters in the history of our class. Also of discarding and adopting concepts based on the narrow margin of political calculation, which is the barometer of Iglesias’ judgments on the Communist International (although the ideological-bourgeois character of this type of reasoning is clear when considering that the line of the Popular Front was not exactly successful, not even from the point of view of immediate political success, as was clear from its experience in these lands). Whatever the case, the idea of ​​social-fascism occupies a strange place in the eyes of the majority who, friendly or unfavorably, talk about Marxism. It is intuitively associated with chauvinism and red-fascist nationalism, with class collaborationism, with the worker lieutenants of the imperialist bourgeoisie and also with the blind communist intransigence towards the social democrats (apparently, they did not exterminate enough vanguard proletarians to justify that the Comintern considered them class enemies). Since intuition is made up of a mixture of empirical, political, sentimental and other criteria, it cannot replace precise theoretical and scientific delimitation, which is what grants universal nature to a given idea.

--- The plane of analysis that best positions us to address this task is that of history. With the Cycle of proletarian revolutions of the 20th century closed, we communists find ourselves in the right position to elucidate the assumptions, logic and meaning of that concept, as well as the place it should occupy in the vanguard theory that summarizes the requirements of the revolution today. Let’s start with some results that are already well established in the work that the RL has been carrying out in this regard. The Communist Party is characterized by highlighting the conscious factor as the determining factor in the construction of communism, providing means and tools based on the ultimate goal of a classless society —hence, for its (re)constitution, the forging of vanguard cadres educated in a comprehensive conception of the world and in the fight against schematism and determinism in general, and economism in particular, is essential. The RL has pointed out this question, which Leninism substantiates, as the key to the beginning of the new Cycle of the World Proletarian Revolution (WPR), and this has led it to focus, theoretically, on the question of the historical limitations that have led to the crisis of said subject (Summation of the October Cycle). This internal aspect is the main one. But from here we can draw a derivative towards the external aspect, which is none other than the reflection in the bourgeoisie of the emergence of the Communist Party, the transformation of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the communist proletariat, which also gives a new content to the old workers’ opportunism —of which Lenin already said that its highest form is, precisely, social-chauvinism. At this intersection is where we can best understand the deep content of the concept of social-fascism and its implications.

The point of view of strategy can be useful as a first approach to this historical phenomenon. The strategy forces us to consider all aspects of the problem (elementary basis of the Marxist class analysis) and, in addition, emphasizes its relationship with the final intention of the actor in question, of the subject, with the order, arrangement and hierarchy of said elements to achieve the projected goal (tactics-as-plan). And, although Marxism has defined opportunism as the renunciation of long-term objectives in favor of momentary success (Engels), this qualification has long ceased to be accurate in historical (not necessarily political) terms. It is true that the dogmatic and anti-Marxist reductionism that restricts the working class to its dimension as variable capital (economism, unionism) closes the possibility of that totalizing perspective, feeding politically on the ad aeternum reproduction of the resistance movement and abjuring, in the words or in fact, of any final objective, as the honest opportunist Bernstein already wrote. But stopping at this is, today, insufficient.

Engels’ qualification is enunciated at a time when the workers’ party was the social democratic mass party. In that context, opportunism was and could not be more than the absolutization of the mechanisms of that first political configuration of the proletariat: the union as the axis of the workers’ organization (on which the national social democratic parties were built) and the fight for reforms. and for political rights as the engine of the constitution of the working class identity, of its consciousness of itself in opposition to the bourgeois class, all of this embedded in the corresponding national framework. The tactical leader, who maneuvers on the given movement on the street or in parliament, was the cadre model of the mass party. Precisely, what will distinguish the left, revolutionary social democracy, will be its emphasis on the final objective of the working class and its necessarily international and internationalist dimension, as established by that program of the revolution that was The Manifesto of the Communist Party.[1]

...--- But this collapsed in 1914. The social democratic parties signed the Sacred Union with imperialism and euphorically joined the states and empires dialectic. They put their gigantic machine of trade unions, propaganda and institutions at the service of the national cause and sow discord among the workers of the peoples of Europe. They unleash white terror on the internationalist left, terrorism with which the organized social democratic masses compromise, when they do not directly support it. The former coexistence within the labor movement becomes its opposite, in the armed repression of the internationalist wing, carried out with sinister discipline by the opportunist wing in close collaboration with the imperialist General Staff and the police. Combining like a fox the carrot of social reforms with the military stick, opportunism has matured to become a true strategist of the counterrevolution, a reward deservedly earned by the heroes of the SPD who sacrificed themselves to proclaim the German republic, the of eight-hour workday... and to organize the carnage in Berlin and Munich, instructing the Freikorps and the Steel Helmets in how these things are done and educating the working masses in the fanatical defense of their imperialist state.

This new model of bourgeois cadre, which moves with equal ease in mass organizations as in state departments, is the imperialist corollary of the communist revolutionary leader, of the Leninist strategist of the revolution,[2] a phenomenon similar to the split of socialism into two wings, into two parties. For the bourgeoisie, strategically facing class war means combining, coordinating, distributing and prioritizing all available resources, from intelligence, military development and counterinsurgency tactics to political and social reforms, investment in the education of the masses (in the bourgeois ideological totems) and the sacrifice of the momentary or particular interests of this or that layer of the bourgeoisie in favor of the sense of state —closing of ranks that is expressed, naturally, as chauvinism. In a certain way, and just as the first mature revolutionary experience of the proletariat gives rise to the political mold for the entire process of revolution up to communism (the Communist Party), the first great anti-communist war of the imperialist bourgeoisie —jointly with social democracy— provides the political keys of that reaction all along the line that is imperialism.

Let’s dwell briefly on this. As the contradiction between productive forces and private appropriation entails the tendency towards communism but also the tendency towards the restructuring of capital, the survival of the bourgeoisie as a class depends on stopping the decomposition of its world by all means, plunging its domination into greater social depth, of the masses —deepening whose provoking economic conditions are the material subsumption of all social spheres under the cycles of capital accumulation, the distribution of the globe, of the entire globe, and the constitution of the proletariat as a class; that is, the same objective conditions that are at the basis of the emergence of the Communist Party.[3] The subjective dynamization of these conditions passes, as we say, through the formation of bourgeois cadres capable, as a whole, of handling themselves skillfully in all fields of knowledge and practice, constituting the bourgeois equivalent of the proletarian collective intellectual, which provides operability to the imperialist state and allows combining, systematically and with great synergy, all forms and tactics of counterrevolutionary or simply counterinsurgency struggle.

And this question is key because the central teaching of the modern revolution, according to Lenin, is that “only when the ‘lower classes’ do not want to live in the old way and the ‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.”[4] The crisis of the capitalist mode of production engenders revolution if and only if the proletarians do not want to continue living in the old way, if they have their highest form of proletarian class organization,[5] the Communist Party, at their disposal, if they have managed to articulate the subjective factor of the revolution. Otherwise, the crisis of capital ends with its restructuring, which is historically based on the aforementioned ideological and political penetration of imperialism into the depths of contemporary society, a mass society by definition and which becomes, in its entirety, the strategic theater of operations of the class enemy.

From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, this process deeply disrupts the ideological foundations of its domination. The growing weight of the spontaneous and reformist movement of the working class in the process of capital accumulation itself questions the individualist-liberal basis on which the bourgeoisie had based, in general terms, its view of the world. The recognition of the trade union as the corporatist representative of the working class is, implicitly, the recognition that the appropriation of the social product is also just that, a social issue.[6] The black moth of imperialism emerges from this cocoon renewed by the reactionary subversion of the communist program of socialization of property, conveniently regulated and crumbled based on quotas, and certainly not as a premise of that integral development of the individual that Marx talked about, but as guarantee of the order between the various branches of production, on the one hand, and all social spheres, on the other.[7] The state becomes a committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie to a degree that Engels could not foresee when he wrote that statement. If its bureaucratic apparatus was an already threatening itch in the sweaty folds of the flesh of the old liberal bourgeoisie, it has now become a suppurating scab that surrounds its entire skin. The state, once limited to clearing the obstacles of free capitalist accumulation and apparently situated above the sum of equal individuals that civil society always was for the liberal creed, is increasingly taking on the appearance of a living organism, in which each element of society has its corporatist role and function: an authentic system of links that goes from the executive-administrative direction of public affairs and its military apparatus to the most open and spontaneous organizations; from the hard core of the state to the trade union, to the party, to the press, to the neighborhood association, to the snitch on the balcony and the police without a badge.

Up to this point we have limited ourselves to the highest vertex of this system, the bourgeois collective intellectual (which encompasses the state bureaucratic and executive apparatus, Parliament, intelligence and security organizations, lobbies, academia, etc.), and the transmission belts that embed their direction in the whole of society. But “transmission belt” does not mean anything other than the mass line contemplated from the organizational angle: what it is about is the political content that it embodies, and in which the bourgeois political game is deployed without calling into question the hard, economic and executive nerve of its system of domination. Precisely because imperialism neutralizes spontaneity from its very presuppositions, it is preserved as the elemental political logic of the last class society (expression of the anarchy of production), no matter how incorporated it is in the mechanisms of control, discipline and direction of its necessary counterpart, the state. In this game of forces, the bourgeois parties are only distinguished by the degree to which they aspire to carry this incorporation as the last barrier against social decomposition or against the revolutionary overcoming of the system.[8]

On the other hand, if this relationship between spontaneous movement and the imperialist state is internal on the general-historical level (which we have analyzed up to this point), on the immediate political level both elements appear as external, one in front of the other. This particularity engenders countless spontaneous illusions in the theoretical vanguard, educated for decades in political empiricism and opportunistic presbyopia. But appearance does not mean fiction; it does not mean unreality. It has a moment of truth, because it is through this gap of relative political exteriority where spontaneity disruptively penetrates official life, and forces it to permanently reconfigure itself in order to once again guarantee the peaceful accumulation of capital. That capital is the continuous revolution of all the conditions of production makes this disruption systematic and inevitable, just as systematic and inevitable is the obligation of the bourgeoisie to find new checkpoints of political balance for incessantly changing conditions. That is the objective content of reform under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and in the absence of the revolutionary subject —an absence that only today, at the closing of the October Cycle, allows us to contemplate that content in its “purest” form, no longer as a by-product of the proletarian revolution. That is why contemporary bourgeois politics is, necessarily, mass politics, and in the first instance directed at the sector of the masses that stands out in this disruption from its immediate demands: the practical vanguard.

As the reader will know, the conquest of the practical vanguard is the central question of the political reconstitution of communism, that is, of the reconstitution of the Communist Party, of the organized revolutionary movement. And blessed be the proletarian intuition of the Comintern, because when it puts the label of social-fascists on the bloodthirsty dogs of the SPD, it does so in the context of that strategic battle for the revolutionary recomposition of the German proletariat after the war.[9] And that is the key to the matter: the practical vanguard. The political crisis of the liberal-parliamentary system, eaten away from below by spontaneous movements that are the living expression of the anarchy of production, has several possible solutions. We will point out, for the purposes of this analysis, the two extremes: the proletarian revolution as a real solution to the problems of the masses, which inevitably involves the (re)constitution of the Communist Party; or the possibility, ultimately and among others, of recomposing the bourgeois order on the basis of an organized, fascist, reactionary mass movement, in which that practical vanguard —the key to spontaneous movement— is incorporated not into the transmission belts of the revolution, but to those of the counterrevolution. This organic fusion tends to suppress, in turn, the liberal coordinates of the traditional political domination of the bourgeoisie, but not in the direction of the proletarian commune state, but in that of the corporatist state, which implies the shrinking of democracy for the ruling class itself and the expulsion from the political game of sectors of the bourgeoisie that once fully participated in it (one of the characteristics that the RL has been pointing out as fundamental to fascism). This is the structural logic of the matter, its conditions of possibility. Whether this possibility becomes an effective reality, and to what degree, is a question that belongs to real historical development; it is at that level, in the concrete analysis of the concrete situation, where it must be examined and determined (political line).

In effect, we are talking about a logic: corporatism nests in the depths of the political logic of the imperialist state, and fascism is, considered from this angle, its extreme development, the consummation of the assembling of the masses as the organizational pillar of the state. This is not an apodictic law; it is not about the deterministic, inexorable and finalistic consummation of some premises. In fact, and as we have already said, the very revolutionary nature of the bourgeois mode of production makes any form of state, any political balance reached at this or that moment, in itself something precarious (equilibrium suggests an idea of zero-sum contradictory forces, not a dead, deflated stability). The monopoly of political power by a single faction of the bourgeoisie is an exceptional form, not the normal one for a society based on the production of goods and competition.

Therefore, specifically, and preventing both the abuse of this category and its sociological-scientistic deturpation, corporatism expresses a certain correlation of forces, a certain state of the class struggle, whose natural thermometer is the practical vanguard. It is the political nature of its ideas, customs and traditions, that is, of its consciousness, that determines its receptivity to a possible authoritarian or fascist resolution of the crisis of the state, beyond speculations about cold objective, structural and deterministic tendencies that have little to do with the Marxist analysis —and they tend to be behind the simplistic assimilations of imperialist bourgeois democracy and fascism, strictly reduced to repression, or to the open terrorist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, according to the limited formula of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. And yes, in the October Cycle the threat of the proletarian revolution was the factor that precipitated the adoption of the fascist form of domination by the bourgeoisie. But, precisely, the absence of the revolution as an ideological, political, cultural and moral referent for the masses creates a more than favorable environment so that, in situations of social crisis, more or less permanent today, the objective tendency towards corporatism is implemented naturally as the default political logic at all levels of society, including, of course, the practical vanguard of the class. And it is in the latter where the thesis of social-fascism acquires sense.

---...iii. The thesis of social-fascism is the generalization of the Leninist thesis that the spontaneous development of the labor movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology,[10] but seen from the side of the counterrevolutionary role of opportunism when the proletariat has historically conquered its highest form of class organization and split the labor movement. In line with that conception of the state as a chain of links, in which every scoundrel has his place under the black sun of imperialism, it is the bourgeois workers’ party that historically embodies reform, which spontaneously directs the resistance movement of the class (which encompasses all its partial expressions, not only the economic and trade unionist) and which has an immediate responsibility in the formation of the culture, traditions and certainties that define the leaders of said movement, its practical vanguard. For this reason, and if the Communist Party is distinguished from the reformist workers’ party by ideology,[11] the state of said layer expresses not only the degree of social maturity of the proletarian revolution, but also that of the counterrevolution, that of the ideological and political conditions for the constitution of a reactionary mass movement. Since the universal progress that the revolutionary bourgeoisie once advocated died, the feverish apology for the particular improvement that imperialism celebrates cannot have any further purpose than to feed the sectoral, selfish, corporate, gregarious, narrow, mediocre, self-satisfied, accommodating and petty consciousness of the masses, cretinism, opportunism, ignorance, careerism, submission, servility; a culture located a stone’s throw away from the fascist restructuring of the mass movement, with or against the very reformists who fueled it.[12] Right and equality before the law appear incapable of offering more democracy, of offering solutions to the problems of the masses, and must be transgressed if the dominant state of affairs is to be ensured. And there is no longer any place for the liberal preventions of someone like Sieyès, who recommended keeping particular interests out of politics so that the Ré-publique would not degenerate into Ré-totale. Today, the spontaneously reformist character of the imperialist state is generally fed by the same subjective conditions as its authoritarian, fascist transmutation.

And this is true for the entire transition from capitalism to communism; the thesis of social-fascism means that “the permanence of the reformist organization type expresses that, in the first place, the process of conscious elevation of the masses towards the place of the communist vanguard is necessarily gradual,”[13] but focused from the point of view of reaction, from the in view of the steps that the bourgeois labor movement takes to preserve its privileges and oppose the revolutionary transformation of the class. This includes, of course, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat too, as Mao perceptively suggested when he referred to the revisionist USSR as social-fascist and pointed out that the People’s Republic of China was under the exact same risk, a risk tragically materialized after 1976. Indeed, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the highest point of the revolutionary class struggle of the Cycle, was also the point of greatest maturity of the counterrevolution: from the point of view of the ideology promoted by the right of the CPC (productivism, material incentives, chauvinism, feminism, etc., all of them painted red) and from the point of view of the political articulation of their counterrevolutionary work. Waving the red flag against the red flag was to raise the Red Guards against the Red Guards, to send the shock workers of the counterrevolution against the shock workers of the revolution; that is, confronting the sectors that were objectively situated in the practical vanguard as it existed under the conditions of socialism and that represented, respectively, the reformist consciousness and the revolutionary consciousness of the class. That is precisely the form that the mature proletarian revolution assumes: civil war between the organized revolutionary masses and the organized counterrevolutionary masses, between the highest form of organization of the proletariat (the Communist Party) and the highest form of organization of the bourgeoisie (the state plus its transmission belts). And it is not at all coincidental that its last line of defense is the reformist workers’ party, the strategist of the counterrevolution, since it is the one which can best pilot its social roots in the last and deepest class war in history by exploiting the spontaneous, reformist consciousness of the proletariat[14] (which is also a negative index of the potentiality of this class, given the objective place it occupies in capitalist social relations and that the bourgeoisie cannot ignore to articulate the political conditions of its domain).

The thesis of social-fascism requires, therefore, analyzing the correlation between reaction and revolution at a given moment, and also the class struggles between the fractions of the bourgeoisie itself, especially when, as is the case, the revolution is absent from the social scene. In that sense, we do not need to look further than to the Spain is different cliché: the Spanish state is an imperialist State, where the communist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat are the order of the day, and where the hegemon of the bourgeois labor movement, the PSOE, is amply accredited as the left hand of the bourgeois dictatorship and as its ultra-reactionary spearhead. Since its debut as a party of government after the Transition, Spanish socialism has stood out as an efficient anti-worker manager, it has waged an authentic terrorist war against the Basque national movement, stirring up discord between peoples, and it has enthusiastically joined the military adventures of its imperialist bloc in the former Yugoslavia, in Libya, in Ukraine, etc., in addition to other niceties that would make the list endless. From their ranks have come the González and the Zapateros, the Solanas and the Chacones, the Borrells, the Calvos and other fanatics. There can be no doubt about its sinister nature and the destiny that the proletariat has to reserve for it.

Now, when the fraction of financial capital represented by Aznar and the Partido Popular hawks unilaterally broke with part of the old consensus of 1975–1982 (with the intervention in Iraq, the Atlanticist turn at the expense of Europe and the government based on decrees) and spurred a certain fascistic tendency —not so much because of its nostalgic and irredentist rhetoric as because it meant the marginalization of a sector of the ruling class itself, including the labor aristocracy—, the PSOE and everything to its left threw themselves into the mobilizations against the war. And they did not do it, of course, out of anti-war convictions (UGT called a terrifying two-hour strike), but because the strategic interests of the Europeist Spanish state and the right of the sectors represented by the socialists and Izquierda Unida to their piece of the imperialist cake were at stake. Then, they fully demonstrated their ability to redirect the mobilizations of the time to their own benefit (against the war, for the Prestige case, for the lies about 11-M…), without, of course, talking about manipulation or deviation from its natural course: the slogans of the anti-war movement were none other than those of pacifism and its maximum reach was the punishment vote against the Partido Popular. But in a context in which the dominant contradiction in the world was between the imperialist countries and the oppressed peoples, and with the Spanish state going through a time of economic stability, Zapatero’s first government was presented as the restoration of the old consensus, of the old rules of the game, as champion of the essences of liberal democracy against Aznar’s petty partisanship. The political crisis of 2002–2004 did not end with the deepening of the fascist path initiated by Aznarism, but with its interruption and the channeling of social unrest through a greater democratic opening for the labor aristocracy, the bourgeoisies of the oppressed nations and the sectors of the Spanish bourgeoisie marginalized by the Partido Popular—a result that was reflected in the vanguard in the form of an insufferable and demagogic resurrected republicanism, sponsored by Zapatero himself and whose high tide lasted more than a decade.

These conditions began to change when the second decade of the century arrived, after the crack of 2008 and with the war in Syria, when the good times ended and the imperialist unilateralism of the United States began to be called into question by Russian and Chinese imperialism. In the Spanish state it was expressed as what we have called Restoration Crisis 2.0, whose first stages were marked by 15-M and the explosion of the national question in Catalonia —an expression of the disorganization of the labor aristocracy and various strata of the Catalonian bourgeoisie, respectively. As the RL pointed out at the time, the rise of Podemos came to demonstrate the total bankruptcy of the schemes of revisionism and the absolute superfluity of the red identity to ride the spontaneous movement and sit in Congress to legislate some small reforms.

The 15-M cycle, as left-wing mobilization, inevitably dominated by the spiteful labor aristocracy, yes, but also the embodiment of the deepest social crisis since the Transition, contributed to the development of the revolution in the Spanish state in the sphere in which it is developing today: it unleashed the open crisis of revisionism and catalyzed the proliferation of circles of propagandists attached to the RL, the basis on which it was able to jump from opinion trend to a political movement in its own right. But, at a general social level, 15-M and Podemos did not and could not aspire to anything other than the restoration of the old positions lost by the labor aristocracy, the resolution of the crisis not forward, but backward. Consequently, the Spanish state was its natural and logical framework of action, the venerable democratic institutions were the highest level to which to aspire (that narrow heaven, or lil’heaven, that had to be taken by storm) and the usurpation of the place of the PSOE was the logical and coherent roadmap, not to mention its shameless vocation for the Spanish state to climb positions in the European imperialist chain.

But the old social pact laid broken in pieces. It was not the river Rubicon, but the Styx, that re-hashed social democracy was crossing. Contrary to Zapatero’s restauratio, the refoundation of the alliance of the labor aristocracy with the imperialist bourgeoisie could not be carried out with a vulgar parliamentary incantation. The conjured demonic powers ran at their free will, without the sorcerer’s apprentice bothering too much to try to tame them: we have already commented on another occasion[15] about Podemos’ liberal disregard for establishing itself as a mass party, sacrificing links with the spontaneous movement in the altar of Spain and the institutions. This clumsiness of the enemy —which the proletariat must keep in mind even if it cannot afford to always count on it— conditioned the way in which the first act of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was resolved: recovery of the PSOE as hegemon of the bourgeois workers’ party and state party (which has managed to drag Podemos, IU-PCE and a good part of revisionism) and starvation of the 15-M and the Catalan national movement in the face of the arrogance of its reformist and nationalist leaders, certifying their bankruptcy as referents of reformism and of national bourgeois-democratic liberation, respectively.

And the chickens have come to roost. By the time the motion of censure against Rajoy triumphs, and especially by the time Unidas Podemos (UP) enters the PSOE government, the spontaneous leftist movement is practically desiccated and the only thing sustaining the most progressive government in history is the permanent state of alarm: first the anti-fascist alert, then the COVID alert and, lately, the Borrellian closing of ranks around the Euro-Atlantic imperialist bloc (with all that this has added to the strengthening of the repressive apparatus of the state). The recent general elections have brought us another helping of emotional blackmail, unity against fascism and hackneyed reactionary clichés about the “two Spains.” All of this not only indicates the discredit and lack of an promising, and even credible, program of the “social-communist” camp, as all political commentators never tire of repeating. It expresses, above all, its objective inability to find the conditions, consensus and rules of the game that establish a new point of political balance for the Spanish state. It is not a problem of lack of will, but rather it is the crisis of the economic foundations of the welfare state, based on technological development sustained by strong public intervention and the more or less continuous increase in the productive force of labor, as well as its rate of exploitation. This model, which with its ups and downs roughly corresponds to an entire cycle, could combine economic growth and international competitiveness with the increase in real wages, the affirmative involvement of the monopolistic-imperialist state in the reproduction of the labor force and the maintenance of a broad public sector —state, regional, provincial and municipal— that redistributed part of the surplus value produced (social security, health, social policies, a large body of civil servants, subsidies for trade unions and their apparatus, etc.). But it all depended on not stopping that movement. This delicate rhythm broke down at the end of the first decade of the century and, at least in the countries of the imperialist West, it is not in sight that can be recomposed without the sacrifice of the material and human surplus.

In summary: the labor aristocracy has lost part of its traditional privileges as a reactionary dominant class, and the failed assault on the heavens of 15-M and Podemos has put an end to the old socio-liberal certainties that allowed it to recover its position in 2004–2008. Not in vain, people like Losantos have pointed to Zapatero the Bolivarian as the political father of Iglesias, and from that point of view they are absolutely right. It is an arc that goes from the Comprehensive Law on Gender Violence to the reactionary women’s strike of March 8, 2018 and the law of only “yes” is “yes,” from the federalizing fit of the Miravit Statute and the nation of nations to the lukewarm attitude of Podemos and company in the face of the national oppression of Catalunya (more concerned with marketing than with democracy), from the alliance of civilizations and Moratinos’ multilateralism to the Europeist commitment of the PSOE-UP tandem, from the Law of Historical Memory to the last “red” republican program of revisionism, etc.

All these reformist keys have been defining not so much of a style of doing politics, but of the program with which the labor aristocracy and the pactist sector of the bourgeoisie resolved the crisis caused by Aznar’s second term, but which is failing without palliatives to solder the joints that burst with the Restoration Crisis 2.0. The figure of Yolanda Díaz expresses like no other the current volatility and precariousness of the objective bases of the reformist party. On the one hand, revalidation of all the essentials of the Partido Popular’s labor reform, that is, the reform that sanctioned the reduction of the amount of structural participation of the labor aristocracy in the distribution of surplus value.[16] On the other, a large compensatory bribe of 17 million for the trade union centrals in the General State Budgets of 2022 (an increase of almost 100% since the communist minister took possession of the Labor portfolio)… but that, like all bribery of this nature, it is specific and must be revalidated every year, without restoring the position of the trade unions in the state or protecting it from political and electoral wobbles. Irene Montero, for her part, is the one who best personifies the crisis of its subjective foundations. The so-called civil war of feminism and, above all, the scandal of the law of only “yes” is “yes” constitute the natural indicator of the extent to which feminism —not long ago one of those pillars of consensus— has become incapable of generating agreement even within the reformist camp. Of course, much less has the bourgeois workers’ party been able to ingratiate itself with the social sector embodied in VOX and the Partido Popular, whose fight against the Sanchista state is eloquent about the extent to which the unity of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie has broken down to continue dominating jointly or by turnism. And it is clear that the party of the discontented is not, today, on the left side of the bourgeois political spectrum. Progressivism entrenches itself firmly in its old positions; reaction takes action and initiative. The subversives and seditionists jealously defend the current legality; the immobilists cry out for its subversion. The party of rebellion votes against the rebellion; the party of order, against itself. Dynamic Spain stays at home; backward Spain overtakes from the right. Political integrity is represented by a jacket; clientelism, a fanatic of its inexorable principles. The secessionists work diligently for the unity of Spain; the Spainists, for their dissolution. The reds look to the past; the whites, to the future. The sense of state is the interest of the party; politics, technocracy. The conservative party is the PSOE; the revolutionary party, the Civil Guard.

---... In this mess the bourgeoisie is unable to understand itself and cries out for certainty. And in the same way that after the good days came the bad days, after the bad days came the worst days. The current social-chauvinist plague —not at all reducible to a series of organizations or individuals— is the reflection, on the vanguard of the class, of the crisis of the traditional liberal-reformist program, fundamentally shared by revisionism, and the attempt of a fraction of the labor aristocracy to devise an opportunist program of a new style, free of the commitments and complexes that until now gave order to the way this class had of understanding its reactionary political project of shared domination with big capital. That is the entire content of the battles between the undefined left and the politically incorrect inquisitors of progressive postmodernism: whether to preserve the old tactic of the labor aristocracy or look for a new one under the skirts of mature opportunism, with all the intermediate positions and mixed breeds that fit between the two. No one is innocent in this game: the strength with which social-chauvinism has erupted is directly proportional to the tenacity with which the false communists have insisted on selling communism to the trade unionist, republican, feminist and other consensuses for decades, hindering the recovery of revolutionary Marxism as a conception of the world and as an ideological referent for the vanguard itself. They are nothing more than two successive links in the same careerist chain, of the same petty class resentful of the loss of its dusty dominant class privileges.

Social-chauvinism thus appears as the opportunist critique of opportunism, at a time when the crisis of the previous reformist program opens the door to a greater reverberation of its revolutionary critique: while revolutionary Marxism champions the consistent application of the right of self-determination against the marketing of small-nation nationalism, social-chauvinism cries out for the unity of Spain; while revolutionary Marxism points out the imperative to destroy the imperialist state, social-chauvinism demands its best executive-police strengthening and its departure from Euro-Atlantic structures to carry out its scavenger foreign policy in a sovereign manner and without supposed restraints; while revolutionary Marxism shoots against the plural left due to the reactionary nature of the construction of the movement as a sum of partial fronts, social-chauvinism does so due to its workerist exclusivism; while revolutionary Marxism takes aim at feminism for its counterrevolutionary and corporatist nature, social-chauvinism criticizes it for its inability to serve its political project, that is, for not being corporatist enough (hence it contrasts feminist corporatism with the equally reactionary and identity-based trade unionist, workerist corporatism); while the war cry of revolutionary Marxism is proletarians of all countries, unite!, social-chauvinism sobs over the borders and masturbates morbidly with nonsense about the Hispanosphere and Anglo-German capitalism, with the Spanish workers’ nation, with one country for the working class, etc., etc.

This ideological shift within the theoretical vanguard carries with it the possibility that the bulk of the population, and especially that decisive practical vanguard, ends up conflating communism with social-chauvinism and the squadron, para-police rhetoric, in which a not inconsiderable part of the theoretical vanguard frolics today. This last question not only determines the political profit that this trend can obtain in the short term, especially when the Spanish political panorama has ostensibly turned to the right and when there are many bourgeois cadres who keep an eye on the left without complexes (as yesterday they kept them on the plural left). It also poses a strategic problem for the reconstitution of communism, to the extent that it stokes national distrust in the name of socialism and distributes its indigestible ideological stew among the masses, discrediting Marxist (further) and making it difficult the fight to recover its referentiality. Not only among the theoretical vanguard; in the practical vanguard too, making it more receptive to chauvinist and authoritarian demagoguery as a way to solve the crisis, which would already place us on the threshold of a possible fascist mass movement. This may force a considerable tactical adjustment of the Plan of Reconstitution, to the extent that communism would find itself in contradiction between the low degree of development of its reconstitution (today ideological, centered on the theoretical vanguard of the class) and the development of a reactionary, fascist, mass movement (the fight against which requires mechanisms that, by their nature, are rather located in the set of tasks corresponding to the political reconstitution, to the reconstitution of the Communist Party).

If the previous chapter of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was the swan song of the old dogmas, in the present arc the articulation of the new ones is played out. Regarding the vanguard of the working class, it can be expected that the development of the social-chauvinist trend will either distance it from all problems related to communism and party construction, or will continue to digest “classical” revisionism and channel its crisis into the direction of building a new revisionist political platform that is more or less operational and opportunistically mature. Both possibilities can occur. In that sense, social-chauvinism has an advantage, both because it rows in favor of the political current of the Spanish state and because its hysterical representatives are taking the task of conquering public opinion and weaving a minimum ideological harmony with their audience very seriously, exploiting precisely the bankruptcy of the previous reformist cycle and the fatigue of a good part of the vanguard with its clichés and fetishes. On the other hand, we are already seeing that the posthumous heralds of the latter respond to the development of social-chauvinism in the vanguard by attempting to reverse history and insisting on the old plural reformist program and the old multicolored “communism” (the “sum of struggles”), despite the fact that it has failed, despite the fact that its failure has been the immediate cause of the Spanish fever and despite the fact that this bet leads them to greater political irrelevance as the crisis of the state deepens. Revolutionary Marxism takes no sides here, and the proletariat is only responsible for denouncing the ones and the others and the internal bond that unites them, which is what substantiates the thesis of social-fascism in the current circumstances of the class struggle in the Spanish state and, in particular, in the field of the theoretical vanguard. Only the consistent application of the Plan of Reconstitution will allow the crisis of revisionism to be translated into the development of the revolution, which today requires the construction of a vanguard referent and, in particular, the defense of proletarian internationalism and the unconditional fight against social-chauvinism. These are the inalienable bases of the revolutionary political line today.

---...iii. We can only move forward. If Esau, the disowned, is to rise and break the yoke from his neck, he will do so knowing that

we do not have reserves in the rear to back us up nor a stronger wall to shield our men from disaster. --

Committee for Reconstitution. (Spanish State). August 2023

--..

Notes

[1] “The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section working-class parties of every of the country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.” MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. The Communist Manifesto. Penguin Classics. London, 2014, pp. 342–343.

[2] “Lenin is the first great revolutionary leader to adopt the position of the strategist in the political leadership of the proletarian class struggle. . . . Unlike the barricade leader, who can only direct a military action, who identifies himself with it and who makes the entire course of the struggle depend on that action alone, thereby reducing all the capacity, intensity and depth of the political movement to the extent that a few tactical maneuvers can confer, Lenin, on the other hand, applies to the leadership of the movement a strategic perspective, that is, the method of combining tactical actions according to the strategic objective, always subordinating the former to the latter and using absolutely all possible means, political and military, in relation to each phase of the movement.” New Orientation on the Path of the Reconstitution of the Communist Party, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/Documentos/Fundamentales/NO_idiomas/Nueva_Orientacion_I_ENG.html [Bold from source – Editor’s Note.]

[3] It is interesting that the science of geopolitics emerged at this same time, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and is the closest thing to what we could call the subjectivity of imperialism. To the extent that capital accumulation is carried out at a global level and to the extent that any pre-capitalist geographical outside or only formally subsumed by capital disappears; to that extent, we say, the geostrategic doctrine of each imperialist state expresses its self-consciousness of the (geo)political conditions of the reproduction of its position in the process of capital accumulation, as well as those of its rise in the imperialist chain. It is enough to consider the theories of Mackinder, Ratzel/Haushofer and Spykman/Mahan, which correspond, clearly and respectively, with the position and expectations of British, German and American imperialism throughout the last century, in the same way as the rise of China today defines its Far Seas doctrine. But this topic, although suggestive, is not the subject of this work.

[4] “Left-Wing” Communism—an Infantile Disorder; in LENIN, V. I. Collected Works, volume 31. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 85.

[5] Ibidem, p. 50.

[6] “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. In this regard, see El sindicalismo que viene [The Trade Unionism to Come]; in LA FORJA # 35, 2006, pp. 50–63.

[7] Ellas quieren la libertad y el comunismo [Women Want Freedom and Communism], in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #6, December 2021, p. 39.

[8] “The fact that imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism is manifested first of all in the tendency to decay, which is characteristic of every monopoly under the system of private ownership of the means of production. The difference between the democratic-republican and the reactionary-monarchist imperialist bourgeoisie is obliterated precisely because they are both rotting alive.” LENIN: C. W., vol. 23, p. 106 [Bold our own – Editor’s Note.]

[9] An example of how, for the KPD in the late 1920s, the practical vanguard was not focused in the trade unions: “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113.

[10] What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement; in LENIN, C. W., v. 5, p. 384.

[11] Thesis of Reconstitution of the Communist Party, p. 9, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/Documentos/Fundamentales/Tesis_idiomas/Tesis_Reconstitucion_PC_ENG.pdf

[12] At the beginning of 1933, as “the political repression and marginalization of the Social Democrats rapidly became more obvious, so the trade unions under Theodor Leipart began to try to preserve their existence by distancing themselves from the Social Democratic Party and seeking an accommodation with the new regime. On 21 March the leadership denied any intention of playing a role in politics and declared that it was prepared to carry out the social function of the trade unions ‘whatever the kind of state regime’ in power. . . .

On 28 April they concluded an agreement with the Christian and Liberal Trade Unions that was intended to form the first step towards a complete unification of all trade unions in a single national organization.” EVANS: Op. cit., pp. 355–356.

[13] Thesis of Reconstitution, p. 7.

[14] This problem was clearly seen, although from liberal coordinates, by some of the most astute scholars of the Cultural Revolution: “[Mao] shares at least one conviction with Western liberals: that, while the difference between paternalistic socialism and fascism is a real one, the line between them is easily crossed. The Kuomintang crossed it; Mao believes that the Soviet Union has crossed it; and he fears that his own party is only a few short steps from it. . . . To both Mao and his liberal opponents in China, the enemy is the same: bureaucracy; but they diverge entirely on the means by which it should be combated. The liberals believe, essentially, in gradually improving the elite. Mao believes in destroying the foundations of the elite. He faces one of the fundamental problems of politics: the tendency for a levelling revolution to produce its own new privileged establishment. But he does not hope to defeat this possibility, as is widely believed in the West, simply by perpetually recurrent, disruptive mass protest.” GRAY, J.; CAVENDISH, P. Chinese Communism In Crisis. Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. Frederick A. Praeger. New York, 1968, pp. 67–68.

[15] Editorial: Ni nueva normalidad, ni vieja normalidad: ¡Revolución o barbarie! [Neither New Normalcy, Nor Old Normalcy: Revolution or Barbarism!]; in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #5, December 2020, pp. 12–13.

[16] The difficulties posed to temporary hiring, for their part, have already been successfully circumvented by the natural laws of competition: employers, large and small, quickly learned to use the trial period as an efficient substitute for the temporary contract. Dismissals before the end of the trial period (which do not require prior notice, reasoned cause, or compensation) skyrocketed by 620% last year: if in 2021 there were 75 000 employees who did not exceed said period, the end of 2022 recorded a total of 540 000.

...---...

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@@@ --- ---  Thesis on Social-Fascism    Thesis on Social-Fascism (Tesis sobre el socialfascismo) -- 

a.- Thesis on Social-Fascism (wordpress.com)

b. - Thesis on Social-Fascism – Comuna Roja (wordpress.com)

Comuna Roja Tesis sobre el socialfascismo -- Thesis on Social-Fascism (wordpress.com) kunturchawa 18 de febrero de [Esta es una traducción no oficial, el texto del Comité para la Reconstitución (Estado español) se puede leer en español aquí . Puede descargar la versión PDF de esta traducción haciendo clic aquí .] “Desde la revolución proletaria en Rusia y sus victorias a escala internacional, que ni la burguesía ni los filisteos esperaban, el mundo entero se ha vuelto diferente, y la burguesía en todas partes también se ha vuelto diferente”. Lenin Nadie ignora que el giro hacia la derecha del panorama político en el Estado español se ha correspondido en el movimiento comunista con la expansión febril de un socialchovinismo sin complejos . Pero pocos se atreven a sacar las consecuencias últimas de un problema que ya ha surgido numerosas veces en la historia de nuestra clase . El lector de Línea Proletaria sabrá que, en los últimos años, la Línea Reconstitución (RL) ha encontrado útil la categoría de socialfascismo para explicar el hilo blanco que lleva del oportunismo (y del oportunismo obrero en particular, pero no sólo) a la desarrollo de un movimiento de masas fascista . Hoy, el oportunismo sin complejos fantasea con alambres de púas, con seducir a las fuerzas armadas, con la patria obrera y con golpear, en nombre del comunismo , a quienes —como nosotros— ofenden la bandera nacional ( rojigualda o tricolor, que es lo mismo en este punto). Sus abuelos alemanes ya se pusieron la chaqueta de húsar prusiano para ordenar a los proletarios que fueran a morir en nombre del país , y, cuando Espartaco se levantó, hicieron lo mismo para ordenar a los patriotas que lo mataran en nombre del socialismo . Sus padres, los Khrushchev, los Brezhnev y compañía, también difundieron el socialismo en Hungría, en Checoslovaquia, en Afganistán (de la misma manera que sus hijos legítimos, el ultraconservador Putin y la ultraconservadora Rusia, propagaron la descomunización en Ucrania). Y todos recibieron, entonces, el mismo adjetivo del comunismo revolucionario: socialfascistas . No por casualidad, este término se sitúa fuertemente en primer plano en el contexto de dos de los tres grandes cambios que ha experimentado el movimiento obrero contemporáneo: el surgimiento histórico del Partido Comunista al inicio del Ciclo de Octubre (1917-1989) y la restauración del capitalismo en la URSS en los años 50, su transformación en “socialimperialista en el exterior y socialfascista en casa”, según Mao (el tercer gran giro fue la caída simbólica del Muro, a finales de los 80) . En estas coyunturas, sin embargo, el concepto de socialfascismo tuvo una proyección principalmente política, dejando a menudo en el aire la conexión de esta categoría en el cuerpo de la doctrina marxista-leninista. Y si bien nadie cuestiona verbalmente la centralidad que tiene la dictadura del proletariado o el Partido Comunista en esta corriente de pensamiento revolucionario, la noción de socialfascismo ha sido y es más problemática entre quienes se autodenominan marxista-leninistas. También entre los enemigos declarados del proletariado, cuya actitud ante el tema suele alternar entre la confusión y la sencillez. Mucho antes de su suicidio político, el joven Pablo Iglesias desafió a la Comintern de los locos años veinte, con su doctrina de clase contra clase y su uso del adjetivo socialfascista contra la socialdemocracia, y elogió a la sensata Comintern del Frente Popular, razonable y abierta. en materia de táctica política. Un consejo prudente mata más que la espada. Los revolucionarios deberían decidir no contrastar puerilmente dos capítulos de la historia de nuestra clase. También de descartar y adoptar conceptos basados ​​en el estrecho margen del cálculo político, que es el barómetro de los juicios de Iglesias sobre la Internacional Comunista (si bien el carácter ideológico-burgués de este tipo de razonamientos queda claro al considerar que la línea del Frente Popular no fue precisamente un éxito, ni siquiera desde el punto de vista del éxito político inmediato, como se desprende de su experiencia en estas tierras). Sea como fuere, la idea de socialfascismo ocupa un lugar extraño a los ojos de la mayoría que, amistosamente o desfavorablemente, habla de marxismo. Se asocia intuitivamente con el chovinismo y el nacionalismo fascista rojo , con el colaboracionismo de clases, con los lugartenientes obreros de la burguesía imperialista y también con la ciega intransigencia comunista hacia los socialdemócratas (al parecer, no exterminaron a suficientes proletarios de vanguardia para justificar que la Comintern los consideraba enemigos de clase). Al estar constituida por una mezcla de criterios empíricos, políticos, sentimentales y de otra índole, la intuición no puede sustituir la delimitación teórica y científica precisa, que es la que confiere carácter universal a una idea determinada. El plano de análisis que mejor nos posiciona para abordar esta tarea es el de la historia . Cerrado el Ciclo de revoluciones proletarias del siglo XX, los comunistas nos encontramos en la posición adecuada para dilucidar los presupuestos, la lógica y el significado de ese concepto, así como el lugar que debe ocupar en la teoría de vanguardia que resume los requerimientos de la revolución hoy. Empecemos por algunos resultados que ya están bien asentados en el trabajo que viene realizando la RL al respecto. El Partido Comunista se caracteriza por resaltar el factor consciente como determinante en la construcción del comunismo, brindando medios y herramientas en función del objetivo último de una sociedad sin clases —de ahí que, para su (re)constitución, se requiera la forja de cuadros de vanguardia educados en una concepción integral del mundo y en la lucha contra el esquematismo y el determinismo en general, y el economicismo en particular, es esencial. La RL ha señalado esta cuestión, que el leninismo fundamenta, como la clave para el inicio del nuevo Ciclo de la Revolución Proletaria Mundial (RPM), y esto la ha llevado a centrarse, teóricamente, en la cuestión de las limitaciones históricas que han tenido. llevó a la crisis de dicho tema (Resumen del Ciclo de Octubre). Este aspecto interno es el principal. Pero de aquí podemos sacar una derivación hacia el aspecto externo, que no es otro que el reflejo en la burguesía del surgimiento del Partido Comunista, la transformación de la lucha de clases de la burguesía contra el proletariado comunista , que también da una nueva contentos con el viejo oportunismo obrero —del que ya Lenin decía que su forma más elevada es, precisamente, el socialchovinismo. En esta intersección es donde mejor podemos comprender el contenido profundo del concepto de socialfascismo y sus implicaciones. El punto de vista de la estrategia puede resultar útil como una primera aproximación a este fenómeno histórico. La estrategia obliga a considerar todos los aspectos del problema (base elemental del análisis de clase marxista) y, además, enfatiza su relación con la intención final del actor en cuestión, del sujeto, con el orden, disposición y jerarquía de dichos elementos para lograr la meta proyectada ( tácticas-como-plan ). Y, aunque el marxismo ha definido el oportunismo como la renuncia a objetivos a largo plazo en favor de un éxito momentáneo (Engels), esta calificación hace tiempo que dejó de ser exacta en términos históricos (no necesariamente políticos). Es cierto que el reduccionismo dogmático y antimarxista que restringe a la clase obrera a su dimensión de capital variable (economismo, sindicalismo) cierra la posibilidad de esa perspectiva totalizadora, alimentándose políticamente de la reproducción ad aeternum del movimiento de resistencia y abjurando, en las palabras o de hecho, de cualquier objetivo final, como ya escribió el honesto oportunista Bernstein. Pero detenerse aquí es, hoy en día, insuficiente. La calificación de Engels se enuncia en una época en la que el partido de los trabajadores era el partido socialdemócrata de masas . En ese contexto, el oportunismo era y no podía ser más que la absolutización de los mecanismos de esa primera configuración política del proletariado: el sindicato como eje de la organización obrera (sobre el cual se construyeron los partidos socialdemócratas nacionales) y la lucha para reformas. y por los derechos políticos como motor de la constitución de la identidad de la clase trabajadora , de su conciencia de sí misma en oposición a la clase burguesa, todo esto incrustado en el marco nacional correspondiente. El líder táctico , que maniobra según un determinado movimiento en la calle o en el parlamento, era el modelo de cuadro del partido de masas. Precisamente, lo que distinguirá a la izquierda, la socialdemocracia revolucionaria , será su énfasis en el objetivo final de la clase obrera y su dimensión necesariamente internacional e internacionalista, tal como lo establece aquel programa de la revolución que fue El Manifiesto del Partido Comunista . [1] Pero esto se derrumbó en 1914. Los partidos socialdemócratas firmaron la Unión Sagrada con el imperialismo y se unieron eufóricamente a la dialéctica de estados e imperios . Ponen su gigantesca maquinaria de sindicatos, propaganda e instituciones al servicio de la causa nacional y siembran discordia entre los trabajadores de los pueblos de Europa. Desata el terror blanco en la izquierda internacionalista, terrorismo con el que se comprometen las masas socialdemócratas organizadas, cuando no la apoyan directamente. La antigua coexistencia dentro del movimiento obrero se convierte en su opuesto, en la represión armada del ala internacionalista, llevada a cabo con siniestra disciplina por el ala oportunista en estrecha colaboración con el Estado Mayor imperialista y la policía. Combinando como un zorro la zanahoria de las reformas sociales con el garrote militar, el oportunismo ha madurado hasta convertirse en un auténtico estratega de la contrarrevolución , recompensa merecida por los héroes del SPD que se sacrificaron para proclamar la república alemana, la de las ocho horas. jornada laboral... y organizar la matanza en Berlín y Munich, instruyendo a los Freikorps y a los Cascos de Acero sobre cómo se hacen estas cosas y educando a las masas trabajadoras en la defensa fanática de su estado imperialista. Este nuevo modelo de cuadro burgués, que se mueve con igual facilidad en las organizaciones de masas que en los departamentos de Estado, es el corolario imperialista del líder revolucionario comunista , del estratega leninista de la revolución, [2] un fenómeno similar a la escisión del socialismo en dos alas , en dos partidos . Para la burguesía, enfrentar estratégicamente la guerra de clases significa combinar, coordinar, distribuir y priorizar todos los recursos disponibles, desde la inteligencia, el desarrollo militar y las tácticas de contrainsurgencia hasta las reformas políticas y sociales, la inversión en la educación de las masas (en los tótems ideológicos burgueses) y la sacrificio de los intereses momentáneos o particulares de tal o cual capa de la burguesía en favor del sentido de Estado: cierre de filas que se expresa, naturalmente, como chovinismo. En cierto modo, y así como la primera experiencia revolucionaria madura del proletariado da origen al molde político de todo el proceso de la revolución hasta el comunismo (el Partido Comunista), la primera gran guerra anticomunista de la burguesía imperialista —conjuntamente con la socialdemocracia— proporciona las claves políticas de esa reacción en toda la línea que es el imperialismo . Detengámonos brevemente en esto. Como la contradicción entre fuerzas productivas y apropiación privada conlleva la tendencia al comunismo pero también la tendencia a la reestructuración del capital, la supervivencia de la burguesía como clase depende de detener por todos los medios la descomposición de su mundo, hundiendo su dominación en mayores niveles sociales. profundidad, de las masas —profundización cuyas condiciones económicas provocadoras son la subsunción material de todas las esferas sociales bajo los ciclos de acumulación de capital, la distribución del globo, del globo entero , y la constitución del proletariado como clase; es decir, las mismas condiciones objetivas que están en la base del surgimiento del Partido Comunista. [3] La dinamización subjetiva de estas condiciones pasa, como decimos, por la formación de cuadros burgueses capaces, en su conjunto, de manejarse hábilmente en todos los campos del conocimiento y de la práctica, constituyendo el equivalente burgués del intelectual colectivo proletario , que proporciona operatividad al Estado imperialista y permite combinar, sistemáticamente y con gran sinergia, todas las formas y tácticas de lucha contrarrevolucionaria o simplemente contrainsurgente. Y esta pregunta es clave porque la enseñanza central de la revolución moderna, según Lenin, es que “sólo cuando las 'clases bajas' no quieran vivir a la antigua usanza y las 'clases altas' no puedan seguir viviendo a la antigua usanza, que la revolución puede triunfar”. [4] La crisis del modo de producción capitalista engendra la revolución si y sólo si los proletarios no quieren seguir viviendo a la antigua usanza , si tienen su forma más elevada de organización de clase proletaria , [5] el Partido Comunista, en su poder. disposición, si han logrado articular el factor subjetivo de la revolución. De lo contrario, la crisis del capital termina con su reestructuración, que se basa históricamente en la antes mencionada penetración ideológica y política del imperialismo en las profundidades de la sociedad contemporánea, una sociedad de masas por definición y que se convierte, en su totalidad , en el teatro estratégico de operaciones del capital. el enemigo de clase. Desde el punto de vista de la burguesía, este proceso trastorna profundamente los fundamentos ideológicos de su dominación. El creciente peso del movimiento espontáneo y reformista de la clase trabajadora en el proceso mismo de acumulación de capital cuestiona la base individualista-liberal sobre la que la burguesía había basado, en términos generales, su visión del mundo. El reconocimiento del sindicato como representante corporativista de la clase trabajadora es, implícitamente, el reconocimiento de que la apropiación del producto social es también eso, una cuestión social. [6] La polilla negra del imperialismo emerge de este capullo renovado por la subversión reaccionaria del programa comunista de socialización de la propiedad, convenientemente regulado y desmenuzado en base a cuotas, y ciertamente no como premisa de ese desarrollo integral del individuo del que hablaba Marx. sino como garantía del orden entre las distintas ramas de la producción, por un lado, y todas las esferas sociales, por el otro. [7] El Estado se convierte en un comité para gestionar los asuntos de la burguesía en un grado que Engels no podía prever cuando escribió esa declaración. Si su aparato burocrático era ya un picor amenazador en los pliegues sudorosos de la carne de la vieja burguesía liberal, ahora se ha convertido en una costra supurante que rodea toda su piel. El Estado, alguna vez limitado a eliminar los obstáculos de la libre acumulación capitalista y aparentemente situado por encima de la suma de individuos iguales que siempre fue la sociedad civil para el credo liberal, está adquiriendo cada vez más la apariencia de un organismo vivo , en el que cada elemento de la sociedad tiene su papel y función corporativista: un auténtico sistema de vínculos que va desde la dirección ejecutivo-administrativa de los asuntos públicos y su aparato militar hasta las organizaciones más abiertas y espontáneas; desde el núcleo duro del Estado hasta el sindicato, pasando por el partido, pasando por la prensa, pasando por la asociación de vecinos, pasando por el soplón en el balcón y los policías sin placa. Hasta este punto nos hemos limitado al vértice más alto de este sistema, el intelectual colectivo burgués (que engloba el aparato burocrático y ejecutivo estatal, el Parlamento, las organizaciones de inteligencia y seguridad, los lobbies , la academia, etc.), y las correas de transmisión que Incrustar su dirección en toda la sociedad. Pero “cinturón de transmisión” no significa otra cosa que la línea de masas contemplada desde el ángulo organizativo : de lo que se trata es del contenido político que encarna, y en el que se despliega el juego político burgués sin cuestionar los objetivos duros, económicos y nervio ejecutivo de su sistema de dominación. Precisamente porque el imperialismo neutraliza la espontaneidad desde sus propios presupuestos, ésta se preserva como lógica política elemental de la sociedad de última clase (expresión de la anarquía de la producción), por más incorporada que esté a los mecanismos de control, disciplina y dirección de sus necesidades necesarias. contraparte, el Estado. En este juego de fuerzas, los partidos burgueses sólo se distinguen por el grado en que aspiran a llevar esa incorporación como última barrera contra la descomposición social o contra la superación revolucionaria del sistema. [8] Por otra parte, si esta relación entre el movimiento espontáneo y el Estado imperialista es interna en el nivel histórico general (que hemos analizado hasta este punto), en el nivel político inmediato ambos elementos aparecen como externos, uno frente al otro. otro. Esta particularidad engendra innumerables ilusiones espontáneas en la vanguardia teórica, educada durante décadas en el empirismo político y la presbicia oportunista. Pero apariencia no significa ficción ; no significa irrealidad . Tiene un momento de la verdad, porque es a través de esta brecha de relativa exterioridad política donde la espontaneidad penetra disruptivamente la vida oficial , y la obliga a reconfigurarse permanentemente para garantizar una vez más la acumulación pacífica del capital. El hecho de que el capital sea la revolución continua de todas las condiciones de producción hace que esta perturbación sea sistemática e inevitable, del mismo modo que es sistemática e inevitable la obligación de la burguesía de encontrar nuevos puntos de control del equilibrio político para condiciones que cambian incesantemente. Ese es el contenido objetivo de la reforma bajo la dictadura de la burguesía y en ausencia del sujeto revolucionario —ausencia que sólo hoy, al cierre del Ciclo de Octubre, nos permite contemplar ese contenido en su forma “más pura”, no ya no es un subproducto de la revolución proletaria. Por eso la política burguesa contemporánea es, necesariamente , política de masas, y en primera instancia dirigida al sector de las masas que se destaca en esta disrupción de sus demandas inmediatas: la vanguardia práctica . Como sabrá el lector, la conquista de la vanguardia práctica es la cuestión central de la reconstitución política del comunismo, es decir, de la reconstitución del Partido Comunista , del movimiento revolucionario organizado. Y bendita sea la intuición proletaria de la Internacional Comunista, porque cuando pone la etiqueta de socialfascistas a los perros sedientos de sangre del SPD, lo hace en el contexto de esa batalla estratégica por la recomposición revolucionaria del proletariado alemán después de la guerra. [9] Y esa es la clave del asunto: la vanguardia práctica. La crisis política del sistema liberal-parlamentario, carcomido desde abajo por movimientos espontáneos que son expresión viva de la anarquía de la producción, tiene varias soluciones posibles. Señalaremos, para los efectos de este análisis, los dos extremos: la revolución proletaria como solución real a los problemas de las masas, que implica inevitablemente la (re)constitución del Partido Comunista; o la posibilidad, en última instancia y entre otras , de recomponer el orden burgués sobre la base de un movimiento de masas organizado, fascista y reaccionario , en el que esa vanguardia práctica —la clave del movimiento espontáneo— no se incorpore a las correas de transmisión de la revolución, sino a los de la contrarrevolución . Esta fusión orgánica tiende a suprimir, a su vez, las coordenadas liberales de la dominación política tradicional de la burguesía, pero no en la dirección del Estado comuna proletario, sino en la del Estado corporativista , lo que implica la reducción de la democracia para los gobernantes. clase misma y la expulsión del juego político de sectores de la burguesía que alguna vez participaron plenamente en él (una de las características que la RL viene señalando como fundamental del fascismo). Ésta es la lógica estructural de la cuestión, sus condiciones de posibilidad. Si esta posibilidad se convierte en una realidad efectiva, y en qué medida, es una cuestión que pertenece al desarrollo histórico real; es en ese nivel, en el análisis concreto de la situación concreta , donde ésta debe ser examinada y determinada ( línea política ). En efecto, estamos hablando de una lógica: el corporativismo anida en lo más profundo de la lógica política del Estado imperialista, y el fascismo es, considerado desde este ángulo, su desarrollo extremo, la consumación de la concentración de las masas como pilar organizativo del sistema. el estado. Ésta no es una ley apodíctica; no se trata de la consumación determinista, inexorable y finalista de unas premisas. De hecho, y como ya hemos dicho, la propia naturaleza revolucionaria del modo de producción burgués hace que cualquier forma de Estado, cualquier equilibrio político alcanzado en este o aquel momento, sea en sí mismo algo precario ( el equilibrio sugiere una idea de suma cero contradictoria). fuerzas, no una estabilidad muerta y desinflada). El monopolio del poder político por parte de una sola facción de la burguesía es una forma excepcional , no normal , para una sociedad basada en la producción de bienes y la competencia. Por tanto, específicamente, y evitando tanto el abuso de esta categoría como su desvirtuación sociológico-científica, el corporativismo expresa una cierta correlación de fuerzas, un cierto estado de la lucha de clases, cuyo termómetro natural es la vanguardia práctica. Es la naturaleza política de sus ideas, costumbres y tradiciones, es decir, de su conciencia , la que determina su receptividad a una posible resolución autoritaria o fascista de la crisis del Estado, más allá de especulaciones sobre las frías tendencias objetivas, estructurales y deterministas que han tenido lugar. poco que ver con el análisis marxista —y suelen estar detrás de las asimilaciones simplistas de la democracia burguesa imperialista y del fascismo, estrictamente reducidas a la represión , o a la abierta dictadura terrorista de la burguesía , según la fórmula limitada del Séptimo Congreso del Internacional Comunista. Y sí, en el Ciclo de Octubre la amenaza de la revolución proletaria fue el factor que precipitó la adopción de la forma fascista de dominación por parte de la burguesía. Pero, precisamente, la ausencia de la revolución como referente ideológico, político, cultural y moral de las masas crea un ambiente más que favorable para que, en situaciones de crisis social, hoy más o menos permanentes, se implemente la tendencia objetiva al corporativismo. naturalmente, como la lógica política predeterminada en todos los niveles de la sociedad, incluida, por supuesto, la vanguardia práctica de la clase. Y es en este último donde cobra sentido la tesis del socialfascismo . La tesis del socialfascismo es la generalización de la tesis leninista de que el desarrollo espontáneo del movimiento obrero conduce a su subordinación a la ideología burguesa , [10] pero visto desde el lado del papel contrarrevolucionario del oportunismo cuando el proletariado ha conquistado históricamente su forma más elevada de organización de clases y escindió el movimiento obrero. De acuerdo con esa concepción del Estado como una cadena de eslabones, en la que cada sinvergüenza tiene su lugar bajo el sol negro del imperialismo, es el partido obrero burgués el que históricamente encarna la reforma, el que dirige espontáneamente el movimiento de resistencia de la clase ( que abarca todas sus expresiones parciales, no sólo la económica y sindical) y que tiene una responsabilidad inmediata en la formación de la cultura, tradiciones y certezas que definen a los líderes de dicho movimiento, su vanguardia práctica. Por ello, y si por su ideología se distingue al Partido Comunista del partido obrero reformista, [11] el estado de dicha capa expresa no sólo el grado de madurez social de la revolución proletaria, sino también el de la contrarrevolución, el de las condiciones ideológicas y políticas para la constitución de un movimiento de masas reaccionario. Desde que murió el progreso universal que alguna vez propugnó la burguesía revolucionaria, la febril apología de la mejora particular que celebra el imperialismo no puede tener otro propósito que alimentar al sector sectorial, egoísta, corporativo, gregario, estrecho, mediocre, satisfecho de sí mismo, complaciente y mezquino. conciencia de masas, cretinismo, oportunismo, ignorancia, arribismo, sumisión, servilismo; una cultura situada a tiro de piedra de la reestructuración fascista del movimiento de masas, con o en contra de los mismos reformistas que lo impulsaron. [12] El derecho y la igualdad ante la ley parecen incapaces de ofrecer más democracia , de ofrecer soluciones a los problemas de las masas, y deben ser transgredidos si se quiere garantizar el estado de cosas dominante. Y ya no hay lugar para las prevenciones liberales de alguien como Sieyès, que recomendaba mantener los intereses particulares fuera de la política para que la Ré-publique no degenerara en Ré-totale . Hoy en día, el carácter espontáneamente reformista del Estado imperialista se alimenta generalmente de las mismas condiciones subjetivas que su transmutación autoritaria y fascista. Y esto es válido para toda la transición del capitalismo al comunismo; La tesis del socialfascismo significa que “la permanencia del tipo de organización reformista expresa que, en primer lugar, el proceso de elevación consciente de las masas hacia el lugar de vanguardia comunista es necesariamente gradual”, [13] pero enfocado desde desde el punto de vista de la reacción , desde el punto de vista de los pasos que da el movimiento obrero burgués para preservar sus privilegios y oponerse a la transformación revolucionaria de la clase. Esto incluye, por supuesto, también el estado de la dictadura del proletariado, como sugirió perspicazmente Mao cuando se refirió a la URSS revisionista como socialfascista y señaló que la República Popular China corría exactamente el mismo riesgo, un riesgo trágicamente materializó después de 1976. De hecho, la Gran Revolución Cultural Proletaria, el punto más alto de la lucha de clases revolucionaria del Ciclo, fue también el punto de mayor madurez de la contrarrevolución: desde el punto de vista de la ideología promovida por la derecha del PCC (productivismo, incentivos materiales, chauvinismo, feminismo, etc., todos pintados de rojo ) y desde el punto de vista de la articulación política de su trabajo contrarrevolucionario. Agitar la bandera roja contra la bandera roja era levantar a los Guardias Rojos contra los Guardias Rojos, enviar a los trabajadores de choque de la contrarrevolución contra los trabajadores de choque de la revolución; es decir, enfrentar a los sectores que estaban objetivamente situados en la vanguardia práctica tal como existía en las condiciones del socialismo y que representaban, respectivamente, la conciencia reformista y la conciencia revolucionaria de la clase. Esa es precisamente la forma que asume la revolución proletaria madura: guerra civil entre las masas revolucionarias organizadas y las masas contrarrevolucionarias organizadas, entre la forma más alta de organización del proletariado (el Partido Comunista) y la forma más alta de organización de la burguesía (el Partido Comunista). estado más sus correas de transmisión). Y no es en absoluto casual que su última línea de defensa sea el partido reformista de los trabajadores, estratega de la contrarrevolución, ya que es el que mejor puede pilotar sus raíces sociales en la última y más profunda guerra de clases de la historia explotando la conciencia espontánea y reformista del proletariado [14] (que es también un índice negativo de la potencialidad de esta clase, dado el lugar objetivo que ocupa en las relaciones sociales capitalistas y que la burguesía no puede ignorar para articular las condiciones políticas de su dominio). La tesis del socialfascismo requiere, por tanto, analizar la correlación entre reacción y revolución en un momento dado , y también las luchas de clases entre las fracciones de la propia burguesía, especialmente cuando, como es el caso, la revolución está ausente del plano social. escena. En ese sentido, no hace falta mirar más allá del cliché de España es diferente : el Estado español es un Estado imperialista, donde la revolución comunista y la dictadura del proletariado están a la orden del día, y donde el poder hegemónico del El movimiento obrero burgués, el PSOE, está ampliamente acreditado como la mano izquierda de la dictadura burguesa y su punta de lanza ultrareaccionaria. Desde su debut como partido de gobierno tras la Transición, el socialismo español se ha destacado como un eficiente gestor antiobrero, ha librado una auténtica guerra terrorista contra el movimiento nacional vasco, atizando la discordia entre los pueblos, y se ha sumado con entusiasmo al aventuras militares de su bloque imperialista en la ex Yugoslavia, en Libia, en Ucrania, etc., además de otras sutilezas que harían la lista interminable. De sus filas han salido los González y los Zapateros, los Solanas y los Chacones, los Borrell, los Calvos y otros fanáticos. No cabe duda de su carácter siniestro y del destino que le tiene reservado el proletariado. Ahora, cuando la fracción del capital financiero representada por Aznar y los halcones del Partido Popular rompió unilateralmente con parte del viejo consenso de 1975-1982 (con la intervención en Irak, el giro atlantista a costa de Europa y del gobierno a base de decretos ) y espoleó una cierta tendencia fascista —no tanto por su retórica nostálgica e irredentista como porque significó la marginación de un sector de la propia clase dominante, incluida la aristocracia obrera—, el PSOE y toda su izquierda se lanzaron a las movilizaciones contra la guerra. Y no lo hicieron, claro está, por convicciones pacifistas (UGT convocó una aterradora huelga de dos horas), sino porque los intereses estratégicos del Estado europeísta español y la derecha de los sectores representados por los socialistas e Izquierda Unida estaban en juego su trozo del pastel imperialista. Entonces, demostraron plenamente su capacidad para redirigir las movilizaciones de la época en su propio beneficio (contra la guerra, por el caso Prestige , por las mentiras sobre el 11-M…), sin hablar, por supuesto, de manipulación o desviación de sus objetivos. Curso natural : las consignas del movimiento pacifista no eran otras que las del pacifismo y su máximo alcance fue el voto de castigo contra el Partido Popular. Pero en un contexto en el que la contradicción dominante en el mundo era entre los países imperialistas y los pueblos oprimidos, y con el Estado español atravesando un momento de estabilidad económica, el primer gobierno de Zapatero se presentó como la restauración del viejo consenso, de la viejas reglas del juego, como defensor de las esencias de la democracia liberal contra el mezquino partidismo de Aznar. La crisis política de 2002-2004 no terminó con la profundización de la vía fascista iniciada por el aznarismo, sino con su interrupción y la canalización del malestar social a través de una mayor apertura democrática para la aristocracia obrera, las burguesías de las naciones oprimidas y los sectores de la burguesía española marginada por el Partido Popular, resultado que se reflejó en la vanguardia en forma de un republicanismo resucitado insufrible y demagógico, auspiciado por el propio Zapatero y cuyo auge duró más de una década. Estas condiciones comenzaron a cambiar cuando llegó la segunda década del siglo, tras el crack de 2008 y con la guerra en Siria, cuando los buenos tiempos terminaron y el unilateralismo imperialista de Estados Unidos comenzó a ser cuestionado por el imperialismo ruso y chino. . En el Estado español se expresó como lo que hemos llamado Crisis de la Restauración 2.0 , cuyas primeras etapas estuvieron marcadas por el 15-M y la explosión de la cuestión nacional en Cataluña —expresión de la desorganización de la aristocracia obrera y de diversos estratos de la sociedad catalana—. burguesía, respectivamente. Como señaló en su momento RL, el ascenso de Podemos vino a demostrar la total quiebra de los esquemas del revisionismo y la absoluta superfluidad de la identidad roja para montarse en el movimiento espontáneo y sentarse en el Congreso a legislar algunas pequeñas reformas. El ciclo del 15-M, como movilización de izquierdas , inevitablemente dominada por la rencorosa aristocracia obrera, sí, pero también encarnación de la crisis social más profunda desde la Transición, contribuyó al desarrollo de la revolución en el Estado español en el ámbito en que está desarrollando hoy: desató la crisis abierta del revisionismo y catalizó la proliferación de círculos de propagandistas adscritos a RL, base sobre la cual pudo saltar de una corriente de opinión a un movimiento político por derecho propio. Pero, a nivel social general, el 15-M y Podemos no aspiraban ni podían aspirar a otra cosa que la restauración de las viejas posiciones perdidas por la aristocracia obrera, la resolución de la crisis no hacia adelante, sino hacia atrás. En consecuencia, el Estado español era su marco natural y lógico de actuación, las venerables instituciones democráticas eran el nivel más alto al que aspirar (ese cielo estrecho, o pequeño cielo , que había que tomar por asalto ) y la usurpación del lugar del PSOE era la hoja de ruta lógica y coherente, por no hablar de su descarada vocación de que el Estado español escalara posiciones en la cadena imperialista europea. Pero el viejo pacto social quedó roto en pedazos. No era el río Rubicón, sino el río Estigia, el que estaba cruzando la socialdemocracia renovada. Al contrario de la restauratio de Zapatero, la refundación de la alianza de la aristocracia obrera con la burguesía imperialista no pudo llevarse a cabo con un vulgar encantamiento parlamentario. Los poderes demoníacos conjurados corrían a su libre albedrío, sin que el aprendiz de brujo se molestara demasiado en intentar domarlos: ya hemos comentado en otra ocasión [15] el desprecio liberal de Podemos por erigirse como un partido de masas , sacrificando vínculos con el Movimiento espontáneo en el altar de España y de las instituciones. Esta torpeza del enemigo —que el proletariado debe tener presente aunque no pueda contar siempre con él— condicionó la forma en que se resolvió el primer acto de la Crisis de la Restauración 2.0: la recuperación del PSOE como hegemonía de los trabajadores burgueses. 'partido y partido de Estado (que ha conseguido arrastrar a Podemos, IU-PCE y buena parte del revisionismo) y hambre del 15-M y del movimiento nacional catalán ante la soberbia de sus dirigentes reformistas y nacionalistas, certificando su la quiebra como referentes del reformismo y de la liberación nacional democrático-burguesa , respectivamente. Y las gallinas se han acostado. Cuando triunfa la moción de censura contra Rajoy, y especialmente cuando Unidas Podemos (UP) entra en el gobierno del PSOE, el movimiento de izquierda espontáneo está prácticamente desecado y lo único que sostiene al gobierno más progresista de la historia es el estado de alarma permanente. : primero la alerta antifascista , luego la alerta COVID y, últimamente, el cierre de filas borrelliano en torno al bloque imperialista euroatlántico (con todo lo que ello ha sumado al fortalecimiento del aparato represivo del Estado). Las recientes elecciones generales nos han traído otra ración de chantaje emocional, unidad contra el fascismo y clichés reaccionarios manidos sobre las “dos Españas”. Todo esto no sólo indica el descrédito y la falta de un programa prometedor , e incluso creíble, del campo “socialcomunista” , como no se cansan de repetir todos los comentaristas políticos. Expresa, sobre todo, su incapacidad objetiva para encontrar las condiciones, consensos y reglas de juego que establezcan un nuevo punto de equilibrio político para el Estado español. No es un problema de falta de voluntad, sino que es la crisis de los fundamentos económicos del Estado de bienestar , basado en el desarrollo tecnológico sostenido por una fuerte intervención pública y el aumento más o menos continuo de la fuerza productiva del trabajo, así como como su tasa de explotación. Este modelo, que con sus altibajos corresponde aproximadamente a un ciclo completo, podría combinar el crecimiento económico y la competitividad internacional con el aumento de los salarios reales, la participación afirmativa del Estado monopolista-imperialista en la reproducción de la fuerza laboral y el mantenimiento de la un amplio sector público —estatal, regional, provincial y municipal— que redistribuía parte de la plusvalía producida (seguridad social, salud, políticas sociales, gran cuerpo de funcionarios, subsidios a los sindicatos y sus aparatos, etc.). Pero todo dependía de no detener ese movimiento. Este delicado ritmo se rompió a finales de la primera década del siglo y, al menos en los países del Occidente imperialista, no se vislumbra que pueda recomponerse sin el sacrificio del excedente material y humano. En resumen: la aristocracia obrera ha perdido parte de sus tradicionales privilegios como clase dominante reaccionaria, y el fallido asalto a los cielos del 15-M y Podemos ha acabado con las viejas certezas socioliberales que le permitieron recuperar su posición. en 2004-2008. No en vano, gente como Losantos ha señalado a Zapatero el Bolivariano como el padre político de Iglesias, y desde ese punto de vista tienen toda la razón . Es un arco que va desde la Ley Integral sobre Violencia de Género hasta el reaccionario paro de mujeres del 8 de marzo de 2018 y la ley del sólo “sí” es “sí”, desde el encaje federalizador del Estatuto Miravit y la nación de naciones hasta la actitud tibia de Podemos y compañía ante la opresión nacional de Catalunya (más preocupada por el marketing que por la democracia), desde la alianza de civilizaciones y el multilateralismo de Moratinos hasta la apuesta europeísta del tándem PSOE-UP, desde la Ley de Memoria Histórica al último programa republicano “rojo” del revisionismo, etc. Todas estas claves reformistas han ido definiendo no tanto un estilo de hacer política, sino el programa con el que la aristocracia obrera y el sector pactista de la burguesía resolvieron la crisis provocada por el segundo mandato de Aznar, pero que está fracasando sin paliativos para soldar las articulaciones que estallan con la Crisis de la Restauración 2.0. La figura de Yolanda Díaz expresa como ninguna la actual volatilidad y precariedad de las bases objetivas del partido reformista. Por un lado, la revalidación de todos los elementos esenciales de la reforma laboral del Partido Popular, es decir, la reforma que sancionó la reducción del volumen de participación estructural de la aristocracia laboral en la distribución de la plusvalía. [16] Por otro, un cuantioso soborno compensatorio de 17 millones para las centrales sindicales en los Presupuestos Generales del Estado de 2022 (un aumento de casi el 100% desde que el ministro comunista tomó posesión de la cartera de Trabajo)… pero que, como todos El soborno de esta naturaleza es específico y debe ser revalidado cada año, sin restaurar la posición de los sindicatos en el estado ni protegerlos de vaivenes políticos y electorales. Irene Montero, por su parte, es quien mejor personifica la crisis de sus fundamentos subjetivos. La llamada guerra civil del feminismo y, sobre todo, el escándalo de la ley de que sólo “sí” es “sí” constituyen el indicador natural de hasta qué punto el feminismo —no hace mucho uno de esos pilares de consenso— se ha convertido incapaz de generar acuerdos ni siquiera dentro del campo reformista. Por supuesto, mucho menos ha podido el partido obrero burgués congraciarse con el sector social encarnado en VOX y el Partido Popular, cuya lucha contra el Estado sanchista es elocuente sobre hasta qué punto la unidad de las diferentes fracciones de la burguesía Se ha desmoronado para seguir dominando de manera conjunta o por turnismo . Y está claro que el partido de los descontentos no está hoy en el lado izquierdo del espectro político burgués. El progresismo se atrinchera firmemente en sus viejas posiciones; la reacción requiere acción e iniciativa. Los subversivos y sediciosos defienden celosamente la legalidad vigente; los inmovilistas claman por su subversión. El partido de la rebelión vota contra la rebelión; el partido del orden , contra sí mismo. La España dinámica se queda en casa; La España atrasada adelanta por la derecha. La integridad política está representada por una chaqueta; clientelismo , fanático de sus principios inexorables. Los secesionistas trabajan diligentemente por la unidad de España; los españolistas , para su disolución. Los rojos miran al pasado; los blancos , al futuro. El sentido de Estado es el interés del partido; política , tecnocracia. El partido conservador es el PSOE; el partido revolucionario , la Guardia Civil. En este lío, la burguesía es incapaz de entenderse a sí misma y clama por certeza. Y de la misma manera que después de los días buenos vinieron los días malos, después de los días malos vinieron los días peores. La actual plaga socialchovinista —en absoluto reducible a una serie de organizaciones o individuos— es el reflejo, en la vanguardia de la clase, de la crisis del tradicional programa liberal-reformista , fundamentalmente compartido por el revisionismo, y el intento de una fracción de la aristocracia obrera para idear un programa oportunista de nuevo estilo , libre de los compromisos y complejos que hasta ahora ordenaban la forma que tenía esta clase de entender su reaccionario proyecto político de dominación compartida con el gran capital. Ése es todo el contenido de las batallas entre la izquierda indefinida y los inquisidores políticamente incorrectos del posmodernismo progresista : si preservar la vieja táctica de la aristocracia obrera o buscar una nueva bajo las faldas del oportunismo maduro , con todas las posiciones intermedias y razas mixtas que encajan entre las dos. Nadie es inocente en este juego: la fuerza con la que ha estallado el socialchovinismo es directamente proporcional a la tenacidad con la que los falsos comunistas han insistido durante décadas en vender el comunismo a los consensos sindicalistas, republicanos, feministas y otros, obstaculizando la recuperación. del marxismo revolucionario como concepción del mundo y como referente ideológico de la propia vanguardia. No son más que dos eslabones sucesivos de la misma cadena arribista, de la misma clase mezquina resentida por la pérdida de sus polvorientos privilegios de clase dominante. El socialchovinismo aparece así como la crítica oportunista del oportunismo , en un momento en que la crisis del programa reformista anterior abre la puerta a una mayor reverberación de su crítica revolucionaria : mientras el marxismo revolucionario defiende la aplicación coherente del derecho de autodeterminación contra el marketing del nacionalismo de las naciones pequeñas, el socialchovinismo clama por la unidad de España; mientras el marxismo revolucionario señala el imperativo de destruir el Estado imperialista, el socialchovinismo exige su mejor fortalecimiento ejecutivo-policial y su salida de las estructuras euroatlánticas para llevar a cabo su política exterior carroñera de manera soberana y sin supuestas restricciones; mientras el marxismo revolucionario dispara contra la izquierda plural por el carácter reaccionario de la construcción del movimiento como suma de frentes parciales, el socialchovinismo lo hace por su exclusivismo obrerista; mientras que el marxismo revolucionario apunta al feminismo por su naturaleza contrarrevolucionaria y corporativista, el socialchovinismo lo critica por su incapacidad de servir a su proyecto político, es decir, por no ser lo suficientemente corporativista (de ahí que contraste el corporativismo feminista con el igualmente reaccionario y identitario). corporativismo sindicalista, obrerista); mientras el grito de guerra del marxismo revolucionario es ¡Proletarios de todos los países, uníos! , el socialchovinismo solloza sobre las fronteras y se masturba morbosamente con tonterías sobre la hispanosfera y el capitalismo angloalemán , con la nación obrera española, con un solo país para la clase obrera , etc., etc. Este giro ideológico dentro de la vanguardia teórica conlleva la posibilidad de que el grueso de la población, y especialmente esa decisiva vanguardia práctica, acabe fusionando el comunismo con el socialchovinismo y la retórica de escuadrón, parapolicial , en la que una parte no despreciable de La vanguardia teórica se divierte hoy. Esta última cuestión no sólo determina el beneficio político que esta tendencia puede obtener a corto plazo, máxime cuando el panorama político español se ha girado ostensiblemente hacia la derecha y cuando son muchos los cuadros burgueses que vigilan sin complejos a la izquierda (como ayer los mantuvieron en plural a la izquierda ). Plantea también un problema estratégico para la reconstitución del comunismo, en la medida en que atiza la desconfianza nacional en nombre del socialismo y distribuye su indigerible guiso ideológico entre las masas, desacreditando (además) al marxismo y dificultando la lucha por recuperar su referencialidad. . No sólo entre la vanguardia teórica; también en la vanguardia práctica, haciéndola más receptiva a la demagogia chauvinista y autoritaria como forma de resolver la crisis, lo que ya nos colocaría en el umbral de un posible movimiento fascista de masas. Esto puede obligar a un ajuste táctico considerable del Plan de Reconstitución, en la medida en que el comunismo se encontraría en contradicción entre el bajo grado de desarrollo de su reconstitución (hoy ideológica , centrada en la vanguardia teórica de la clase) y el desarrollo de una movimiento reaccionario, fascista, de masas (cuya lucha contra el cual requiere mecanismos que, por su naturaleza, se ubican más bien en el conjunto de tareas correspondientes a la reconstitución política , a la reconstitución del Partido Comunista). Si el capítulo anterior de la Crisis de Restauración 2.0 fue el canto del cisne de los viejos dogmas, en el presente arco se desarrolla la articulación de los nuevos. En cuanto a la vanguardia de la clase obrera, se puede esperar que el desarrollo de la tendencia socialchovinista la aleje de todos los problemas relacionados con el comunismo y la construcción del partido, o continúe digiriendo el revisionismo “clásico” y canalice su crisis hacia la vanguardia. dirección de construir una nueva plataforma política revisionista que sea más o menos operativa y oportunistamente madura . Pueden ocurrir ambas posibilidades. En ese sentido, el socialchovinismo tiene ventaja, tanto porque rema a favor de la corriente política del Estado español como porque sus histéricos representantes se toman muy en serio la tarea de conquistar la opinión pública y tejer una mínima sintonía ideológica con su audiencia. explotando precisamente la quiebra del anterior ciclo reformista y el cansancio de buena parte de la vanguardia con sus clichés y fetiches. Por otro lado, ya estamos viendo que los heraldos póstumos de este último responden al desarrollo del socialchovinismo en la vanguardia intentando revertir la historia e insistiendo en el viejo programa reformista plural y el viejo “comunismo” multicolor (el “comunismo ” multicolor). suma de luchas” ), a pesar de que ha fracasado, a pesar de que su fracaso ha sido la causa inmediata de la fiebre española y a pesar de que esta apuesta les lleva a una mayor irrelevancia política a medida que se profundiza la crisis del Estado. El marxismo revolucionario aquí no toma partido, y al proletariado sólo le corresponde denunciar a unos y a otros y el vínculo interno que los une, que es el que fundamenta la tesis del socialfascismo en las actuales circunstancias de la lucha de clases en el Estado español. y, en particular, en el campo de la vanguardia teórica. Sólo la aplicación consecuente del Plan de Reconstitución permitirá que la crisis del revisionismo se traduzca en el desarrollo de la revolución, que hoy requiere la construcción de un referente de vanguardia y, en particular, la defensa del internacionalismo proletario y la lucha incondicional contra la sociedad. -chovinismo . Éstas son las bases inalienables de la línea política revolucionaria hoy.

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1. - THESIS ON SOCIAL-FASCISM “Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoise nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too.” Lenin Nobody is unaware that the shift towards the right of the political panorama in the Spanish state has been corresponded in the communist movement with the feverish spread of an unapologetic socialchauvinism. But few dare to draw the ultimate consequences of a problem that has already arisen numerous times in the history of our class. The reader of Línea Proletaria will know that, in recent years, the Reconstitution Line (RL) has found the category of social-fascism useful to explain the white thread that leads from opportunism (and worker opportunism in particular, but not only) to the development of a fascist mass movement. Today, unapologetic opportunism fantasizes about barbed wire, about seducing the armed forces, about the workers’ fatherland, and about beating up, in the name of communism, those who—like us—offend the national flag (rojigualda or tricolor, which is the same at this point). Their German grandparents already put on the Prussian hussar’s jacket to order the proletarians to go die in the name of the country, and, when Spartacus rose up, they did the same to order the patriots to kill him in the name of socialism. Their parents, the Khrushchevs, the Brezhnevs and company, also spread socialism in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan (in the same way that their legitimate children, the ultra-conservative Putin and the ultra-conservative Russia, spread decommunization in Ukraine). And they all received, then, the same adjective from revolutionary communism: social-fascists. Not by chance, this term is strongly placed in the foreground in the context of two of the three great changes that the contemporary labor movement has experienced: the historical emergence of the Communist Party at the beginning of the October Cycle (1917-1989) and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR in the 1950s, its transformation into “socialimperialist abroad and social-fascist at home,” according to Mao (the third great turn being the symbolic fall of the Wall, at the end of the 80s). In these junctures, however, the concept of social fascism had a mainly political projection, often leaving the connection of this category in the body of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine up in the air. And while no one verbally questions the centrality that the dictatorship of the proletariat or 1 the Communist Party has in this current of revolutionary thought, the notion of social-fascism has been and is more problematic among those who call themselves Marxist-Leninists. Also among the declared enemies of the proletariat, whose attitude towards the subject usually alternates between confusion and simplicity. Long before his political suicide, the young Pablo Iglesias challenged the Comintern of the roaring twenties, with its class against class doctrine plus its use of the social-fascist adjective against social democracy, and praised the sensible Comintern of the Popular Front, reasonable and open in matter of political tactics. Prudent advice kills more than the sword. Revolutionaries should decide against childishly contrasting two chapters in the history of our class. Also of discarding and adopting concepts based on the narrow margin of political calculation, which is the barometer of Iglesias’ judgments on the Communist International (although the ideological-bourgeois character of this type of reasoning is clear when considering that the line of the Popular Front was not exactly successful, not even from the point of view of immediate political success, as was clear from its experience in these lands). Whatever the case, the idea of social-fascism occupies a strange place in the eyes of the majority who, friendly or unfavorably, talk about Marxism. It is intuitively associated with chauvinism and red-fascist nationalism, with class collaborationism, with the worker lieutenants of the imperialist bourgeoisie and also with the blind communist intransigence towards the social democrats (apparently, they did not exterminate enough vanguard proletarians to justify that the Comintern considered them class enemies). Since intuition is made up of a mixture of empirical, political, sentimental and other criteria, it cannot replace precise theoretical and scientific delimitation, which is what grants universal nature to a given idea. The plane of analysis that best positions us to address this task is that of history. With the Cycle of proletarian revolutions of the 20th century closed, we communists find ourselves in the right position to elucidate the assumptions, logic and meaning of that concept, as well as the place it should occupy in the vanguard theory that summarizes the requirements of the revolution today. Let’s start with some results that are already well established in the work that the RL has been carrying out in this regard. The Communist Party is characterized by highlighting the conscious factor as the determining factor in the construction of communism, providing means and tools based on the ultimate goal of a classless society —hence, for its (re)constitution, the forging of vanguard cadres educated in a comprehensive conception of the world and in the fight against schematism and determinism in general, and economism in 2 particular, is essential. The RL has pointed out this question, which Leninism substantiates, as the key to the beginning of the new Cycle of the World Proletarian Revolution (WPR), and this has led it to focus, theoretically, on the question of the historical limitations that have led to the crisis of said subject (Summation of the October Cycle). This internal aspect is the main one. But from here we can draw a derivative towards the external aspect, which is none other than the reflection in the bourgeoisie of the emergence of the Communist Party, the transformation of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the communist proletariat, which also gives a new content to the old workers’ opportunism —of which Lenin already said that its highest form is, precisely, social-chauvinism. At this intersection is where we can best understand the deep content of the concept of social-fascism and its implications. The point of view of strategy can be useful as a first approach to this historical phenomenon. The strategy forces us to consider all aspects of the problem (elementary basis of the Marxist class analysis) and, in addition, emphasizes its relationship with the final intention of the actor in question, of the subject, with the order, arrangement and hierarchy of said elements to achieve the projected goal (tactics-as-plan). And, although Marxism has defined opportunism as the renunciation of long-term objectives in favor of momentary success (Engels), this qualification has long ceased to be accurate in historical (not necessarily political) terms. It is true that the dogmatic and anti-Marxist reductionism that restricts the working class to its dimension as variable capital (economism, unionism) closes the possibility of that totalizing perspective, feeding politically on the ad aeternum reproduction of the resistance movement and abjuring, in the words or in fact, of any final objective, as the honest opportunist Bernstein already wrote. But stopping at this is, today, insufficient. Engels’ qualification is enunciated at a time when the workers’ party was the social democratic mass party. In that context, opportunism was and could not be more than the absolutization of the mechanisms of that first political configuration of the proletariat: the union as the axis of the workers’ organization (on which the national social democratic parties were built) and the fight for reforms. and for political rights as the engine of the constitution of the working class identity, of its consciousness of itself in opposition to the bourgeois class, all of this embedded in the corresponding national framework. The tactical leader, who maneuvers on the given movement on the street or in parliament, was the cadre model of the mass party. Precisely, what will distinguish the left, revolutionary social democracy, will be its emphasis 3 on the final objective of the working class and its necessarily international and internationalist dimension, as established by that program of the revolution that was The Manifesto of the Communist Party.1 But this collapsed in 1914. The social democratic parties signed the Sacred Union with imperialism and euphorically joined the states and empires dialectic. They put their gigantic machine of trade unions, propaganda and institutions at the service of the national cause and sow discord among the workers of the peoples of Europe. They unleash white terror on the internationalist left, terrorism with which the organized social democratic masses compromise, when they do not directly support it. The former coexistence within the labor movement becomes its opposite, in the armed repression of the internationalist wing, carried out with sinister discipline by the opportunist wing in close collaboration with the imperialist General Staff and the police. Combining like a fox the carrot of social reforms with the military stick, opportunism has matured to become a true strategist of the counterrevolution, a reward deservedly earned by the heroes of the SPD who sacrificed themselves to proclaim the German republic, the of eight-hour workday... and to organize the carnage in Berlin and Munich, instructing the Freikorps and the Steel Helmets in how these things are done and educating the working masses in the fanatical defense of their imperialist state. This new model of bourgeois cadre, which moves with equal ease in mass organizations as in state departments, is the imperialist corollary of the communist revolutionary leader, of the Leninist 1 “The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section working-class parties of every of the country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.” MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. The Communist Manifesto. Penguin Classics. London, 2014, pp. 342–343. 4 strategist of the revolution, a phenomenon similar to the split of 2 socialism into two wings, into two parties. For the bourgeoisie, strategically facing class war means combining, coordinating, distributing and prioritizing all available resources, from intelligence, military development and counterinsurgency tactics to political and social reforms, investment in the education of the masses (in the bourgeois ideological totems) and the sacrifice of the momentary or particular interests of this or that layer of the bourgeoisie in favor of the sense of state —closing of ranks that is expressed, naturally, as chauvinism. In a certain way, and just as the first mature revolutionary experience of the proletariat gives rise to the political mold for the entire process of revolution up to communism (the Communist Party), the first great anticommunist war of the imperialist bourgeoisie —jointly with social democracy—provides the political keys of that reaction all along the line that is imperialism. Let’s dwell briefly on this. As the contradiction between productive forces and private appropriation entails the tendency towards communism but also the tendency towards the restructuring of capital, the survival of the bourgeoisie as a class depends on stopping the decomposition of its world by all means, plunging its domination into greater social depth, of the masses —deepening whose provoking economic conditions are the material subsumption of all social spheres under the cycles of capital accumulation, the distribution of the globe, of the entire globe, and the constitution of the proletariat as a class; that is, the same objective conditions that are at the basis of the emergence of the 2 “Lenin is the first great revolutionary leader to adopt the position of the strategist in the political leadership of the proletarian class struggle. . . . Unlike the barricade leader, who can only direct a military action, who identifies himself with it and who makes the entire course of the struggle depend on that action alone, thereby reducing all the capacity, intensity and depth of the political movement to the extent that a few tactical maneuvers can confer, Lenin, on the other hand, applies to the leadership of the movement a strategic perspective, that is, the method of combining tactical actions according to the strategic objective, always subordinating the former to the latter and using absolutely all possible means, political and military, in relation to each phase of the movement.” New Orientation on the Path of the Reconstitution of the Communist Party, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/Documentos/ Fundamentales/NO_idiomas/Nueva_Orientacion_I_ENG.html [Bold from source – Editor’s Note.] 5 Communist Party. The subjective dynamization of these conditions 3 passes, as we say, through the formation of bourgeois cadres capable, as a whole, of handling themselves skillfully in all fields of knowledge and practice, constituting the bourgeois equivalent of the proletarian collective intellectual, which provides operability to the imperialist state and allows combining, systematically and with great synergy, all forms and tactics of counterrevolutionary or simply counterinsurgency struggle. And this question is key because the central teaching of the modern revolution, according to Lenin, is that “only when the ‘lower classes’ do not want to live in the old way and the ‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.” The crisis of the capi- 4 talist mode of production engenders revolution if and only if the proletarians do not want to continue living in the old way, if they have their highest form of proletarian class organization, the Communist Party, at their 5 disposal, if they have managed to articulate the subjective factor of the revolution. Otherwise, the crisis of capital ends with its restructuring, which is historically based on the aforementioned ideological and political penetration of imperialism into the depths of contemporary society, a mass society by definition and which becomes, in its entirety, the strategic theater of operations of the class enemy. From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, this process deeply disrupts the ideological foundations of its domination. The growing weight of the spontaneous and reformist movement of the working class in the process of capital accumulation itself questions the individualistliberal basis on which the bourgeoisie had based, in general terms, its view of the world. The recognition of the trade union as the corporatist 3 It is interesting that the science of geopolitics emerged at this same time, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and is the closest thing to what we could call the subjectivity of imperialism. To the extent that capital accumulation is carried out at a global level and to the extent that any pre-capitalist geographical outside or only formally subsumed by capital disappears; to that extent, we say, the geostrategic doctrine of each imperialist state expresses its self-consciousness of the (geo)political conditions of the reproduction of its position in the process of capital accumulation, as well as those of its rise in the imperialist chain. It is enough to consider the theories of Mackinder, Ratzel/Haushofer and Spykman/Mahan, which correspond, clearly and respectively, with the position and expectations of British, German and American imperialism throughout the last century, in the same way as the rise of China today defines its Far Seas doctrine. But this topic, although suggestive, is not the subject of this work. 4 “Left-Wing” Communism—an Infantile Disorder; in LENIN, V. I. Collected Works, volume 31. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 85. 5 Ibidem, p. 50. 6 representative of the working class is, implicitly, the recognition that the appropriation of the social product is also just that, a social issue. The 6 black moth of imperialism emerges from this cocoon renewed by the reactionary subversion of the communist program of socialization of property, conveniently regulated and crumbled based on quotas, and certainly not as a premise of that integral development of the individual that Marx talked about, but as guarantee of the order between the various branches of production, on the one hand, and all social spheres, on the other. The state becomes a committee for managing the affairs of the 7 bourgeoisie to a degree that Engels could not foresee when he wrote that statement. If its bureaucratic apparatus was an already threatening itch in the sweaty folds of the flesh of the old liberal bourgeoisie, it has now become a suppurating scab that surrounds its entire skin. The state, once limited to clearing the obstacles of free capitalist accumulation and apparently situated above the sum of equal individuals that civil society always was for the liberal creed, is increasingly taking on the appearance of a living organism, in which each element of society has its corporatist role and function: an authentic system of links that goes from the executive-administrative direction of public affairs and its military apparatus to the most open and spontaneous organizations; from the hard core of the state to the trade union, to the party, to the press, to the neighborhood association, to the snitch on the balcony and the police without a badge. Up to this point we have limited ourselves to the highest vertex of this system, the bourgeois collective intellectual (which encompasses the state bureaucratic and executive apparatus, Parliament, intelligence and security organizations, lobbies, academia, etc.), and the transmission 6 “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. In this regard, see El sindicalismo que viene [The Trade Unionism to Come]; in LA FORJA # 35, 2006, pp. 50–63. 7 Ellas quieren la libertad y el comunismo [Women Want Freedom and Communism], in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #6, December 2021, p. 39. 7 belts that embed their direction in the whole of society. But “transmission belt” does not mean anything other than the mass line contemplated from the organizational angle: what it is about is the political content that it embodies, and in which the bourgeois political game is deployed without calling into question the hard, economic and executive nerve of its system of domination. Precisely because imperialism neutralizes spontaneity from its very presuppositions, it is preserved as the elemental political logic of the last class society (expression of the anarchy of production), no matter how incorporated it is in the mechanisms of control, discipline and direction of its necessary counterpart, the state. In this game of forces, the bourgeois parties are only distinguished by the degree to which they aspire to carry this incorporation as the last barrier against social decomposition or against the revolutionary overcoming of the system.8 On the other hand, if this relationship between spontaneous movement and the imperialist state is internal on the general-historical level (which we have analyzed up to this point), on the immediate political level both elements appear as external, one in front of the other. This particularity engenders countless spontaneous illusions in the theoretical vanguard, educated for decades in political empiricism and opportunistic presbyopia. But appearance does not mean fiction; it does not mean unreality. It has a moment of truth, because it is through this gap of relative political exteriority where spontaneity disruptively penetrates official life, and forces it to permanently reconfigure itself in order to once again guarantee the peaceful accumulation of capital. That capital is the continuous revolution of all the conditions of production makes this disruption systematic and inevitable, just as systematic and inevitable is the obligation of the bourgeoisie to find new checkpoints of political balance for incessantly changing conditions. That is the objective content of reform under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and in the absence of the revolutionary subject —an absence that only today, at the closing of the October Cycle, allows us to contemplate that content in its “purest” form, no longer as a by-product of the proletarian revolution. That is why contemporary bourgeois politics is, necessarily, mass politics, and in the first instance directed at the sector of the masses that stands out in this disruption from its immediate demands: the practical vanguard. 8 “The fact that imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism is manifested first of all in the tendency to decay, which is characteristic of every monopoly under the system of private ownership of the means of production. The difference between the democraticrepublican and the reactionary-monarchist imperialist bourgeoisie is obliterated precisely because they are both rotting alive.” LENIN: C.W., vol. 23, p. 106 [Bold our own – Editor’s Note.] 8 As the reader will know, the conquest of the practical vanguard is the central question of the political reconstitution of communism, that is, of the reconstitution of the Communist Party, of the organized revolutionary movement. And blessed be the proletarian intuition of the Comintern, because when it puts the label of social-fascists on the bloodthirsty dogs of the SPD, it does so in the context of that strategic battle for the revolutionary recomposition of the German proletariat after the war. And that is the key to the matter: the practical vanguard. The 9 political crisis of the liberal-parliamentary system, eaten away from below by spontaneous movements that are the living expression of the anarchy of production, has several possible solutions. We will point out, for the purposes of this analysis, the two extremes: the proletarian revolution as a real solution to the problems of the masses, which inevitably involves the (re)constitution of the Communist Party; or the possibility, ultimately and among others, of recomposing the bourgeois order on the basis of an organized, fascist, reactionary mass movement, in which that practical vanguard —the key to spontaneous movement— is incorporated not into the transmission belts of the revolution, but to those of the counterrevolution. This organic fusion tends to suppress, in turn, the liberal coordinates of the traditional political domination of the bourgeoisie, but not in the direction of the proletarian commune state, but in that of the corporatist state, which implies the shrinking of democracy for the ruling class itself and the expulsion from the political game of sectors of the bourgeoisie that once fully participated in it (one of the characteristics that the RL has been pointing out as fundamental to fascism). This is the structural logic of the matter, its conditions of possibility. Whether this possibility becomes an effective reality, and to what degree, is a question that belongs to real historical development; it is at that level, in the 9 An example of how, for the KPD in the late 1920s, the practical vanguard was not focused in the trade unions: “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. 9 concrete analysis of the concrete situation, where it must be examined and determined (political line). In effect, we are talking about a logic: corporatism nests in the depths of the political logic of the imperialist state, and fascism is, considered from this angle, its extreme development, the consummation of the assembling of the masses as the organizational pillar of the state. This is not an apodictic law; it is not about the deterministic, inexorable and finalistic consummation of some premises. In fact, and as we have already said, the very revolutionary nature of the bourgeois mode of production makes any form of state, any political balance reached at this or that moment, in itself something precarious (equilibrium suggests an idea of zero-sum contradictory forces, not a dead, deflated stability). The monopoly of political power by a single faction of the bourgeoisie is an exceptional form, not the normal one for a society based on the production of goods and competition. Therefore, specifically, and preventing both the abuse of this category and its sociological-scientistic deturpation, corporatism expresses a certain correlation of forces, a certain state of the class struggle, whose natural thermometer is the practical vanguard. It is the political nature of its ideas, customs and traditions, that is, of its consciousness, that determines its receptivity to a possible authoritarian or fascist resolution of the crisis of the state, beyond speculations about cold objective, structural and deterministic tendencies that have little to do with the Marxist analysis —and they tend to be behind the simplistic assimilations of imperialist bourgeois democracy and fascism, strictly reduced to repression, or to the open terrorist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, according to the limited formula of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. And yes, in the October Cycle the threat of the proletarian revolution was the factor that precipitated the adoption of the fascist form of domination by the bourgeoisie. But, precisely, the absence of the revolution as an ideological, political, cultural and moral referent for the masses creates a more than favorable environment so that, in situations of social crisis, more or less permanent today, the objective tendency towards corporatism is implemented naturally as the default political logic at all levels of society, including, of course, the practical vanguard of the class. And it is in the latter where the thesis of social-fascism acquires sense. The thesis of social-fascism is the generalization of the Leninist thesis that the spontaneous development of the labor movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology, but seen from the side of the 10 10 What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement; in LENIN, C.W., v. 5, p. 384. 10 counterrevolutionary role of opportunism when the proletariat has historically conquered its highest form of class organization and split the labor movement. In line with that conception of the state as a chain of links, in which every scoundrel has his place under the black sun of imperialism, it is the bourgeois workers’ party that historically embodies reform, which spontaneously directs the resistance movement of the class (which encompasses all its partial expressions, not only the economic and trade unionist) and which has an immediate responsibility in the formation of the culture, traditions and certainties that define the leaders of said movement, its practical vanguard. For this reason, and if the Communist Party is distinguished from the reformist workers’ party by ideology, the 11 state of said layer expresses not only the degree of social maturity of the proletarian revolution, but also that of the counterrevolution, that of the ideological and political conditions for the constitution of a reactionary mass movement. Since the universal progress that the revolutionary bourgeoisie once advocated died, the feverish apology for the particular improvement that imperialism celebrates cannot have any further purpose than to feed the sectoral, selfish, corporate, gregarious, narrow, mediocre, self-satisfied, accommodating and petty consciousness of the masses, cretinism, opportunism, ignorance, careerism, submission, servility; a culture located a stone’s throw away from the fascist restructuring of the mass movement, with or against the very reformists who fueled it. Right 12 and equality before the law appear incapable of offering more democracy, of offering solutions to the problems of the masses, and must be transgressed if the dominant state of affairs is to be ensured. And there is no longer any place for the liberal preventions of someone like Sieyès, who recommended keeping particular interests out of politics so that the République would not degenerate into Ré-totale. Today, the spontaneously reformist character of the imperialist state is generally fed by the same subjective conditions as its authoritarian, fascist transmutation. 11 Thesis of Reconstitution of the Communist Party, p. 9, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/ Documentos/Fundamentales/Tesis_idiomas/Tesis_Reconstitucion_PC_ENG.pdf 12 At the beginning of 1933, as “the political repression and marginalization of the Social Democrats rapidly became more obvious, so the trade unions under Theodor Leipart began to try to preserve their existence by distancing themselves from the Social Democratic Party and seeking an accommodation with the new regime. On 21 March the leadership denied any intention of playing a role in politics and declared that it was prepared to carry out the social function of the trade unions ‘whatever the kind of state regime’ in power. . . . On 28 April they concluded an agreement with the Christian and Liberal Trade Unions that was intended to form the first step towards a complete unification of all trade unions in a single national organization.” EVANS: Op. cit., pp. 355–356. 11 And this is true for the entire transition from capitalism to communism; the thesis of social-fascism means that “the permanence of the reformist organization type expresses that, in the first place, the process of conscious elevation of the masses towards the place of the communist vanguard is necessarily gradual,” but focused from the point of 13 view of reaction, from the in view of the steps that the bourgeois labor movement takes to preserve its privileges and oppose the revolutionary transformation of the class. This includes, of course, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat too, as Mao perceptively suggested when he referred to the revisionist USSR as social-fascist and pointed out that the People’s Republic of China was under the exact same risk, a risk tragically materialized after 1976. Indeed, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the highest point of the revolutionary class struggle of the Cycle, was also the point of greatest maturity of the counterrevolution: from the point of view of the ideology promoted by the right of the CPC (productivism, material incentives, chauvinism, feminism, etc., all of them painted red) and from the point of view of the political articulation of their counterrevolutionary work. Waving the red flag against the red flag was to raise the Red Guards against the Red Guards, to send the shock workers of the counterrevolution against the shock workers of the revolution; that is, confronting the sectors that were objectively situated in the practical vanguard as it existed under the conditions of socialism and that represented, respectively, the reformist consciousness and the revolutionary consciousness of the class. That is precisely the form that the mature proletarian revolution assumes: civil war between the organized revolutionary masses and the organized counterrevolutionary masses, between the highest form of organization of the proletariat (the Communist Party) and the highest form of organization of the bourgeoisie (the state plus its transmission belts). And it is not at all coincidental that its last line of defense is the reformist workers’ party, the strategist of the counterrevolution, since it is the one which can best pilot its social roots in the last and deepest class war in history by exploiting the spontaneous, 13 Thesis of Reconstitution, p. 7. 12 reformist consciousness of the proletariat (which is also a negative index 14 of the potentiality of this class, given the objective place it occupies in capitalist social relations and that the bourgeoisie cannot ignore to articulate the political conditions of its domain). The thesis of social-fascism requires, therefore, analyzing the correlation between reaction and revolution at a given moment, and also the class struggles between the fractions of the bourgeoisie itself, especially when, as is the case, the revolution is absent from the social scene. In that sense, we do not need to look further than to the Spain is different cliché: the Spanish state is an imperialist State, where the communist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat are the order of the day, and where the hegemon of the bourgeois labor movement, the PSOE, is amply accredited as the left hand of the bourgeois dictatorship and as its ultra-reactionary spearhead. Since its debut as a party of government after the Transition, Spanish socialism has stood out as an efficient anti-worker manager, it has waged an authentic terrorist war against the Basque national movement, stirring up discord between peoples, and it has enthusiastically joined the military adventures of its imperialist bloc in the former Yugoslavia, in Libya, in Ukraine, etc., in addition to other niceties that would make the list endless. From their ranks have come the González and the Zapateros, the Solanas and the Chacones, the Borrells, the Calvos and other fanatics. There can be no doubt about its sinister nature and the destiny that the proletariat has to reserve for it. Now, when the fraction of financial capital represented by Aznar and the Partido Popular hawks unilaterally broke with part of the old consensus of 1975–1982 (with the intervention in Iraq, the Atlanticist turn at the expense of Europe and the government based on decrees) and spurred a certain fascistic tendency —not so much because of its nostalgic 14 This problem was clearly seen, although from liberal coordinates, by some of the most astute scholars of the Cultural Revolution: “[Mao] shares at least one conviction with Western liberals: that, while the difference between paternalistic socialism and fascism is a real one, the line between them is easily crossed. The Kuomintang crossed it; Mao believes that the Soviet Union has crossed it; and he fears that his own party is only a few short steps from it. . . . To both Mao and his liberal opponents in China, the enemy is the same: bureaucracy; but they diverge entirely on the means by which it should be combated. The liberals believe, essentially, in gradually improving the elite. Mao believes in destroying the foundations of the elite. He faces one of the fundamental problems of politics: the tendency for a levelling revolution to produce its own new privileged establishment. But he does not hope to defeat this possibility, as is widely believed in the West, simply by perpetually recurrent, disruptive mass protest.” GRAY, J.; CAVENDISH, P. Chinese Communism In Crisis. Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. Frederick A. Praeger. New York, 1968, pp. 67–68. 13 and irredentist rhetoric as because it meant the marginalization of a sector of the ruling class itself, including the labor aristocracy—, the PSOE and everything to its left threw themselves into the mobilizations against the war. And they did not do it, of course, out of anti-war convictions (UGT called a terrifying two-hour strike), but because the strategic interests of the Europeist Spanish state and the right of the sectors represented by the socialists and Izquierda Unida to their piece of the imperialist cake were at stake. Then, they fully demonstrated their ability to redirect the mobilizations of the time to their own benefit (against the war, for the Prestige case, for the lies about 11-M…), without, of course, talking about manipulation or deviation from its natural course: the slogans of the anti-war movement were none other than those of pacifism and its maximum reach was the punishment vote against the Partido Popular. But in a context in which the dominant contradiction in the world was between the imperialist countries and the oppressed peoples, and with the Spanish state going through a time of economic stability, Zapatero’s first government was presented as the restoration of the old consensus, of the old rules of the game, as champion of the essences of liberal democracy against Aznar’s petty partisanship. The political crisis of 2002–2004 did not end with the deepening of the fascist path initiated by Aznarism, but with its interruption and the channeling of social unrest through a greater democratic opening for the labor aristocracy, the bourgeoisies of the oppressed nations and the sectors of the Spanish bourgeoisie marginalized by the Partido Popular—a result that was reflected in the vanguard in the form of an insufferable and demagogic resurrected republicanism, sponsored by Zapatero himself and whose high tide lasted more than a decade. These conditions began to change when the second decade of the century arrived, after the crack of 2008 and with the war in Syria, when the good times ended and the imperialist unilateralism of the United States began to be called into question by Russian and Chinese imperialism. In the Spanish state it was expressed as what we have called Restoration Crisis 2.0, whose first stages were marked by 15-M and the explosion of the national question in Catalonia —an expression of the disorganization of the labor aristocracy and various strata of the Catalonian bourgeoisie, respectively. As the RL pointed out at the time, the rise of Podemos came to demonstrate the total bankruptcy of the schemes of revisionism and the absolute superfluity of the red identity to ride the spontaneous movement and sit in Congress to legislate some small reforms. The 15-M cycle, as left-wing mobilization, inevitably dominated by the spiteful labor aristocracy, yes, but also the embodiment of the deepest 14 social crisis since the Transition, contributed to the development of the revolution in the Spanish state in the sphere in which it is developing today: it unleashed the open crisis of revisionism and catalyzed the proliferation of circles of propagandists attached to the RL, the basis on which it was able to jump from opinion trend to a political movement in its own right. But, at a general social level, 15-M and Podemos did not and could not aspire to anything other than the restoration of the old positions lost by the labor aristocracy, the resolution of the crisis not forward, but backward. Consequently, the Spanish state was its natural and logical framework of action, the venerable democratic institutions were the highest level to which to aspire (that narrow heaven, or lil’heaven, that had to be taken by storm) and the usurpation of the place of the PSOE was the logical and coherent roadmap, not to mention its shameless vocation for the Spanish state to climb positions in the European imperialist chain. But the old social pact laid broken in pieces. It was not the river Rubicon, but the Styx, that re-hashed social democracy was crossing. Contrary to Zapatero’s restauratio, the refoundation of the alliance of the labor aristocracy with the imperialist bourgeoisie could not be carried out with a vulgar parliamentary incantation. The conjured demonic powers ran at their free will, without the sorcerer’s apprentice bothering too much to try to tame them: we have already commented on another occasion15 about Podemos’ liberal disregard for establishing itself as a mass party, sacrificing links with the spontaneous movement in the altar of Spain and the institutions. This clumsiness of the enemy—which the proletariat must keep in mind even if it cannot afford to always count on it— conditioned the way in which the first act of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was resolved: recovery of the PSOE as hegemon of the bourgeois workers’ party and state party (which has managed to drag Podemos, IU-PCE and a good part of revisionism) and starvation of the 15-M and the Catalan national movement in the face of the arrogance of its reformist and nationalist leaders, certifying their bankruptcy as referents of reformism and of national bourgeois-democratic liberation, respectively. And the chickens have come to roost. By the time the motion of censure against Rajoy triumphs, and especially by the time Unidas Podemos (UP) enters the PSOE government, the spontaneous leftist movement is practically desiccated and the only thing sustaining the most progressive government in history is the permanent state of alarm: first the 15 Editorial: Ni nueva normalidad, ni vieja normalidad: ¡Revolución o barbarie! [Neither new normalcy nor old normalcy: Revolution or barbarism!]; in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #5, December 2020, pp. 12–13. 15 anti-fascist alert, then the COVID alert and, lately, the Borrellian closing of ranks around the Euro-Atlantic imperialist bloc (with all that this has added to the strengthening of the repressive apparatus of the state). The recent general elections have brought us another helping of emotional blackmail, unity against fascism and hackneyed reactionary clichés about the “two Spains.” All of this not only indicates the discredit and lack of an promising, and even credible, program of the “social-communist” camp, as all political commentators never tire of repeating. It expresses, above all, its objective inability to find the conditions, consensus and rules of the game that establish a new point of political balance for the Spanish state. It is not a problem of lack of will, but rather it is the crisis of the economic foundations of the welfare state, based on technological development sustained by strong public intervention and the more or less continuous increase in the productive force of labor, as well as its rate of exploitation. This model, which with its ups and downs roughly corresponds to an entire cycle, could combine economic growth and international competitiveness with the increase in real wages, the affirmative involvement of the monopolistic-imperialist state in the reproduction of the labor force and the maintenance of a broad public sector —state, regional, provincial and municipal— that redistributed part of the surplus value produced (social security, health, social policies, a large body of civil servants, subsidies for trade unions and their apparatus, etc.). But it all depended on not stopping that movement. This delicate rhythm broke down at the end of the first decade of the century and, at least in the countries of the imperialist West, it is not in sight that can be recomposed without the sacrifice of the material and human surplus. In summary: the labor aristocracy has lost part of its traditional privileges as a reactionary dominant class, and the failed assault on the heavens of 15-M and Podemos has put an end to the old socio-liberal certainties that allowed it to recover its position in 2004–2008. Not in vain, people like Losantos have pointed to Zapatero the Bolivarian as the political father of Iglesias, and from that point of view they are absolutely right. It is an arc that goes from the Comprehensive Law on Gender Violence to the reactionary women’s strike of March 8, 2018 and the law of only “yes” is “yes,” from the federalizing fit of the Miravit Statute and the nation of nations to the lukewarm attitude of Podemos and company in the face of the national oppression of Catalunya (more concerned with marketing than with democracy), from the alliance of civilizations and Moratinos’ multilateralism to the Europeist commitment of the PSOE-UP tandem, from the Law of Historical Memory to the last “red” republican program of revisionism, etc. 16 All these reformist keys have been defining not so much of a style of doing politics, but of the program with which the labor aristocracy and the pactist sector of the bourgeoisie resolved the crisis caused by Aznar’s second term, but which is failing without palliatives to solder the joints that burst with the Restoration Crisis 2.0. The figure of Yolanda Díaz expresses like no other the current volatility and precariousness of the objective bases of the reformist party. On the one hand, revalidation of all the essentials of the Partido Popular’s labor reform, that is, the reform that sanctioned the reduction of the amount of structural participation of the labor aristocracy in the distribution of surplus value. On the other, a 16 large compensatory bribe of 17 million for the trade union centrals in the General State Budgets of 2022 (an increase of almost 100% since the communist minister took possession of the Labor portfolio)… but that, like all bribery of this nature, it is specific and must be revalidated every year, without restoring the position of the trade unions in the state or protecting it from political and electoral wobbles. Irene Montero, for her part, is the one who best personifies the crisis of its subjective foundations. The so-called civil war of feminism and, above all, the scandal of the law of only “yes” is “yes” constitute the natural indicator of the extent to which feminism —not long ago one of those pillars of consensus— has become incapable of generating agreement even within the reformist camp. Of course, much less has the bourgeois workers’ party been able to ingratiate itself with the social sector embodied in VOX and the Partido Popular, whose fight against the Sanchista state is eloquent about the extent to which the unity of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie has broken down to continue dominating jointly or by turnism. And it is clear that the party of the discontented is not, today, on the left side of the bourgeois political spectrum. Progressivism entrenches itself firmly in its old positions; reaction takes action and initiative. The subversives and seditionists jealously defend the current legality; the immobilists cry out for its subversion. The party of rebellion votes against the rebellion; the party of order, against itself. Dynamic Spain stays at home; backward Spain overtakes from the right. Political integrity is represented by a jacket; clientelism, a fanatic of its inexorable principles. The secessionists work diligently for the unity of Spain; the Spainists, for their dissolution. The reds look to the past; 16 The difficulties posed to temporary hiring, for their part, have already been successfully circumvented by the natural laws of competition: employers, large and small, quickly learned to use the trial period as an efficient substitute for the temporary contract. Dismissals before the end of the trial period (which do not require prior notice, reasoned cause, or compensation) skyrocketed by 620% last year: if in 2021 there were 75000 employees who did not exceed said period, the end of 2022 recorded a total of 540000. 17 the whites, to the future. The sense of state is the interest of the party; politics, technocracy. The conservative party is the PSOE; the revolutionary party, the Civil Guard. In this mess the bourgeoisie is unable to understand itself and cries out for certainty. And in the same way that after the good days came the bad days, after the bad days came the worst days. The current socialchauvinist plague —not at all reducible to a series of organizations or individuals—is the reflection, on the vanguard of the class, of the crisis of the traditional liberal-reformist program, fundamentally shared by revisionism, and the attempt of a fraction of the labor aristocracy to devise an opportunist program of a new style, free of the commitments and complexes that until now gave order to the way this class had of understanding its reactionary political project of shared domination with big capital. That is the entire content of the battles between the undefined lef and the politically incorrect inquisitors of progressive postmodernism: whether to preserve the old tactic of the labor aristocracy or look for a new one under the skirts of mature opportunism, with all the intermediate positions and mixed breeds that fit between the two. No one is innocent in this game: the strength with which social-chauvinism has erupted is directly proportional to the tenacity with which the false communists have insisted on selling communism to the trade unionist, republican, feminist and other consensuses for decades, hindering the recovery of revolutionary Marxism as a conception of the world and as an ideological referent for the vanguard itself. They are nothing more than two successive links in the same careerist chain, of the same petty class resentful of the loss of its dusty dominant class privileges. Social-chauvinism thus appears as the opportunist critique of opportunism, at a time when the crisis of the previous reformist program opens the door to a greater reverberation of its revolutionary critique: while revolutionary Marxism champions the consistent application of the right of self-determination against the marketing of small-nation nationalism, social-chauvinism cries out for the unity of Spain; while revolutionary Marxism points out the imperative to destroy the imperialist state, socialchauvinism demands its best executive-police strengthening and its departure from Euro-Atlantic structures to carry out its scavenger foreign policy in a sovereign manner and without supposed restraints; while revolutionary Marxism shoots against the plural lef due to the reactionary nature of the construction of the movement as a sum of partial fronts, social-chauvinism does so due to its workerist exclusivism; while revolutionary Marxism takes aim at feminism for its counterrevolutionary and corporatist nature, social-chauvinism criticizes it for its inability to serve 18 its political project, that is, for not being corporatist enough (hence it contrasts feminist corporatism with the equally reactionary and identitybased trade unionist, workerist corporatism); while the war cry of revolutionary Marxism is proletarians of all countries, unite!, social-chauvinism sobs over the borders and masturbates morbidly with nonsense about the Hispanosphere and Anglo-German capitalism, with the Spanish workers’ nation, with one country for the working class, etc., etc. This ideological shift within the theoretical vanguard carries with it the possibility that the bulk of the population, and especially that decisive practical vanguard, ends up conflating communism with social-chauvinism and the squadron, para-police rhetoric, in which a not inconsiderable part of the theoretical vanguard frolics today. This last question not only determines the political profit that this trend can obtain in the short term, especially when the Spanish political panorama has ostensibly turned to the right and when there are many bourgeois cadres who keep an eye on the left without complexes (as yesterday they kept them on the plural lef). It also poses a strategic problem for the reconstitution of communism, to the extent that it stokes national distrust in the name of socialism and distributes its indigestible ideological stew among the masses, discrediting Marxist (further) and making it difficult the fight to recover its referentiality. Not only among the theoretical vanguard; in the practical vanguard too, making it more receptive to chauvinist and authoritarian demagoguery as a way to solve the crisis, which would already place us on the threshold of a possible fascist mass movement. This may force a considerable tactical adjustment of the Plan of Reconstitution, to the extent that communism would find itself in contradiction between the low degree of development of its reconstitution (today ideological, centered on the theoretical vanguard of the class) and the development of a reactionary, fascist, mass movement (the fight against which requires mechanisms that, by their nature, are rather located in the set of tasks corresponding to the political reconstitution, to the reconstitution of the Communist Party). If the previous chapter of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was the swan song of the old dogmas, in the present arc the articulation of the new ones is played out. Regarding the vanguard of the working class, it can be expected that the development of the social-chauvinist trend will either distance it from all problems related to communism and party construction, or will continue to digest “classical” revisionism and channel its crisis into the direction of building a new revisionist political platform that is more or less operational and opportunistically mature. Both possibilities can occur. In that sense, social-chauvinism has an advantage, both because it 19 rows in favor of the political current of the Spanish state and because its hysterical representatives are taking the task of conquering public opinion and weaving a minimum ideological harmony with their audience very seriously, exploiting precisely the bankruptcy of the previous reformist cycle and the fatigue of a good part of the vanguard with its clichés and fetishes. On the other hand, we are already seeing that the posthumous heralds of the latter respond to the development of socialchauvinism in the vanguard by attempting to reverse history and insisting on the old plural reformist program and the old multicolored “communism” (the “sum of struggles”), despite the fact that it has failed, despite the fact that its failure has been the immediate cause of the Spanish fever and despite the fact that this bet leads them to greater political irrelevance as the crisis of the state deepens. Revolutionary Marxism takes no sides here, and the proletariat is only responsible for denouncing the ones and the others and the internal bond that unites them, which is what substantiates the thesis of social-fascism in the current circumstances of the class struggle in the Spanish state and, in particular, in the field of the theoretical vanguard. Only the consistent application of the Plan of Reconstitution will allow the crisis of revisionism to be translated into the development of the revolution, which today requires the construction of a vanguard referent and, in particular, the defense of proletarian internationalism and the unconditional fight against socialchauvinism. These are the inalienable bases of the revolutionary political line today. We can only move forward. If Esau, the disowned, is to rise and break the yoke from his neck, he will do so knowing that we do not have reserves in the rear to back us up nor a stronger wall to shield our men from disaster. 

Committee for Reconstitution (Spanish State) 

August 2023

2. - ... Thesis on Social-Fascism – Comuna Roja (wordpress.com) --- kunturchawa. 18 de febrero de 2.024. -- 

[This is an unofficial translation, the text by the Committee for Reconstitution (Spanish State) can be read in Spanish here. You can download the PDF version of this translation by clicking here.] -- “Since the proletarian revolution in Russia and its victories on an international scale, expected neither by the bourgeoise nor the philistines, the entire world has become different, and the bourgeoisie everywhere has become different too.”  Lenin. iii. ---

... Nobody is unaware that the shift towards the right of the political panorama in the Spanish state has been corresponded in the communist movement with the feverish spread of an unapologetic social-chauvinism. But few dare to draw the ultimate consequences of a problem that has already arisen numerous times in the history of our class. The reader of Línea Proletaria will know that, in recent years, the Reconstitution Line (RL) has found the category of social-fascism useful to explain the white thread that leads from opportunism (and worker opportunism in particular, but not only) to the development of a fascist mass movement. Today, unapologetic opportunism fantasizes about barbed wire, about seducing the armed forces, about the workers’ fatherland, and about beating up, in the name of communism, those who —like us— offend the national flag (rojigualda or tricolor, which is the same at this point). Their German grandparents already put on the Prussian hussar’s jacket to order the proletarians to go die in the name of the country, and, when Spartacus rose up, they did the same to order the patriots to kill him in the name of socialism. Their parents, the Khrushchevs, the Brezhnevs and company, also spread socialism in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan (in the same way that their legitimate children, the ultra-conservative Putin and the ultra-conservative Russia, spread decommunization in Ukraine). And they all received, then, the same adjective from revolutionary communism: social-fascists. Not by chance, this term is strongly placed in the foreground in the context of two of the three great changes that the contemporary labor movement has experienced: the historical emergence of the Communist Party at the beginning of the October Cycle (1917-1989) and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR in the 1950s, its transformation into “social-imperialist abroad and social-fascist at home,” according to Mao (the third great turn being the symbolic fall of the Wall, at the end of the 80s). In these junctures, however, the concept of social fascism had a mainly political projection, often leaving the connection of this category in the body of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine up in the air. And while no one verbally questions the centrality that the dictatorship of the proletariat or the Communist Party has in this current of revolutionary thought, the notion of social-fascism has been and is more problematic among those who call themselves Marxist-Leninists. Also among the declared enemies of the proletariat, whose attitude towards the subject usually alternates between confusion and simplicity. Long before his political suicide, the young Pablo Iglesias challenged the Comintern of the roaring twenties, with its class against class doctrine plus its use of the social-fascist adjective against social democracy, and praised the sensible Comintern of the Popular Front, reasonable and open in matter of political tactics. Prudent advice kills more than the sword. Revolutionaries should decide against childishly contrasting two chapters in the history of our class. Also of discarding and adopting concepts based on the narrow margin of political calculation, which is the barometer of Iglesias’ judgments on the Communist International (although the ideological-bourgeois character of this type of reasoning is clear when considering that the line of the Popular Front was not exactly successful, not even from the point of view of immediate political success, as was clear from its experience in these lands). Whatever the case, the idea of ​​social-fascism occupies a strange place in the eyes of the majority who, friendly or unfavorably, talk about Marxism. It is intuitively associated with chauvinism and red-fascist nationalism, with class collaborationism, with the worker lieutenants of the imperialist bourgeoisie and also with the blind communist intransigence towards the social democrats (apparently, they did not exterminate enough vanguard proletarians to justify that the Comintern considered them class enemies). Since intuition is made up of a mixture of empirical, political, sentimental and other criteria, it cannot replace precise theoretical and scientific delimitation, which is what grants universal nature to a given idea. --- The plane of analysis that best positions us to address this task is that of history. With the Cycle of proletarian revolutions of the 20th century closed, we communists find ourselves in the right position to elucidate the assumptions, logic and meaning of that concept, as well as the place it should occupy in the vanguard theory that summarizes the requirements of the revolution today. Let’s start with some results that are already well established in the work that the RL has been carrying out in this regard. The Communist Party is characterized by highlighting the conscious factor as the determining factor in the construction of communism, providing means and tools based on the ultimate goal of a classless society —hence, for its (re)constitution, the forging of vanguard cadres educated in a comprehensive conception of the world and in the fight against schematism and determinism in general, and economism in particular, is essential. The RL has pointed out this question, which Leninism substantiates, as the key to the beginning of the new Cycle of the World Proletarian Revolution (WPR), and this has led it to focus, theoretically, on the question of the historical limitations that have led to the crisis of said subject (Summation of the October Cycle). This internal aspect is the main one. But from here we can draw a derivative towards the external aspect, which is none other than the reflection in the bourgeoisie of the emergence of the Communist Party, the transformation of the class struggle of the bourgeoisie against the communist proletariat, which also gives a new content to the old workers’ opportunism —of which Lenin already said that its highest form is, precisely, social-chauvinism. At this intersection is where we can best understand the deep content of the concept of social-fascism and its implications. The point of view of strategy can be useful as a first approach to this historical phenomenon. The strategy forces us to consider all aspects of the problem (elementary basis of the Marxist class analysis) and, in addition, emphasizes its relationship with the final intention of the actor in question, of the subject, with the order, arrangement and hierarchy of said elements to achieve the projected goal (tactics-as-plan). And, although Marxism has defined opportunism as the renunciation of long-term objectives in favor of momentary success (Engels), this qualification has long ceased to be accurate in historical (not necessarily political) terms. It is true that the dogmatic and anti-Marxist reductionism that restricts the working class to its dimension as variable capital (economism, unionism) closes the possibility of that totalizing perspective, feeding politically on the ad aeternum reproduction of the resistance movement and abjuring, in the words or in fact, of any final objective, as the honest opportunist Bernstein already wrote. But stopping at this is, today, insufficient. Engels’ qualification is enunciated at a time when the workers’ party was the social democratic mass party. In that context, opportunism was and could not be more than the absolutization of the mechanisms of that first political configuration of the proletariat: the union as the axis of the workers’ organization (on which the national social democratic parties were built) and the fight for reforms. and for political rights as the engine of the constitution of the working class identity, of its consciousness of itself in opposition to the bourgeois class, all of this embedded in the corresponding national framework. The tactical leader, who maneuvers on the given movement on the street or in parliament, was the cadre model of the mass party. Precisely, what will distinguish the left, revolutionary social democracy, will be its emphasis on the final objective of the working class and its necessarily international and internationalist dimension, as established by that program of the revolution that was The Manifesto of the Communist Party.[1] ...--- But this collapsed in 1914. The social democratic parties signed the Sacred Union with imperialism and euphorically joined the states and empires dialectic. They put their gigantic machine of trade unions, propaganda and institutions at the service of the national cause and sow discord among the workers of the peoples of Europe. They unleash white terror on the internationalist left, terrorism with which the organized social democratic masses compromise, when they do not directly support it. The former coexistence within the labor movement becomes its opposite, in the armed repression of the internationalist wing, carried out with sinister discipline by the opportunist wing in close collaboration with the imperialist General Staff and the police. Combining like a fox the carrot of social reforms with the military stick, opportunism has matured to become a true strategist of the counterrevolution, a reward deservedly earned by the heroes of the SPD who sacrificed themselves to proclaim the German republic, the of eight-hour workday... and to organize the carnage in Berlin and Munich, instructing the Freikorps and the Steel Helmets in how these things are done and educating the working masses in the fanatical defense of their imperialist state. This new model of bourgeois cadre, which moves with equal ease in mass organizations as in state departments, is the imperialist corollary of the communist revolutionary leader, of the Leninist strategist of the revolution,[2] a phenomenon similar to the split of socialism into two wings, into two parties. For the bourgeoisie, strategically facing class war means combining, coordinating, distributing and prioritizing all available resources, from intelligence, military development and counterinsurgency tactics to political and social reforms, investment in the education of the masses (in the bourgeois ideological totems) and the sacrifice of the momentary or particular interests of this or that layer of the bourgeoisie in favor of the sense of state —closing of ranks that is expressed, naturally, as chauvinism. In a certain way, and just as the first mature revolutionary experience of the proletariat gives rise to the political mold for the entire process of revolution up to communism (the Communist Party), the first great anti-communist war of the imperialist bourgeoisie —jointly with social democracy— provides the political keys of that reaction all along the line that is imperialism. Let’s dwell briefly on this. As the contradiction between productive forces and private appropriation entails the tendency towards communism but also the tendency towards the restructuring of capital, the survival of the bourgeoisie as a class depends on stopping the decomposition of its world by all means, plunging its domination into greater social depth, of the masses —deepening whose provoking economic conditions are the material subsumption of all social spheres under the cycles of capital accumulation, the distribution of the globe, of the entire globe, and the constitution of the proletariat as a class; that is, the same objective conditions that are at the basis of the emergence of the Communist Party.[3] The subjective dynamization of these conditions passes, as we say, through the formation of bourgeois cadres capable, as a whole, of handling themselves skillfully in all fields of knowledge and practice, constituting the bourgeois equivalent of the proletarian collective intellectual, which provides operability to the imperialist state and allows combining, systematically and with great synergy, all forms and tactics of counterrevolutionary or simply counterinsurgency struggle. And this question is key because the central teaching of the modern revolution, according to Lenin, is that “only when the ‘lower classes’ do not want to live in the old way and the ‘upper classes’ cannot carry on in the old way that the revolution can triumph.”[4] The crisis of the capitalist mode of production engenders revolution if and only if the proletarians do not want to continue living in the old way, if they have their highest form of proletarian class organization,[5] the Communist Party, at their disposal, if they have managed to articulate the subjective factor of the revolution. Otherwise, the crisis of capital ends with its restructuring, which is historically based on the aforementioned ideological and political penetration of imperialism into the depths of contemporary society, a mass society by definition and which becomes, in its entirety, the strategic theater of operations of the class enemy. From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, this process deeply disrupts the ideological foundations of its domination. The growing weight of the spontaneous and reformist movement of the working class in the process of capital accumulation itself questions the individualist-liberal basis on which the bourgeoisie had based, in general terms, its view of the world. The recognition of the trade union as the corporatist representative of the working class is, implicitly, the recognition that the appropriation of the social product is also just that, a social issue.[6] The black moth of imperialism emerges from this cocoon renewed by the reactionary subversion of the communist program of socialization of property, conveniently regulated and crumbled based on quotas, and certainly not as a premise of that integral development of the individual that Marx talked about, but as guarantee of the order between the various branches of production, on the one hand, and all social spheres, on the other.[7] The state becomes a committee for managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie to a degree that Engels could not foresee when he wrote that statement. If its bureaucratic apparatus was an already threatening itch in the sweaty folds of the flesh of the old liberal bourgeoisie, it has now become a suppurating scab that surrounds its entire skin. The state, once limited to clearing the obstacles of free capitalist accumulation and apparently situated above the sum of equal individuals that civil society always was for the liberal creed, is increasingly taking on the appearance of a living organism, in which each element of society has its corporatist role and function: an authentic system of links that goes from the executive-administrative direction of public affairs and its military apparatus to the most open and spontaneous organizations; from the hard core of the state to the trade union, to the party, to the press, to the neighborhood association, to the snitch on the balcony and the police without a badge. Up to this point we have limited ourselves to the highest vertex of this system, the bourgeois collective intellectual (which encompasses the state bureaucratic and executive apparatus, Parliament, intelligence and security organizations, lobbies, academia, etc.), and the transmission belts that embed their direction in the whole of society. But “transmission belt” does not mean anything other than the mass line contemplated from the organizational angle: what it is about is the political content that it embodies, and in which the bourgeois political game is deployed without calling into question the hard, economic and executive nerve of its system of domination. Precisely because imperialism neutralizes spontaneity from its very presuppositions, it is preserved as the elemental political logic of the last class society (expression of the anarchy of production), no matter how incorporated it is in the mechanisms of control, discipline and direction of its necessary counterpart, the state. In this game of forces, the bourgeois parties are only distinguished by the degree to which they aspire to carry this incorporation as the last barrier against social decomposition or against the revolutionary overcoming of the system.[8] On the other hand, if this relationship between spontaneous movement and the imperialist state is internal on the general-historical level (which we have analyzed up to this point), on the immediate political level both elements appear as external, one in front of the other. This particularity engenders countless spontaneous illusions in the theoretical vanguard, educated for decades in political empiricism and opportunistic presbyopia. But appearance does not mean fiction; it does not mean unreality. It has a moment of truth, because it is through this gap of relative political exteriority where spontaneity disruptively penetrates official life, and forces it to permanently reconfigure itself in order to once again guarantee the peaceful accumulation of capital. That capital is the continuous revolution of all the conditions of production makes this disruption systematic and inevitable, just as systematic and inevitable is the obligation of the bourgeoisie to find new checkpoints of political balance for incessantly changing conditions. That is the objective content of reform under the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and in the absence of the revolutionary subject —an absence that only today, at the closing of the October Cycle, allows us to contemplate that content in its “purest” form, no longer as a by-product of the proletarian revolution. That is why contemporary bourgeois politics is, necessarily, mass politics, and in the first instance directed at the sector of the masses that stands out in this disruption from its immediate demands: the practical vanguard. As the reader will know, the conquest of the practical vanguard is the central question of the political reconstitution of communism, that is, of the reconstitution of the Communist Party, of the organized revolutionary movement. And blessed be the proletarian intuition of the Comintern, because when it puts the label of social-fascists on the bloodthirsty dogs of the SPD, it does so in the context of that strategic battle for the revolutionary recomposition of the German proletariat after the war.[9] And that is the key to the matter: the practical vanguard. The political crisis of the liberal-parliamentary system, eaten away from below by spontaneous movements that are the living expression of the anarchy of production, has several possible solutions. We will point out, for the purposes of this analysis, the two extremes: the proletarian revolution as a real solution to the problems of the masses, which inevitably involves the (re)constitution of the Communist Party; or the possibility, ultimately and among others, of recomposing the bourgeois order on the basis of an organized, fascist, reactionary mass movement, in which that practical vanguard —the key to spontaneous movement— is incorporated not into the transmission belts of the revolution, but to those of the counterrevolution. This organic fusion tends to suppress, in turn, the liberal coordinates of the traditional political domination of the bourgeoisie, but not in the direction of the proletarian commune state, but in that of the corporatist state, which implies the shrinking of democracy for the ruling class itself and the expulsion from the political game of sectors of the bourgeoisie that once fully participated in it (one of the characteristics that the RL has been pointing out as fundamental to fascism). This is the structural logic of the matter, its conditions of possibility. Whether this possibility becomes an effective reality, and to what degree, is a question that belongs to real historical development; it is at that level, in the concrete analysis of the concrete situation, where it must be examined and determined (political line). In effect, we are talking about a logic: corporatism nests in the depths of the political logic of the imperialist state, and fascism is, considered from this angle, its extreme development, the consummation of the assembling of the masses as the organizational pillar of the state. This is not an apodictic law; it is not about the deterministic, inexorable and finalistic consummation of some premises. In fact, and as we have already said, the very revolutionary nature of the bourgeois mode of production makes any form of state, any political balance reached at this or that moment, in itself something precarious (equilibrium suggests an idea of zero-sum contradictory forces, not a dead, deflated stability). The monopoly of political power by a single faction of the bourgeoisie is an exceptional form, not the normal one for a society based on the production of goods and competition. Therefore, specifically, and preventing both the abuse of this category and its sociological-scientistic deturpation, corporatism expresses a certain correlation of forces, a certain state of the class struggle, whose natural thermometer is the practical vanguard. It is the political nature of its ideas, customs and traditions, that is, of its consciousness, that determines its receptivity to a possible authoritarian or fascist resolution of the crisis of the state, beyond speculations about cold objective, structural and deterministic tendencies that have little to do with the Marxist analysis —and they tend to be behind the simplistic assimilations of imperialist bourgeois democracy and fascism, strictly reduced to repression, or to the open terrorist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, according to the limited formula of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. And yes, in the October Cycle the threat of the proletarian revolution was the factor that precipitated the adoption of the fascist form of domination by the bourgeoisie. But, precisely, the absence of the revolution as an ideological, political, cultural and moral referent for the masses creates a more than favorable environment so that, in situations of social crisis, more or less permanent today, the objective tendency towards corporatism is implemented naturally as the default political logic at all levels of society, including, of course, the practical vanguard of the class. And it is in the latter where the thesis of social-fascism acquires sense. ---...iii. The thesis of social-fascism is the generalization of the Leninist thesis that the spontaneous development of the labor movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology,[10] but seen from the side of the counterrevolutionary role of opportunism when the proletariat has historically conquered its highest form of class organization and split the labor movement. In line with that conception of the state as a chain of links, in which every scoundrel has his place under the black sun of imperialism, it is the bourgeois workers’ party that historically embodies reform, which spontaneously directs the resistance movement of the class (which encompasses all its partial expressions, not only the economic and trade unionist) and which has an immediate responsibility in the formation of the culture, traditions and certainties that define the leaders of said movement, its practical vanguard. For this reason, and if the Communist Party is distinguished from the reformist workers’ party by ideology,[11] the state of said layer expresses not only the degree of social maturity of the proletarian revolution, but also that of the counterrevolution, that of the ideological and political conditions for the constitution of a reactionary mass movement. Since the universal progress that the revolutionary bourgeoisie once advocated died, the feverish apology for the particular improvement that imperialism celebrates cannot have any further purpose than to feed the sectoral, selfish, corporate, gregarious, narrow, mediocre, self-satisfied, accommodating and petty consciousness of the masses, cretinism, opportunism, ignorance, careerism, submission, servility; a culture located a stone’s throw away from the fascist restructuring of the mass movement, with or against the very reformists who fueled it.[12] Right and equality before the law appear incapable of offering more democracy, of offering solutions to the problems of the masses, and must be transgressed if the dominant state of affairs is to be ensured. And there is no longer any place for the liberal preventions of someone like Sieyès, who recommended keeping particular interests out of politics so that the Ré-publique would not degenerate into Ré-totale. Today, the spontaneously reformist character of the imperialist state is generally fed by the same subjective conditions as its authoritarian, fascist transmutation. And this is true for the entire transition from capitalism to communism; the thesis of social-fascism means that “the permanence of the reformist organization type expresses that, in the first place, the process of conscious elevation of the masses towards the place of the communist vanguard is necessarily gradual,”[13] but focused from the point of view of reaction, from the in view of the steps that the bourgeois labor movement takes to preserve its privileges and oppose the revolutionary transformation of the class. This includes, of course, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat too, as Mao perceptively suggested when he referred to the revisionist USSR as social-fascist and pointed out that the People’s Republic of China was under the exact same risk, a risk tragically materialized after 1976. Indeed, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the highest point of the revolutionary class struggle of the Cycle, was also the point of greatest maturity of the counterrevolution: from the point of view of the ideology promoted by the right of the CPC (productivism, material incentives, chauvinism, feminism, etc., all of them painted red) and from the point of view of the political articulation of their counterrevolutionary work. Waving the red flag against the red flag was to raise the Red Guards against the Red Guards, to send the shock workers of the counterrevolution against the shock workers of the revolution; that is, confronting the sectors that were objectively situated in the practical vanguard as it existed under the conditions of socialism and that represented, respectively, the reformist consciousness and the revolutionary consciousness of the class. That is precisely the form that the mature proletarian revolution assumes: civil war between the organized revolutionary masses and the organized counterrevolutionary masses, between the highest form of organization of the proletariat (the Communist Party) and the highest form of organization of the bourgeoisie (the state plus its transmission belts). And it is not at all coincidental that its last line of defense is the reformist workers’ party, the strategist of the counterrevolution, since it is the one which can best pilot its social roots in the last and deepest class war in history by exploiting the spontaneous, reformist consciousness of the proletariat[14] (which is also a negative index of the potentiality of this class, given the objective place it occupies in capitalist social relations and that the bourgeoisie cannot ignore to articulate the political conditions of its domain). The thesis of social-fascism requires, therefore, analyzing the correlation between reaction and revolution at a given moment, and also the class struggles between the fractions of the bourgeoisie itself, especially when, as is the case, the revolution is absent from the social scene. In that sense, we do not need to look further than to the Spain is different cliché: the Spanish state is an imperialist State, where the communist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat are the order of the day, and where the hegemon of the bourgeois labor movement, the PSOE, is amply accredited as the left hand of the bourgeois dictatorship and as its ultra-reactionary spearhead. Since its debut as a party of government after the Transition, Spanish socialism has stood out as an efficient anti-worker manager, it has waged an authentic terrorist war against the Basque national movement, stirring up discord between peoples, and it has enthusiastically joined the military adventures of its imperialist bloc in the former Yugoslavia, in Libya, in Ukraine, etc., in addition to other niceties that would make the list endless. From their ranks have come the González and the Zapateros, the Solanas and the Chacones, the Borrells, the Calvos and other fanatics. There can be no doubt about its sinister nature and the destiny that the proletariat has to reserve for it. Now, when the fraction of financial capital represented by Aznar and the Partido Popular hawks unilaterally broke with part of the old consensus of 1975–1982 (with the intervention in Iraq, the Atlanticist turn at the expense of Europe and the government based on decrees) and spurred a certain fascistic tendency —not so much because of its nostalgic and irredentist rhetoric as because it meant the marginalization of a sector of the ruling class itself, including the labor aristocracy—, the PSOE and everything to its left threw themselves into the mobilizations against the war. And they did not do it, of course, out of anti-war convictions (UGT called a terrifying two-hour strike), but because the strategic interests of the Europeist Spanish state and the right of the sectors represented by the socialists and Izquierda Unida to their piece of the imperialist cake were at stake. Then, they fully demonstrated their ability to redirect the mobilizations of the time to their own benefit (against the war, for the Prestige case, for the lies about 11-M…), without, of course, talking about manipulation or deviation from its natural course: the slogans of the anti-war movement were none other than those of pacifism and its maximum reach was the punishment vote against the Partido Popular. But in a context in which the dominant contradiction in the world was between the imperialist countries and the oppressed peoples, and with the Spanish state going through a time of economic stability, Zapatero’s first government was presented as the restoration of the old consensus, of the old rules of the game, as champion of the essences of liberal democracy against Aznar’s petty partisanship. The political crisis of 2002–2004 did not end with the deepening of the fascist path initiated by Aznarism, but with its interruption and the channeling of social unrest through a greater democratic opening for the labor aristocracy, the bourgeoisies of the oppressed nations and the sectors of the Spanish bourgeoisie marginalized by the Partido Popular—a result that was reflected in the vanguard in the form of an insufferable and demagogic resurrected republicanism, sponsored by Zapatero himself and whose high tide lasted more than a decade. These conditions began to change when the second decade of the century arrived, after the crack of 2008 and with the war in Syria, when the good times ended and the imperialist unilateralism of the United States began to be called into question by Russian and Chinese imperialism. In the Spanish state it was expressed as what we have called Restoration Crisis 2.0, whose first stages were marked by 15-M and the explosion of the national question in Catalonia —an expression of the disorganization of the labor aristocracy and various strata of the Catalonian bourgeoisie, respectively. As the RL pointed out at the time, the rise of Podemos came to demonstrate the total bankruptcy of the schemes of revisionism and the absolute superfluity of the red identity to ride the spontaneous movement and sit in Congress to legislate some small reforms. The 15-M cycle, as left-wing mobilization, inevitably dominated by the spiteful labor aristocracy, yes, but also the embodiment of the deepest social crisis since the Transition, contributed to the development of the revolution in the Spanish state in the sphere in which it is developing today: it unleashed the open crisis of revisionism and catalyzed the proliferation of circles of propagandists attached to the RL, the basis on which it was able to jump from opinion trend to a political movement in its own right. But, at a general social level, 15-M and Podemos did not and could not aspire to anything other than the restoration of the old positions lost by the labor aristocracy, the resolution of the crisis not forward, but backward. Consequently, the Spanish state was its natural and logical framework of action, the venerable democratic institutions were the highest level to which to aspire (that narrow heaven, or lil’heaven, that had to be taken by storm) and the usurpation of the place of the PSOE was the logical and coherent roadmap, not to mention its shameless vocation for the Spanish state to climb positions in the European imperialist chain. But the old social pact laid broken in pieces. It was not the river Rubicon, but the Styx, that re-hashed social democracy was crossing. Contrary to Zapatero’s restauratio, the refoundation of the alliance of the labor aristocracy with the imperialist bourgeoisie could not be carried out with a vulgar parliamentary incantation. The conjured demonic powers ran at their free will, without the sorcerer’s apprentice bothering too much to try to tame them: we have already commented on another occasion[15] about Podemos’ liberal disregard for establishing itself as a mass party, sacrificing links with the spontaneous movement in the altar of Spain and the institutions. This clumsiness of the enemy —which the proletariat must keep in mind even if it cannot afford to always count on it— conditioned the way in which the first act of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was resolved: recovery of the PSOE as hegemon of the bourgeois workers’ party and state party (which has managed to drag Podemos, IU-PCE and a good part of revisionism) and starvation of the 15-M and the Catalan national movement in the face of the arrogance of its reformist and nationalist leaders, certifying their bankruptcy as referents of reformism and of national bourgeois-democratic liberation, respectively. And the chickens have come to roost. By the time the motion of censure against Rajoy triumphs, and especially by the time Unidas Podemos (UP) enters the PSOE government, the spontaneous leftist movement is practically desiccated and the only thing sustaining the most progressive government in history is the permanent state of alarm: first the anti-fascist alert, then the COVID alert and, lately, the Borrellian closing of ranks around the Euro-Atlantic imperialist bloc (with all that this has added to the strengthening of the repressive apparatus of the state). The recent general elections have brought us another helping of emotional blackmail, unity against fascism and hackneyed reactionary clichés about the “two Spains.” All of this not only indicates the discredit and lack of an promising, and even credible, program of the “social-communist” camp, as all political commentators never tire of repeating. It expresses, above all, its objective inability to find the conditions, consensus and rules of the game that establish a new point of political balance for the Spanish state. It is not a problem of lack of will, but rather it is the crisis of the economic foundations of the welfare state, based on technological development sustained by strong public intervention and the more or less continuous increase in the productive force of labor, as well as its rate of exploitation. This model, which with its ups and downs roughly corresponds to an entire cycle, could combine economic growth and international competitiveness with the increase in real wages, the affirmative involvement of the monopolistic-imperialist state in the reproduction of the labor force and the maintenance of a broad public sector —state, regional, provincial and municipal— that redistributed part of the surplus value produced (social security, health, social policies, a large body of civil servants, subsidies for trade unions and their apparatus, etc.). But it all depended on not stopping that movement. This delicate rhythm broke down at the end of the first decade of the century and, at least in the countries of the imperialist West, it is not in sight that can be recomposed without the sacrifice of the material and human surplus. In summary: the labor aristocracy has lost part of its traditional privileges as a reactionary dominant class, and the failed assault on the heavens of 15-M and Podemos has put an end to the old socio-liberal certainties that allowed it to recover its position in 2004–2008. Not in vain, people like Losantos have pointed to Zapatero the Bolivarian as the political father of Iglesias, and from that point of view they are absolutely right. It is an arc that goes from the Comprehensive Law on Gender Violence to the reactionary women’s strike of March 8, 2018 and the law of only “yes” is “yes,” from the federalizing fit of the Miravit Statute and the nation of nations to the lukewarm attitude of Podemos and company in the face of the national oppression of Catalunya (more concerned with marketing than with democracy), from the alliance of civilizations and Moratinos’ multilateralism to the Europeist commitment of the PSOE-UP tandem, from the Law of Historical Memory to the last “red” republican program of revisionism, etc. All these reformist keys have been defining not so much of a style of doing politics, but of the program with which the labor aristocracy and the pactist sector of the bourgeoisie resolved the crisis caused by Aznar’s second term, but which is failing without palliatives to solder the joints that burst with the Restoration Crisis 2.0. The figure of Yolanda Díaz expresses like no other the current volatility and precariousness of the objective bases of the reformist party. On the one hand, revalidation of all the essentials of the Partido Popular’s labor reform, that is, the reform that sanctioned the reduction of the amount of structural participation of the labor aristocracy in the distribution of surplus value.[16] On the other, a large compensatory bribe of 17 million for the trade union centrals in the General State Budgets of 2022 (an increase of almost 100% since the communist minister took possession of the Labor portfolio)… but that, like all bribery of this nature, it is specific and must be revalidated every year, without restoring the position of the trade unions in the state or protecting it from political and electoral wobbles. Irene Montero, for her part, is the one who best personifies the crisis of its subjective foundations. The so-called civil war of feminism and, above all, the scandal of the law of only “yes” is “yes” constitute the natural indicator of the extent to which feminism —not long ago one of those pillars of consensus— has become incapable of generating agreement even within the reformist camp. Of course, much less has the bourgeois workers’ party been able to ingratiate itself with the social sector embodied in VOX and the Partido Popular, whose fight against the Sanchista state is eloquent about the extent to which the unity of the different fractions of the bourgeoisie has broken down to continue dominating jointly or by turnism. And it is clear that the party of the discontented is not, today, on the left side of the bourgeois political spectrum. Progressivism entrenches itself firmly in its old positions; reaction takes action and initiative. The subversives and seditionists jealously defend the current legality; the immobilists cry out for its subversion. The party of rebellion votes against the rebellion; the party of order, against itself. Dynamic Spain stays at home; backward Spain overtakes from the right. Political integrity is represented by a jacket; clientelism, a fanatic of its inexorable principles. The secessionists work diligently for the unity of Spain; the Spainists, for their dissolution. The reds look to the past; the whites, to the future. The sense of state is the interest of the party; politics, technocracy. The conservative party is the PSOE; the revolutionary party, the Civil Guard. ---... In this mess the bourgeoisie is unable to understand itself and cries out for certainty. And in the same way that after the good days came the bad days, after the bad days came the worst days. The current social-chauvinist plague —not at all reducible to a series of organizations or individuals— is the reflection, on the vanguard of the class, of the crisis of the traditional liberal-reformist program, fundamentally shared by revisionism, and the attempt of a fraction of the labor aristocracy to devise an opportunist program of a new style, free of the commitments and complexes that until now gave order to the way this class had of understanding its reactionary political project of shared domination with big capital. That is the entire content of the battles between the undefined left and the politically incorrect inquisitors of progressive postmodernism: whether to preserve the old tactic of the labor aristocracy or look for a new one under the skirts of mature opportunism, with all the intermediate positions and mixed breeds that fit between the two. No one is innocent in this game: the strength with which social-chauvinism has erupted is directly proportional to the tenacity with which the false communists have insisted on selling communism to the trade unionist, republican, feminist and other consensuses for decades, hindering the recovery of revolutionary Marxism as a conception of the world and as an ideological referent for the vanguard itself. They are nothing more than two successive links in the same careerist chain, of the same petty class resentful of the loss of its dusty dominant class privileges. Social-chauvinism thus appears as the opportunist critique of opportunism, at a time when the crisis of the previous reformist program opens the door to a greater reverberation of its revolutionary critique: while revolutionary Marxism champions the consistent application of the right of self-determination against the marketing of small-nation nationalism, social-chauvinism cries out for the unity of Spain; while revolutionary Marxism points out the imperative to destroy the imperialist state, social-chauvinism demands its best executive-police strengthening and its departure from Euro-Atlantic structures to carry out its scavenger foreign policy in a sovereign manner and without supposed restraints; while revolutionary Marxism shoots against the plural left due to the reactionary nature of the construction of the movement as a sum of partial fronts, social-chauvinism does so due to its workerist exclusivism; while revolutionary Marxism takes aim at feminism for its counterrevolutionary and corporatist nature, social-chauvinism criticizes it for its inability to serve its political project, that is, for not being corporatist enough (hence it contrasts feminist corporatism with the equally reactionary and identity-based trade unionist, workerist corporatism); while the war cry of revolutionary Marxism is proletarians of all countries, unite!, social-chauvinism sobs over the borders and masturbates morbidly with nonsense about the Hispanosphere and Anglo-German capitalism, with the Spanish workers’ nation, with one country for the working class, etc., etc. This ideological shift within the theoretical vanguard carries with it the possibility that the bulk of the population, and especially that decisive practical vanguard, ends up conflating communism with social-chauvinism and the squadron, para-police rhetoric, in which a not inconsiderable part of the theoretical vanguard frolics today. This last question not only determines the political profit that this trend can obtain in the short term, especially when the Spanish political panorama has ostensibly turned to the right and when there are many bourgeois cadres who keep an eye on the left without complexes (as yesterday they kept them on the plural left). It also poses a strategic problem for the reconstitution of communism, to the extent that it stokes national distrust in the name of socialism and distributes its indigestible ideological stew among the masses, discrediting Marxist (further) and making it difficult the fight to recover its referentiality. Not only among the theoretical vanguard; in the practical vanguard too, making it more receptive to chauvinist and authoritarian demagoguery as a way to solve the crisis, which would already place us on the threshold of a possible fascist mass movement. This may force a considerable tactical adjustment of the Plan of Reconstitution, to the extent that communism would find itself in contradiction between the low degree of development of its reconstitution (today ideological, centered on the theoretical vanguard of the class) and the development of a reactionary, fascist, mass movement (the fight against which requires mechanisms that, by their nature, are rather located in the set of tasks corresponding to the political reconstitution, to the reconstitution of the Communist Party). If the previous chapter of the Restoration Crisis 2.0 was the swan song of the old dogmas, in the present arc the articulation of the new ones is played out. Regarding the vanguard of the working class, it can be expected that the development of the social-chauvinist trend will either distance it from all problems related to communism and party construction, or will continue to digest “classical” revisionism and channel its crisis into the direction of building a new revisionist political platform that is more or less operational and opportunistically mature. Both possibilities can occur. In that sense, social-chauvinism has an advantage, both because it rows in favor of the political current of the Spanish state and because its hysterical representatives are taking the task of conquering public opinion and weaving a minimum ideological harmony with their audience very seriously, exploiting precisely the bankruptcy of the previous reformist cycle and the fatigue of a good part of the vanguard with its clichés and fetishes. On the other hand, we are already seeing that the posthumous heralds of the latter respond to the development of social-chauvinism in the vanguard by attempting to reverse history and insisting on the old plural reformist program and the old multicolored “communism” (the “sum of struggles”), despite the fact that it has failed, despite the fact that its failure has been the immediate cause of the Spanish fever and despite the fact that this bet leads them to greater political irrelevance as the crisis of the state deepens. Revolutionary Marxism takes no sides here, and the proletariat is only responsible for denouncing the ones and the others and the internal bond that unites them, which is what substantiates the thesis of social-fascism in the current circumstances of the class struggle in the Spanish state and, in particular, in the field of the theoretical vanguard. Only the consistent application of the Plan of Reconstitution will allow the crisis of revisionism to be translated into the development of the revolution, which today requires the construction of a vanguard referent and, in particular, the defense of proletarian internationalism and the unconditional fight against social-chauvinism. These are the inalienable bases of the revolutionary political line today. ---...iii. We can only move forward. If Esau, the disowned, is to rise and break the yoke from his neck, he will do so knowing that we do not have reserves in the rear to back us up nor a stronger wall to shield our men from disaster. --  Committee for Reconstitution. (Spanish State). August 2023 --..   Notes [1] “The Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: 1. In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2. In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section working-class parties of every of the country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.” MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. The Communist Manifesto. Penguin Classics. London, 2014, pp. 342–343. [2] “Lenin is the first great revolutionary leader to adopt the position of the strategist in the political leadership of the proletarian class struggle. . . . Unlike the barricade leader, who can only direct a military action, who identifies himself with it and who makes the entire course of the struggle depend on that action alone, thereby reducing all the capacity, intensity and depth of the political movement to the extent that a few tactical maneuvers can confer, Lenin, on the other hand, applies to the leadership of the movement a strategic perspective, that is, the method of combining tactical actions according to the strategic objective, always subordinating the former to the latter and using absolutely all possible means, political and military, in relation to each phase of the movement.” New Orientation on the Path of the Reconstitution of the Communist Party, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/Documentos/Fundamentales/NO_idiomas/Nueva_Orientacion_I_ENG.html [Bold from source – Editor’s Note.] [3] It is interesting that the science of geopolitics emerged at this same time, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, and is the closest thing to what we could call the subjectivity of imperialism. To the extent that capital accumulation is carried out at a global level and to the extent that any pre-capitalist geographical outside or only formally subsumed by capital disappears; to that extent, we say, the geostrategic doctrine of each imperialist state expresses its self-consciousness of the (geo)political conditions of the reproduction of its position in the process of capital accumulation, as well as those of its rise in the imperialist chain. It is enough to consider the theories of Mackinder, Ratzel/Haushofer and Spykman/Mahan, which correspond, clearly and respectively, with the position and expectations of British, German and American imperialism throughout the last century, in the same way as the rise of China today defines its Far Seas doctrine. But this topic, although suggestive, is not the subject of this work. [4] “Left-Wing” Communism—an Infantile Disorder; in LENIN, V. I. Collected Works, volume 31. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 85. [5] Ibidem, p. 50. [6] “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. In this regard, see El sindicalismo que viene [The Trade Unionism to Come]; in LA FORJA # 35, 2006, pp. 50–63. [7] Ellas quieren la libertad y el comunismo [Women Want Freedom and Communism], in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #6, December 2021, p. 39. [8] “The fact that imperialism is parasitic or decaying capitalism is manifested first of all in the tendency to decay, which is characteristic of every monopoly under the system of private ownership of the means of production. The difference between the democratic-republican and the reactionary-monarchist imperialist bourgeoisie is obliterated precisely because they are both rotting alive.” LENIN: C. W., vol. 23, p. 106 [Bold our own – Editor’s Note.] [9] An example of how, for the KPD in the late 1920s, the practical vanguard was not focused in the trade unions: “Such men [magnates line Krupp, Stumm, Thyssen, etc.] tended, with varying emphases, to resist unionization and reject the idea of collective bargaining. During the war, however, they had softened their antagonism under the impact of growing state interference in labour relations, and on 15 November 1918 business and the unions, represented respectively by Hugo Stinnes and Carl Legien, signed a pact establishing a new framework of collective bargaining, including recognition of the eight-hour day. Both sides had an interest in warding off the threat of sweeping socialization from the extreme left, and the agreement preserved the existing structure of big business while giving the unions equal representation on a nationwide network of joint bargaining committees. Like other elements of the Wilhelmine establishment, big business accepted the Republic because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.” EVANS, R. J. The Coming of the Third Reich. The Penguin Press. New York, 2004, pp. 112–113. [10] What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement; in LENIN, C. W., v. 5, p. 384. [11] Thesis of Reconstitution of the Communist Party, p. 9, available at: https://reconstitucion.net/Documentos/Fundamentales/Tesis_idiomas/Tesis_Reconstitucion_PC_ENG.pdf [12] At the beginning of 1933, as “the political repression and marginalization of the Social Democrats rapidly became more obvious, so the trade unions under Theodor Leipart began to try to preserve their existence by distancing themselves from the Social Democratic Party and seeking an accommodation with the new regime. On 21 March the leadership denied any intention of playing a role in politics and declared that it was prepared to carry out the social function of the trade unions ‘whatever the kind of state regime’ in power. . . . On 28 April they concluded an agreement with the Christian and Liberal Trade Unions that was intended to form the first step towards a complete unification of all trade unions in a single national organization.” EVANS: Op. cit., pp. 355–356. [13] Thesis of Reconstitution, p. 7. [14] This problem was clearly seen, although from liberal coordinates, by some of the most astute scholars of the Cultural Revolution: “[Mao] shares at least one conviction with Western liberals: that, while the difference between paternalistic socialism and fascism is a real one, the line between them is easily crossed. The Kuomintang crossed it; Mao believes that the Soviet Union has crossed it; and he fears that his own party is only a few short steps from it. . . . To both Mao and his liberal opponents in China, the enemy is the same: bureaucracy; but they diverge entirely on the means by which it should be combated. The liberals believe, essentially, in gradually improving the elite. Mao believes in destroying the foundations of the elite. He faces one of the fundamental problems of politics: the tendency for a levelling revolution to produce its own new privileged establishment. But he does not hope to defeat this possibility, as is widely believed in the West, simply by perpetually recurrent, disruptive mass protest.” GRAY, J.; CAVENDISH, P. Chinese Communism In Crisis. Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. Frederick A. Praeger. New York, 1968, pp. 67–68. [15] Editorial: Ni nueva normalidad, ni vieja normalidad: ¡Revolución o barbarie! [Neither New Normalcy, Nor Old Normalcy: Revolution or Barbarism!]; in LÍNEA PROLETARIA #5, December 2020, pp. 12–13. [16] The difficulties posed to temporary hiring, for their part, have already been successfully circumvented by the natural laws of competition: employers, large and small, quickly learned to use the trial period as an efficient substitute for the temporary contract. Dismissals before the end of the trial period (which do not require prior notice, reasoned cause, or compensation) skyrocketed by 620% last year: if in 2021 there were 75 000 employees who did not exceed said period, the end of 2022 recorded a total of 540 000.

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